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Pakistan

The cost of lost progress

The News Pakistan

Published: 21 Nov 2026, 06:56 PM

The cost of lost progress

Photo: Reuters

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Pakistan’s poverty crisis is no longer simply a story of high and persistent deprivation. By 2018-19, national poverty had declined substantially to 21.9%, down from 64.3% in 2001-02.

However, almost six years later, poverty has again risen to 29%, and the country has lost much of the progress it made during the last two decades.

The recently published report by the World Bank, ‘Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan (MENAAP) Economic Update: From Divide to Opportunity: AI, Jobs, and Growth’, provides a sobering picture of Pakistan’s deteriorating position, both in terms of its own historical experience and in comparison with other developing economies.

According to the update, Pakistan accounts for almost half of the extreme-poor population across the MENAAP region, while it represents only 30% of its total population.

This figure does not tell you anything about the proportion of Pakistan’s population living in poverty. Nevertheless, such a disproportionate share is alarming and certainly a verdict on Pakistan’s development trajectory.

A country that has achieved significant progress in reducing poverty over the past two decades has become increasingly vulnerable to reversing those gains, to the point that its performance now compares with that of countries once considered less prosperous.

These latest statistics raise some serious questions that need to be addressed carefully regarding the sustainability of the poverty gains the country once made.

To begin with, how did Pakistan become the ‘sick man’ of MENAAP, and what does this disproportion tell us? The fact that Pakistan accounts for almost half of MENAAP’s extreme poverty suggests that the country’s poverty problem is a consequence of a combination of a large population and a high poverty incidence.

However, comparisons with countries like Nigeria, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo should be understood in terms of specific poverty indicators rather than taken to mean that these countries share identical economic structures and circumstances.

The description of Pakistan as the sick man of the MENAAP region might be provocative, but it raises other serious questions: how did a country with considerable agricultural resources, a large domestic market and a sizeable workforce reach this position?

Also, has poverty in Pakistan always been this high? Well, certainly not. If so, why did the country’s poverty reduction prove so fragile and vulnerable to economic and climate shocks?

The answer to these questions cannot be found in one economic crisis or one government. It reflects a prolonged failure to create sustained, broad-based economic growth that translates into better living standards for ordinary households.

The country’s poverty experience since 2000 – a useful starting point because this period offers a more consistent basis for tracking changes in poverty in terms of the choice of poverty line, welfare measures and estimation methodologies – can be understood through three distinct phases.

First, a substantial decline in the poverty rate from 2000 onwards until 2007-08; second, a slowdown in poverty reduction and rising vulnerability (2008-2018); third, a reversal of poverty reduction gains from 2018 onwards.

There is broad agreement among academics and development policy experts that poverty declined across all measures during the first decade of the 21st century in Pakistan.

The literature largely attributes this sharp decline to the interaction of economic growth, structural transformation towards non-farm activities, the expansion of employment opportunities and higher remittance inflows.

Together, these developments translated into broad-based improvements in household consumption levels and, given Pakistan’s consumption-based poverty measurement, rapid declines in poverty rates.

However, differences remained in the literature regarding the relative significance of the drivers of poverty reduction.

While some studies identify economic growth and improvements in the labour market as key determinants of poverty reduction during the early 2000s, others place greater importance on factors such as a surge in remittances, urbanisation, livelihood diversification or demographic changes.

Likewise, there has been considerable debate about whether welfare gains reflect improvements in labour earnings or substantial support from external income transfers, since most studies contend that poverty reduction did not occur due to redistribution. In fact, economic growth remained uneven across regions and socio-economic groups.

During phase II of the poverty trajectory, from 2008 onwards, the literature points to a clear and credible conclusion: poverty reduction slowed and welfare gains became fragile. It highlights two to three emerging issues in Pakistan’s poverty trajectory after 2007-08.

First, poverty continued to decline through 2018-19; however, the mechanism underlying this decline weakened and became increasingly contingent on compensatory rather than transformative processes. Economic growth remained an important driver of poverty reduction, but slower and volatile growth constrained the expansion of productive employment.

Second, rising returns to non-farm work continued to support household income even during the high-inflation period, particularly for rural households. However, much of this employment was informal and insecure, limiting the creation of stable salaried employment, while low female labour force participation depleted the benefits achieved during the preceding decade.

Third, remittances and social safety nets, particularly BISP, increasingly cushioned households against domestic economic pressures as inflation eroded some of their purchasing power gains. However, the literature on cash transfers points to an important distinction between protecting households from poverty and permanently moving them out of poverty. Cash transfers improved consumption for many beneficiaries, but their small size and the persistence of poverty among recipients constrained their transformative potential.

Also, the national poverty headcount conceals spatial variations, and a continued decline in the national poverty headcount obscured the fragility of the underlying welfare gains. The literature shows that a large proportion of households were concentrated just above the poverty line, with vulnerability increasing over time. By 2018-19, poverty had reached its lowest recorded level, yet the achievement rested on a population whose economic security remained highly uneven and vulnerable. Thus, the significance of this phase lies in the growing fragility and unevenness of welfare gains rather than a continued fall in poverty.

The post-2018 period, in contrast to the previous phases, shows an erosion and eventual reversal of earlier gains. However, the absence of household survey data after 2018-19 made it difficult to observe the evolution of poverty directly. The World Bank brought this development into focus in 2025, and later the HIES 2024-25 provided direct evidence of that reversal.

The central argument emerging from the literature is more complex than simply stating that poverty has ‘returned’. Pakistan experienced an insufficiently resilient exit from poverty. Millions of households genuinely improved their consumption; however, a substantial proportion remained vulnerable and only marginally above the poverty threshold. The emergence of an aspiring but vulnerable middle class was an important, but often overlooked, outcome of the earlier poverty reduction.

During periods of high inflation or slow growth, these households are likely to fall back into poverty rapidly, leading to sharp swings in national poverty rates. This narrow upward mobility explains why progress made over the years was reversed within a short period.

The underlying fragility of Pakistan’s poverty reduction became evident as soon as the economy was hit by a succession of shocks that reinforced one another from 2020 onwards. For instance, the Covid-19 pandemic disrupted incomes, informal employment and small businesses; the subsequent global food and energy price hikes increased the cost of living; the flash floods in the latter half of 2022 destroyed agricultural assets, houses and livelihoods; and further macroeconomic adjustment weakened employment and purchasing power.

The broader lesson is therefore that crossing the poverty line is not equivalent to escaping economic vulnerability. Pakistan’s earlier growth model was effective at generating a large-scale exit from poverty, but much less effective at creating the productive employment, human capital, assets and resilience required to sustain those gains.

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