Photo: Reuters
Pakistan’s poverty crisis is no longer simply a story of high and persistent deprivation. By 2018-19, national poverty had declined substantially to 21.9%, down from 64.3% in 2001-02.
However, almost six years later, poverty has again
risen to 29%, and the country has lost much of the progress it made during the
last two decades.
The recently published report by the World Bank,
‘Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan (MENAAP) Economic Update:
From Divide to Opportunity: AI, Jobs, and Growth’, provides a sobering picture
of Pakistan’s deteriorating position, both in terms of its own historical
experience and in comparison with other developing economies.
According to the update, Pakistan accounts for
almost half of the extreme-poor population across the MENAAP region, while it
represents only 30% of its total population.
This figure does not tell you anything about the proportion
of Pakistan’s population living in poverty. Nevertheless, such a
disproportionate share is alarming and certainly a verdict on Pakistan’s
development trajectory.
A country that has achieved significant progress in
reducing poverty over the past two decades has become increasingly vulnerable
to reversing those gains, to the point that its performance now compares with
that of countries once considered less prosperous.
These latest statistics raise some serious questions
that need to be addressed carefully regarding the sustainability of the poverty
gains the country once made.
To begin with, how did Pakistan become the ‘sick
man’ of MENAAP, and what does this disproportion tell us? The fact that
Pakistan accounts for almost half of MENAAP’s extreme poverty suggests that the
country’s poverty problem is a consequence of a combination of a large
population and a high poverty incidence.
However, comparisons with countries like Nigeria,
Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo should be understood in terms of
specific poverty indicators rather than taken to mean that these countries
share identical economic structures and circumstances.
The description of Pakistan as the sick man of the
MENAAP region might be provocative, but it raises other serious questions: how
did a country with considerable agricultural resources, a large domestic market
and a sizeable workforce reach this position?
Also, has poverty in Pakistan always been this high?
Well, certainly not. If so, why did the country’s poverty reduction prove so
fragile and vulnerable to economic and climate shocks?
The answer to these questions cannot be found in one
economic crisis or one government. It reflects a prolonged failure to create
sustained, broad-based economic growth that translates into better living
standards for ordinary households.
The country’s poverty experience since 2000 – a
useful starting point because this period offers a more consistent basis for
tracking changes in poverty in terms of the choice of poverty line, welfare
measures and estimation methodologies – can be understood through three
distinct phases.
First, a substantial decline in the poverty rate
from 2000 onwards until 2007-08; second, a slowdown in poverty reduction and
rising vulnerability (2008-2018); third, a reversal of poverty reduction gains
from 2018 onwards.
There is broad agreement among academics and
development policy experts that poverty declined across all measures during the
first decade of the 21st century in Pakistan.
The literature largely attributes this sharp decline
to the interaction of economic growth, structural transformation towards
non-farm activities, the expansion of employment opportunities and higher
remittance inflows.
Together, these developments translated into broad-based improvements in household consumption levels and, given Pakistan’s consumption-based poverty measurement, rapid declines in poverty rates.
However, differences remained in the literature
regarding the relative significance of the drivers of poverty reduction.
While some studies identify economic growth and
improvements in the labour market as key determinants of poverty reduction
during the early 2000s, others place greater importance on factors such as a
surge in remittances, urbanisation, livelihood diversification or demographic
changes.
Likewise, there has been considerable debate about
whether welfare gains reflect improvements in labour earnings or substantial
support from external income transfers, since most studies contend that poverty
reduction did not occur due to redistribution. In fact, economic growth
remained uneven across regions and socio-economic groups.
During phase II of the poverty trajectory, from 2008
onwards, the literature points to a clear and credible conclusion: poverty
reduction slowed and welfare gains became fragile. It highlights two to three
emerging issues in Pakistan’s poverty trajectory after 2007-08.
First, poverty continued to decline through 2018-19;
however, the mechanism underlying this decline weakened and became increasingly
contingent on compensatory rather than transformative processes. Economic
growth remained an important driver of poverty reduction, but slower and
volatile growth constrained the expansion of productive employment.
Second, rising returns to non-farm work continued to
support household income even during the high-inflation period, particularly
for rural households. However, much of this employment was informal and
insecure, limiting the creation of stable salaried employment, while low female
labour force participation depleted the benefits achieved during the preceding
decade.
Third, remittances and social safety nets,
particularly BISP, increasingly cushioned households against domestic economic
pressures as inflation eroded some of their purchasing power gains. However,
the literature on cash transfers points to an important distinction between
protecting households from poverty and permanently moving them out of poverty.
Cash transfers improved consumption for many beneficiaries, but their small
size and the persistence of poverty among recipients constrained their
transformative potential.
Also, the national poverty headcount conceals
spatial variations, and a continued decline in the national poverty headcount
obscured the fragility of the underlying welfare gains. The literature shows
that a large proportion of households were concentrated just above the poverty
line, with vulnerability increasing over time. By 2018-19, poverty had reached
its lowest recorded level, yet the achievement rested on a population whose
economic security remained highly uneven and vulnerable. Thus, the significance
of this phase lies in the growing fragility and unevenness of welfare gains
rather than a continued fall in poverty.
The post-2018 period, in contrast to the previous
phases, shows an erosion and eventual reversal of earlier gains. However, the
absence of household survey data after 2018-19 made it difficult to observe the
evolution of poverty directly. The World Bank brought this development into
focus in 2025, and later the HIES 2024-25 provided direct evidence of that
reversal.
The central argument emerging from the literature is
more complex than simply stating that poverty has ‘returned’. Pakistan
experienced an insufficiently resilient exit from poverty. Millions of households
genuinely improved their consumption; however, a substantial proportion
remained vulnerable and only marginally above the poverty threshold. The
emergence of an aspiring but vulnerable middle class was an important, but
often overlooked, outcome of the earlier poverty reduction.
During periods of high inflation or slow growth,
these households are likely to fall back into poverty rapidly, leading to sharp
swings in national poverty rates. This narrow upward mobility explains why
progress made over the years was reversed within a short period.
The underlying fragility of Pakistan’s poverty
reduction became evident as soon as the economy was hit by a succession of
shocks that reinforced one another from 2020 onwards. For instance, the
Covid-19 pandemic disrupted incomes, informal employment and small businesses;
the subsequent global food and energy price hikes increased the cost of living;
the flash floods in the latter half of 2022 destroyed agricultural assets,
houses and livelihoods; and further macroeconomic adjustment weakened
employment and purchasing power.
The broader lesson is therefore that crossing the
poverty line is not equivalent to escaping economic vulnerability. Pakistan’s
earlier growth model was effective at generating a large-scale exit from
poverty, but much less effective at creating the productive employment, human
capital, assets and resilience required to sustain those gains.
