Pakistan brings One China policy to its airspace

Reports that Pakistan had last month barred two Taiwanese airlines, its state carrier China Airlines and private carrier EVA Air, from transiting through its airspace raised questions about Islamabad’s interpretation of the One China policy and the extent of Beijing’s influence over its decisions.

Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif said, “The aviation division follows the One China policy, only mainland China is allowed.” The move was all the more unusual given that even China does not impose such restrictions on Taiwanese commercial airlines.

The ban was abruptly reversed, with both airlines granted access to Pakistani airspace until 27 March 2027. This is only a temporary arrangement, however, and no explanation has been given about what happens after the deadline.

Pakistan and Taiwan have few substantive ties. Islamabad strictly adheres to the One China policy and maintains an “ironclad friendship” with China. Pakistan’s limited links with Taiwan include just over 900 Pakistani nationals (Opens in new window) living there, including students, restaurant owners and other professionals.

There is no representative office, nor has there ever been one. There are also no direct flights between the two sides. The only air connection between South Asia and Taiwan is the Taipei–Delhi route (Opens in new window), which is scheduled to resume on 1 December.

The ban goes beyond what Pakistan’s adherence to the One China policy would normally require. Islamabad is among its strongest adherents, regularly reaffirming its commitment and unconditionally supporting China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, including its position on Taiwan.

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At the risk of simplifying a complex issue, a strict adherence, like that of Pakistan’s, generally means opposing Taiwan’s independence, accepting Beijing’s claim that Taiwan is part of China, and not maintaining official ties with Taipei.

However, countries interpret the policy differently. Some that adhere to it still maintain trade ties and unofficial offices in Taiwan. The policy does not entail that countries deny Taiwanese commercial airlines permission to transit through their airspace. Such permission is a matter of civil aviation arrangements.

Countries have restricted Taiwanese flights on political grounds. In April this year, Seychelles, Mauritius and Madagascar withdrew overflight permissions for Taiwan’s incumbent President Lai Ching-te’s planned trip to Eswatini, Taiwan’s only remaining diplomatically in Africa. But, restricting a presidential flight is an entirely different issue from denying overflight rights to commercial airlines.

So, what could have prompted the decision? Was it an extension of China’s grey-zone activities, or a show of loyalty arising from the China-Pakistan all-weather friendship?

There are two possible explanations for Pakistan’s decision. The first is that China asked Pakistan to impose the ban to reinforce the One China policy, discourage international engagement with Taiwan and demonstrate Beijing’s influence over its partners. Pakistan remains one of China’s most reliable supporters of its position on Taiwan.

The second possibility is that Pakistan imposed the ban on its own initiative to show its loyalty to China, particularly at a time when it is seeking closer ties with the United States. The Makkah Pact may have added to Islamabad’s incentive to reassure Beijing.

Meanwhile, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a flagship component of the Belt and Road Initiative, has become a security liability rather than a strategic and economic asset for Beijing.

Against this backdrop, the ban may have been a token gesture to show that Pakistan’s efforts to move closer to Washington have not come at the expense of its relationship with China.

Although overflight permissions have since been restored, at least for the time being, the message to Beijing is already delivered.

Pakistani airspace is useful for Taiwanese flights travelling to Middle East and Europe. If there is a renewed ban after the March 2027 deadline, it may not have major long-term implications for Taiwan, but rerouting would add to the duration and cost of operating these routes.

The episode is also a reminder that Pakistan wants to remain useful to China and is willing to demonstrate that usefulness through decisions affecting Taiwan.

The greater concern is whether this sets a precedent. China could use similar pressure to influence other countries that are close to Beijing and strongly adhere to the One China policy, creating problems for Taiwanese airlines, particularly given Taipei’s lack of representation in the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).

Restrictions on commercial aviation can potentially become another means of exerting pressure on Taiwan.

The decision is further evidence of China’s already formidable influence over Pakistan and Islamabad’s willingness to go further in demonstrating its loyalty to Beijing. But it does little for Pakistan. Applying the One China policy to commercial aviation imposes a restriction with little benefit beyond political signalling.

More problematic is Pakistan’s readiness to extend its interpretation of the policy into areas not traditionally associated with it, adding new dimensions to and further complicating an already complex issue.