The International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) judgment of 19 November 2026, finding Myanmar responsible for committing genocide against the Rohingya in northern Rakhine State, represents a defining moment for international justice. The Court ordered Myanmar to investigate suspected perpetrators, prosecute and punish them where warranted, provide guarantees against recurrence, facilitate the safe, voluntary and dignified return of displaced Rohingya, restore or replace lost property, provide rehabilitation and compensate victims. The judgment is final and binding on the parties. Yet its legal authority does not automatically translate into enforcement. The central challenge is whether the United Nations can translate this judicial determination into meaningful consequences for Myanmar, given that the Security Council, the institution primarily responsible for international peace and security, is unlikely to agree on coercive action.
The immediate political reality is discouraging. Bangladesh should not expect the Security Council to adopt meaningful punitive measures against Myanmar, particularly sanctions under Chapter VII, an arms embargo or an International Criminal Court referral. Under Article 27 of the UN Charter, substantive decisions require at least nine affirmative votes and no negative vote from any of the five permanent members.
China’s strategic investments and security interests in Myanmar, alongside Russia’s military and diplomatic ties with its authorities, make meaningful Security Council action, including sanctions, an arms embargo or an ICC referral, unlikely. Although the United States and European powers may support stronger accountability, neither can overcome a Chinese or Russian veto. Bangladesh, with procedural help from The Gambia, must therefore look beyond the Security Council and strategically mobilise the UN General Assembly, using Resolutions 76/262 and 377 A(V) to sustain international scrutiny, build diplomatic support and advance implementation of the ICJ judgment.
The Council's recent record reinforces this assessment. In December 2022, it adopted Resolution 2669, its first resolution specifically addressing Myanmar, by 12 votes in favour and three abstentions. China, Russia and India abstained rather than exercising a veto. The resolution called for an immediate end to violence and the release of arbitrarily detained prisoners. However, by March 2026, the Security Council Report observed that, since that resolution, the Council had managed to agree on only one additional product concerning Myanmar: a press statement following the April 2025 earthquake. A proposed British draft resolution in August 2024 was withdrawn after China and Russia opposed the initiative and declined to engage in negotiations on its text. These developments demonstrate the difference between securing limited diplomatic agreement and obtaining meaningful enforcement action. The Council may still agree on humanitarian language or calls for restraint, but the prospects for binding sanctions, military restrictions or coercive accountability measures remain poor.
This is why Bangladesh must avoid making Security Council action the sole measure of success. The more realistic approach is to pursue two institutional tracks simultaneously: first, bring Myanmar's non-compliance before the Security Council through the procedure established under Article 94(2) of the UN Charter; second, mobilise the General Assembly to generate international political pressure, coordinate collective responses and establish mechanisms that can continue operating even when the Security Council is paralysed.
Article 94(2) provides the immediate legal route. It allows a state party to an ICJ case, when the opposing party fails to perform its obligations under the judgment, to have recourse to the Security Council. In this case, The Gambia, not Bangladesh, is the applicant state entitled to invoke that provision. Bangladesh should therefore work closely with The Gambia to develop a coordinated diplomatic and legal initiative requesting an urgent Security Council meeting and specific measures to give effect to the judgment. The Council could consider recommendations or measures addressing compliance, international monitoring, humanitarian access and the protection of the Rohingya. However, Article 94(2) does not automatically oblige the Council to impose sanctions or take enforcement action. Its wording leaves the Council discretion, and a substantive decision remains subject to Article 27 and the permanent members' veto powers. The Gambia's referral is therefore necessary, but it cannot by itself resolve the enforcement problem.
Here comes the UN General Assembly, which offers a potentially more effective diplomatic avenue. Although it cannot exercise the Security Council's Chapter VII enforcement powers, it is not powerless when the Council fails to act. Articles 10 and 11 of the UN Charter authorise the Assembly to discuss matters relating to international peace and security and make recommendations to member states or the Security Council. Article 13 provides authority to promote international cooperation and the progressive development of international law, while Article 14 allows recommendations concerning situations affecting international welfare and relations among nations. Article 22 authorises the Assembly to establish subsidiary organs necessary to perform its functions. These provisions give the General Assembly considerable political and institutional capacity to address the consequences of Myanmar's non-compliance.
The legal distinction is important. General Assembly resolutions are generally recommendatory rather than binding, and the Assembly cannot independently impose mandatory Chapter VII sanctions, authorise coercive military enforcement or overturn a Security Council veto. Nevertheless, the International Court of Justice's 1962 Certain Expenses of the United Nations advisory opinion recognised that the Security Council's responsibility for international peace and security is primary, not exclusive. The Assembly retains a complementary responsibility, including the authority to recommend measures and establish subsidiary bodies for investigation, observation and supervision. Its political legitimacy derives from the participation of all 193 UN member states, each possessing one vote. Recommendations on important questions, including international peace and security, require a two-thirds majority of members present and voting. A sufficiently broad coalition can therefore give the international response a degree of legitimacy and diplomatic weight that a divided Security Council cannot provide.
The most important instrument available to Bangladesh is General Assembly Resolution 377A(V), adopted on 3 November 1950 and commonly known as Uniting for Peace. It establishes that when the Security Council fails to exercise its primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security due to disagreement among the permanent members, the General Assembly may immediately consider the situation and recommend collective measures. If the Assembly is not in session, an Emergency Special Session can be convened within 24 hours following a request by the Security Council or a majority of UN member states. The procedure has been used in major international crises, including Korea, the Suez Crisis and Ukraine. It provides an institutional response to precisely the kind of paralysis that Bangladesh may encounter in the Myanmar case.
Bangladesh should therefore prepare to use Uniting for Peace if a Chinese or Russian veto blocks meaningful Security Council action. The diplomatic sequence should begin with The Gambia's Article 94(2) referral and a request for an urgent Security Council meeting. If a substantive draft is vetoed, Bangladesh should immediately mobilise a cross-regional coalition to seek an Emergency Special Session. The objective should not simply be to condemn the veto. It should be to secure a comprehensive General Assembly resolution demanding compliance with the ICJ judgment, recommending coordinated measures by states parties to the Genocide Convention and establishing a continuing mechanism for monitoring implementation. This would not legally compel the Security Council to reverse its position, but it would make its inaction more visible, politically costly and difficult to justify.
Another important instrument is General Assembly Resolution 76/262, adopted in April 2022, which established a standing mandate for a General Assembly debate whenever a permanent member exercises its veto in the Security Council. Under this procedure, the President of the General Assembly must convene a formal meeting within ten working days of a veto, provided the Assembly is not already meeting in an Emergency Special Session on the same situation. The vetoing permanent member is expected to explain its position before the wider membership. Bangladesh should use this mechanism to ensure that any veto blocking action on Myanmar is followed by a formal international debate. It creates an opportunity for states to question the legal and political justification for blocking measures intended to implement a binding international judgment. The procedure does not remove the veto, but it transforms its exercise into a matter of broader institutional accountability.
The political significance of the General Assembly becomes even greater when viewed against the position of the Rohingya as a protected population and the international community's obligations under the Genocide Convention. The ICJ judgment confirms that the prevention and punishment of genocide are not merely bilateral concerns between The Gambia and Myanmar. They involve obligations owed to all state parties to the Convention. In its jurisprudence, the Court has recognised the collective legal interest of states parties in compliance with obligations under the Convention. The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility, particularly Article 41, also provide that states must cooperate through lawful means to bring serious breaches of peremptory international norms to an end and must not recognise as lawful situations created by such breaches or render aid or assistance in maintaining them. The precise application of these principles to individual national policies requires legal assessment, but they provide a basis for Bangladesh to encourage states to review military cooperation, arms transfers, financial relationships and other forms of support that could contribute to the continuation of unlawful conduct.
The General Assembly can translate the principles enshrined in its charter into coordinated recommendations. It can encourage member states to adopt targeted national sanctions against individuals reasonably implicated in atrocities, restrict military cooperation and arms transfers, scrutinise financial transactions involving military-owned enterprises and strengthen investigations into credible allegations of complicity. These would be national or regional measures, not sanctions imposed directly by the Assembly. The distinction matters because Bangladesh must pursue a legally defensible strategy that does not overstate the Assembly's authority. The objective should be to create coordinated pressure through national legal systems, regional organisations and existing international accountability institutions.
A further opportunity lies in establishing or strengthening an international monitoring and compliance mechanism under Article 22 of the UN Charter. Bangladesh should propose a General Assembly initiative that regularly assesses Myanmar's implementation of the ICJ judgment. Its mandate should include monitoring legislative reform, investigations and prosecutions, protection against further persecution, restitution of Rohingya property, humanitarian access and conditions for safe return. It should also examine Myanmar's compliance with the Court's orders concerning rehabilitation and compensation. Such a mechanism could publish periodic assessments and report directly to the General Assembly. Its work should be coordinated with the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), whose evidence and investigative work contributed significantly to the ICJ proceedings. Strengthening existing institutions may be more efficient than creating an entirely new investigative body.
The question of an international criminal tribunal also deserves serious consideration. In her 2019 article, Accountability for Crimes against the Rohingya: Possibilities for the General Assembly where the Security Council Fails, published in the Journal of International Criminal Justice, legal scholar Rebecca Barber examined whether the General Assembly could establish an ad hoc international criminal tribunal when the Security Council fails to act. Barber argued that the Assembly's powers under the UN Charter, its historical practise and the Uniting for Peace framework could provide a basis for establishing such a body, although it would lack the coercive powers of a Security Council-created tribunal. This proposal warrants further legal examination, given the November 2026 judgment. A General Assembly-sponsored tribunal would face serious practical and jurisdictional limitations, particularly regarding the arrest and surrender of suspects, access to Myanmar's territory and enforcement of its decisions. Nevertheless, the Assembly could commission a legal feasibility assessment and explore cooperation arrangements with states willing to support accountability. It should complement rather than duplicate the IIMM and existing judicial mechanisms.
Bangladesh also has an important opportunity to connect the judgment with the existing international framework for reparations and repatriation. The ICJ has ordered Myanmar to facilitate safe, voluntary and dignified return, restore or replace lost property, assist in identifying and recovering the remains of victims, provide physical and psychological rehabilitation and protect the Rohingya from discrimination and persecution. It has also established Myanmar's obligation to compensate the Rohingya for damage not remedied through restitution, with the Court reserving the question of the amount and modalities of compensation for a subsequent stage. The General Assembly should therefore support an international framework for documenting victims' losses, identifying property claims, providing rehabilitation and ensuring that any future return process is subject to independent monitoring. International humanitarian funding should support refugees while they remain displaced, but donor assistance must not replace Myanmar's legal responsibility to provide reparations. Importantly, the judgment does not simply order an unrestricted grant of citizenship to every Rohingya; it requires protection from discrimination and persecution, including discrimination in access to citizenship. That distinction should be reflected accurately in Bangladesh's diplomatic proposals.
The most immediate political opportunity, however, concerns the presidency of the 81st session of the General Assembly. Dr Khalilur Rahman of Bangladesh is a former National Security Adviser and High Representative for Rohingya Affairs. His presidency is guided by the theme "Restoring Trust, Managing Transformation: A United Nations That Delivers for All." The ICJ judgment directly tests that commitment. On 20 November 2026, Khalilur issued a statement on the judgment from the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh, calling for its implementation, safe return, reparations and the prevention of recurrence. He also expressed his intention, as President of the General Assembly, to engage member states on follow-up to the judgment. This creates an immediate institutional opportunity to move from statements of solidarity towards a structured international implementation process.
Bangladesh should therefore pursue two complementary diplomatic tracks. Through its national foreign policy, Dhaka should coordinate with The Gambia, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the eleven states that intervened in the ICJ proceedings, ASEAN members, the European Union and other concerned countries to develop a draft General Assembly resolution. These eleven states include Belgium, Canada, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, the Maldives, the Netherlands, Slovenia and the United Kingdom. Their participation provides a foundation for a cross-regional coalition. Bangladesh should also engage China and Russia directly, emphasising that humanitarian access, prevention of further atrocities, regional stability and voluntary repatriation need not be presented as an attempt to impose a particular political settlement on Myanmar.
Through the institutional presidency, Khalilur should facilitate inclusive consultations on implementation of the judgment, invite legal and humanitarian briefings, encourage discussions among regional groups and ensure that the issue receives sustained attention during the 81st session. The Presidency could facilitate a high-level plenary discussion or an appropriate informal consultation involving The Gambia, the eleven intervening states, the Secretary-General, the Special Envoy on Myanmar, the IIMM and representatives of the Rohingya community. The existing General Assembly agenda item about Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar provides an institutional foundation. Resolution 80/221, adopted on 18 December 2025, already established a framework for continued General Assembly attention to the situation. The objective should be to connect this existing agenda with the new legal obligations arising from the ICJ judgment, rather than create another disconnected diplomatic initiative.
The proposed General Assembly resolution should be entitled "Implementation of the Judgment of the International Court of Justice in The Gambia v. Myanmar and the Prevention of Further Genocide against the Rohingya." It should reaffirm the binding and final character of the judgment between the parties, call upon Myanmar to comply fully, encourage The Gambia to use Article 94(2), and call upon the Security Council to consider appropriate measures. It should also recommend coordinated action by states parties to the Genocide Convention, strengthen cooperation with the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), a United Nations investigative body established by the UN Human Rights Council on 27 September 2018 through Resolution 39/2, request regular reporting by the Secretary-General, and establish or strengthen a compliance-monitoring mechanism under Article 22. In addition, it should support a framework for reparations, rehabilitation and safe, voluntary and dignified repatriation, while requesting periodic assessments of conditions in Rakhine State. If the Security Council remains paralysed, the Assembly should consider further action under Resolution 377A(V), commonly known as the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution, adopted on 3 November 1950.
The timing is important. Bangladesh should use the immediate period following the judgment to initiate diplomatic consultations, circulate a draft resolution and secure support from states across Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. If a Security Council veto occurs, the 76/262 procedure should be activated within its prescribed timeframe, while the Uniting for Peace option should remain available if the Council's paralysis prevents an adequate response. The Assembly should then adopt a resolution establishing a continuing reporting and monitoring process. The purpose is to avoid a one-time political declaration that fades from international attention. Myanmar's compliance should remain a regular subject of UN deliberation until its obligations have been fulfilled.
General Assembly cannot replace the Security Council, eliminate its veto system or independently enforce the ICJ judgment through Chapter VII measures. But it can prevent Security Council inaction from becoming international silence. By mobilising the 193 member states, invoking Uniting for Peace, using the veto-accountability procedure under Resolution 76/262, establishing monitoring mechanisms and encouraging coordinated national measures, the Assembly can create sustained diplomatic pressure that may influence the calculations of even the most reluctant permanent members.
An ICJ judgment recognising genocide must not become the end of international responsibility; it must become the beginning of an international campaign for compliance, accountability, reparations and the safe return of the Rohingya.
________________________________
The writer is a 2026 Legislative Policy Fellow of the US Congress