Why China Could Gain Most from Trump–Putin–Xi Summit

The proposed meeting of Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen could become a defining moment in contemporary great-power diplomacy. Yet its significance may lie less in the prospect of a historic agreement than in the different strategic ambitions each leader brings to the table. The United States seeks to preserve its global influence; Russia seeks international recognition and greater room to pursue its interests in Ukraine; and China aims to strengthen its position as an indispensable global power. In a world increasingly shaped by competing interests, economic interdependence and strategic uncertainty, no single leader can easily dictate the outcome. Although all three may gain something from the meeting, China could emerge with the greatest diplomatic advantage.
The three leaders are not approaching this summit with a common strategic vision. Trump wants a diplomatic achievement that demonstrates American leadership, advances nuclear arms control and potentially helps address the conflict with Iran. Following the 3 November midterm elections, which shifted control of Congress to the Democrats, an international diplomatic success could also help him demonstrate that his administration remains influential despite its domestic political setback. However, Trump retains the presidency and considerable authority over foreign policy. Congressional oversight and political resistance may complicate his broader agenda, but they do not automatically prevent him from conducting summit diplomacy.
Putin's objectives are different. Russia wants recognition as a major global power and an opportunity to advance its interests in Ukraine. Participation alongside the American and Chinese presidents would itself carry symbolic value, allowing Moscow to return to the centre of international diplomacy without necessarily making concessions. Putin may seek to use the meeting to raise Ukraine, but Washington has indicated that the trilateral format is not expected to become a negotiating forum for ending that war. Russia's immediate gain, therefore, may be diplomatic recognition rather than a concrete settlement.
Xi Jinping, meanwhile, has a more complex calculation. China wants to demonstrate that it is not merely a participant in the emerging international order but a power capable of shaping it. Hosting the meeting gives Beijing diplomatic visibility and places Xi at the centre of an encounter involving Washington and Moscow. Brookings latest analysis identifies this convening role as a potential source of Chinese influence and international prestige. The meeting could reinforce the perception that major international questions increasingly require China's participation, even when Beijing does not offer substantial concessions.
Nuclear arms control illustrates the limits of a common agenda. Trump has expressed interest in reducing the nuclear arsenals of all three countries, but their strategic positions are unequal. The United States and Russia each possess more than 5,000 nuclear warheads, while China's arsenal is estimated at around 500, although it is expanding. Beijing has consistently resisted trilateral negotiations that could impose comparable obligations on countries with substantially different nuclear capabilities. For China, entering such a framework now could restrict its strategic flexibility without providing equivalent security benefits. Consequently, the most realistic outcome may be an agreement to continue dialogue or reaffirm general principles rather than a substantive arms-control breakthrough.
Ukraine presents another fundamental disagreement. Putin wants an outcome that protects Russian interests, while Washington may seek to demonstrate diplomatic progress. Beijing, however, has shown reluctance to place the war in Ukraine at the centre of the proposed trilateral agenda. China maintains close strategic and economic relations with Russia but also has important economic interests in Europe. A summit that appears to negotiate Ukraine's future without Ukrainian participation or European consultation could further damage Beijing's relations with European governments. As the Lowy Institute's Alicja Bachulska argues, the diplomatic symbolism of the meeting could create costs for China, particularly if Europe interprets it as an attempt to bypass its interests.
The comparison with the 1945 Yalta Conference is therefore relevant but should not be overstated. Today's international system is far more complex than the post-Second World War environment. Ukraine is not simply an object of negotiation; it has its own military and diplomatic agency. European governments possess economic, institutional and security capabilities, while countries across Asia and the wider developing world increasingly pursue independent foreign policies. Neither Washington, Moscow nor Beijing can simply divide the world into exclusive spheres of influence. Any settlement that disregards the interests of smaller states is likely to face resistance and may prove difficult to sustain.
The summit also carries consequences for the Indo-Pacific. Japan, Australia, India, the Philippines and South Korea depend on credible American engagement, but each has its own economic and strategic relationship with China. If Washington appears more interested in negotiating with Beijing and Moscow than consulting its regional partners, doubts about American reliability could grow. For China, the opportunity lies in presenting itself as an indispensable diplomatic power while continuing to expand its economic and strategic influence. Yet this advantage has limits: regional governments will continue to assess Beijing through its conduct in the South China Sea, its economic policies and its relations with neighbouring countries.
The central question, therefore, is not simply which leader will emerge as the winner of the summit, but whose long-term strategic position could benefit most from its symbolism. Putin may gain international recognition, and Trump may gain a high-profile diplomatic platform. But Xi could secure something more consequential: the opportunity to present China as an indispensable centre of global diplomacy, capable of bringing competing powers together without accepting the strategic obligations Washington seeks to impose. This is a potential diplomatic advantage, not proof that Beijing will control the meeting or secure its preferred outcomes.
There are risks for China as well. Hosting a summit that produces little substance could expose the limits of its diplomatic influence, while appearing to facilitate great-power bargaining over Ukraine could alienate Europe and other partners. Brookings and Lowy Institute analyses both underscore these competing possibilities. The outcome will depend not only on the leaders' statements but also on whether any commitments are implemented and whether the interests of countries outside the room are respected.
Ultimately, the Shenzhen meeting is unlikely to produce a new world order or a comprehensive agreement among the three powers. Their interests are too different, their strategic calculations too complex, and the international system too interconnected for a simple grand bargain. Nevertheless, the summit could mark another step in China's emergence as a central diplomatic actor. In this three-way contest, the United States and Russia may seek immediate political and strategic gains, while China has an opportunity to strengthen its long-term international standing. The greatest potential beneficiary may therefore be Beijing, not because it can dictate the outcome, but because the very act of hosting the other two powers reinforces China's place at the centre of global diplomacy.
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The writer is a 2026 Legislative Policy Fellow of the US Congress