Bangladesh Must Be the Doorway, Not the Pawn

When at least 12 American officials met Myanmar’s representatives in Tokyo this month, their second encounter in a month, according to Reuters, the venue said as much as the agenda. Washington’s turn towards Naypyidaw, and Tokyo’s quieter version of it, are redrawing the strategic map on Bangladesh’s eastern flank. Prime Minister Tarique Rahman arrives in Japan on 26 October for a four-day visit. He should travel knowing that the scramble for rare earths next door has turned Bangladesh from a development partner into strategic real estate. 

According to Reuters, on 8 October, the Trump administration opened direct talks with Myanmar’s military-backed government, reversing years of post-coup isolation. US Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Michael Vance met Myanmar President Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyidaw on 15-16 September, the highest-level American contact since 2021. The critical Chipwi-Pangwa rare earth belt is held by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Myanmar lacks domestic processing capacity, and Chinese President Xi Jinping is actively pushing back by urging the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) to negotiate with the junta. 

Tokyo is rapidly re-engaging with Myanmar. Tokyo signed a critical-minerals framework with Washington, and Yohei Sasakawa (Japan’s special envoy for national reconciliation) met Min Aung Hlaing on 20 October to offer aid for the peace process. According to the Nippon Foundation, Yohei Sasakawa brokered the collapse of the 2022 military-AA truce and met Arakan Army (AA) representatives in Rakhine. Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision seeks an industrial chain linking the Bay of Bengal with Northeast India, anchored at the JICA-financed Matarbari port near AA-held Maungdaw, and requires a stable Rakhine and Naypyidaw. 

The AA holds the entire 271-km border and 14 of Rakhine’s 17 townships, and is pressing on Sittwe and Kyaukphyu. The junta has begun to fight back in recent days, initially with air strikes, according to reports. A more robust campaign is likely to follow. Bangladesh hosts about 1.18 million Rohingya. The potential campaign will not likely displace Rohingyas but other communities too; some near the border of Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT).

The Tokyo visit, therefore, matters beyond its billing as investment, jobs and trade. Implementation of the Economic Partnership Agreement signed in February, a manpower deal, financing for Matarbari for 2026–31, and fewer than ten cooperation instruments are on the table. Japan has already handed over five patrol boats to the Bangladesh Navy under its Official Security Assistance programme, explicitly citing the Bay of Bengal’s importance to Japanese sea lanes. Tokyo reportedly raised concerns about anti-“militarism” language in the communiqué that Dhaka signed in Beijing in June. Moreover, Japan’s engagement with officials in Bangladesh has also raised willingness to enhance defence ties, while Japan now looks to engage and invest in areas where it had hardly focused in Bangladesh. 

Bangladesh cannot choose its neighbourhood, but it can choose how it plays its hand. First, make Matarbari a shared regional asset, not a bargaining chip. Bangladesh’s own trade needs come first, but the port’s value multiplies when every neighbour can use it on fair and transparent terms. Cooperation, not leverage, has always defined Bangladesh’s foreign policy. A Bangladesh that rations access to extract concessions would invite pressure from those left out and would find it far harder to remain a secure, unpressured regional actor. Open access gives every partner a stake in a stable, neutral Bangladesh.

Second, welcome security cooperation, but keep it defensive and transparent. Maritime surveillance, disaster response and coast guard capacity serve Bangladesh. Any arrangement that could be read as a platform for operations into Myanmar would not. Third, guard the language. Sign nothing in that endorses one power’s strategic narrative against another.

Fourth, make the Rohingya the price of partnership. Japan’s channels to Naypyidaw and to the AA are precisely what a credible return roadmap needs, and Dhaka should ask Tokyo to put them to work. But a humanitarian corridor is the wrong instrument: it risks becoming a supply line in someone else’s war. Any cross-border humanitarian effort should instead be a collaborative regional undertaking, mandated by the UN, operated and controlled by Bangladesh, and monitored and secured with the participation of all regional actors, so that no single power can claim it or bend it to strategic ends.

Fifth, talk to everyone across the border. Formal recognition of a non-state actor is neither possible nor wise. Neither is pretending that the AA does not govern the other bank of the Naf. Dhaka should keep its state-to-state relationship with Naypyidaw while giving its practical contacts with the AA steady, discreet channels on border management, trade, fishermen and the safety of any returning Rohingya. Dealing with whoever controls the ground is a matter of necessity, not endorsement. Finally, coordinate rather than compete. If Washington and Tokyo want supply routes or access through the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh should negotiate as a stakeholder with conditions, not serve as a corridor by default. 

Bangladesh’s geography makes it a doorway; diplomacy determines whether it is also a gatekeeper. Japan has been a trusted friend for half a century, and deeper ties are welcome. Tarique Rahman’s task in Tokyo is to bank the investment, jobs, and goodwill while making it clear that Bangladesh’s neutrality is a policy, not a vacancy. A doorway that controls its own hinges is never a pawn.

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The writer is political and international affairs analyst, and Research Fellow at Bangladesh Neeti Gobeshona Kendra