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Beyond Maritime Victory: Why Bangladesh Still Waits for Offshore Gas

Shahidul Alam Swapan

Shahidul Alam Swapan

Published: 07 Oct 2026, 12:00 AM

Beyond Maritime Victory: Why Bangladesh Still Waits for Offshore Gas
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Bangladesh secured its maritime boundaries through international adjudication, but has struggled to turn that achievement into energy security. India produces gas from its eastern offshore fields. Myanmar supplies offshore gas to domestic consumers and China. Bangladesh, meanwhile, remains caught between declining domestic supplies, expensive imports and promises about the Bay of Bengal.

The question is not whether Bangladesh won at sea. It is why legal certainty has failed to generate sustained exploration and new production. Answering requires scrutiny of contracts, commercial conditions and institutional performance, rather than another celebration of maritime rights.

Two dates establish the chronology. On 14 March 2012, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea delivered its judgment concerning Bangladesh and Myanmar. The final arbitral award concerning Bangladesh and India followed on 7 July 2014. These decisions clarified maritime entitlements; they did not establish the existence of commercially recoverable reserves. Nor is Bangladesh entirely without offshore experience. The Sangu field supplied gas for years before closing in 2013. Cairn, Shell and subsequently Santos were associated with its development or operation. The failure lies in not building a sustained exploration programme capable of delivering replacement production.


Several foreign companies received exploration contracts. ConocoPhillips signed for two deepwater blocks in June 2011, before either maritime ruling. In February 2014, India’s ONGC Videsh and Oil India signed production sharing contracts covering shallow water blocks SS04 and SS09, with Bapex participating. This was after the Myanmar judgment but before the final award involving India.

Santos and Singapore’s KrisEnergy received block SS11 in March 2014, each holding 45 per cent, alongside Bapex’s 10 per cent. South Korea’s POSCO Daewoo signed for deepwater block DS12 in March 2017. Separately, Petrobangla contracted the TGS and Schlumberger joint venture in March 2020 for seismic surveying. Surveying gathers geological information; it is not a production licence.

Was awarding contracts to Indian companies the right decision? Their nationality alone cannot settle that question. Offshore exploration demands capital, technology and experience. Bangladesh should select partners through competition, competence and terms that protect its interests. Neither automatic exclusion nor preferential treatment serves that purpose.

The unresolved boundary dispute nevertheless warranted particular care. Block coordinates, operational limits, control over geological information and protection of Bangladesh’s legal position required scrutiny. Without examining the complete contracts and relevant records, it would be irresponsible to label the agreements either a surrender of sovereignty or an unqualified success.

Implementation raises clearer questions. ONGC Videsh began drilling the Kanchan 1 exploration well in September 2021, more than seven years after signing. Reporting in August 2025 indicated that the well found no gas and the company was winding down without completing further planned work. An unsuccessful well does not prove misconduct: geological risk is inherent in exploration. But the delay, extensions, outstanding commitments and treatment of contractual obligations deserve a documented explanation. Bangladesh must establish whether it received all survey and drilling data and enforced whatever remedies the agreements provided.

Neighbouring successes offer lessons, not geological guarantees. India’s Krishna Godavari basin and Myanmar’s Rakhine offshore areas are not identical to Bangladesh’s blocks. Their discoveries cannot establish Bangladesh’s reserves. They do demonstrate the importance of connecting exploration with sustained investment, development infrastructure and dependable buyers.

Reliance and BP brought India’s MJ field into production in 2023 through a sequence of offshore developments. Myanmar’s Shwe project followed contracts in 2000, successive discoveries and production beginning in 2013. These timelines underline why exploration must continue consistently, rather than restart whenever a supply crisis becomes acute.

Bangladesh’s difficulty also involves commercial design. Its 2024 offshore bidding round attracted no bids. Revised terms accompanied a fresh invitation covering 26 blocks in May 2026. The test is whether these changes produce credible commitments and drilling, not merely another announcement. Investors assess exploration risk, development costs, pipelines, gas prices and payment security together. Terms that promise the state generous returns but attract no investment achieve little. Excessive concessions are equally dangerous. Independent economic evaluation, competitive selection and rigorous cost auditing must guide negotiations.

Imports can address immediate shortages, but cannot substitute for domestic exploration. Nor should slow exploration be attributed to an import lobby without evidence. The stronger demand is for an independent review identifying delayed decisions, unmet obligations and institutional responsibility. The government should publish progress against commitments for every offshore block, explain extensions and disclose the basis for contract termination. Commercial confidentiality need not conceal whether promised work was completed. Priority should go to prospects supported by stronger data and realistic development options.
Bapex must gain practical experience in interpretation, well planning, auditing and operations. Participation measured only by equity percentages will not build national capability. Environmental safeguards, fishing livelihoods, emergency response and eventual removal of installations must also be incorporated from the outset. 

Bangladesh cannot command geology to deliver gas. It can demand competent institutions, enforceable contracts and timely decisions. Maritime rights were an achievement. Turning them into economic opportunity requires a different discipline: persistent exploration, commercial realism and public accountability. The public deserves results proportionate to the years already lost. Another decade of waiting would be a failure of governance, whatever lies beneath the seabed.
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The writer is a political analyst, private banking financial crime compliance specialist, columnist and poet based in Geneva, Switzerland. He can be reached at [email protected] 

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