Houthi Attacks, Saudi-UAE Rift and New Regional Order

The strategic map of the Arabian Peninsula is being redrawn by three interconnected developments: the widening rupture between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the renewed Houthi offensive against the kingdom, and Riyadh’s attempt to reduce its dependence on traditional security arrangements. Together, these developments have placed Saudi Arabia at one of the most difficult geopolitical crossroads in its modern history. The Saudi-UAE disagreement is no longer merely a quiet rivalry between two influential Gulf states. Yemen has exposed their fundamentally different objectives. Saudi Arabia has formally supported Yemen’s territorial unity and an internationally recognised central government. The UAE, by contrast, cultivated powerful relationships with southern separatists, especially the Southern Transitional Council, while expanding its strategic influence around ports, islands and maritime routes.

This rivalry erupted openly in December 2025, when Saudi Arabia supported demands for Emirati forces to leave Yemen and struck what it described as a weapons shipment connected to UAE-backed forces at Mukalla. Abu Dhabi subsequently announced the withdrawal of its remaining military personnel. The episode marked an extraordinary breakdown between two countries that had jointly intervened in Yemen in 2015. Saudi Arabia then supported the reorganisation of political and security authority in areas outside Houthi control. Riyadh’s objective was not simply to reduce Emirati influence but to restore itself as the principal external power shaping the non-Houthi Yemeni order. Yet removing a competing influence is easier than creating a unified state. Yemen remains divided among the Houthis, government forces, tribal groups, southern separatists and numerous local militias. Saudi primacy in the anti-Houthi camp does not automatically produce Yemeni national unity.

At the same time, Riyadh remained outside the Abraham Accords. These agreements are formally a framework for normalising relations between Israel and several Arab countries, not a military alliance with an officially declared Israeli or Emirati command structure. Nevertheless, Saudi leaders have reason to fear that joining such a framework without resolving the Palestinian question could limit their regional legitimacy and place the kingdom within a strategic order designed largely by Washington, Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi. Saudi hesitation should therefore not be interpreted simply as hostility towards Israel or rejection of cooperation with the West. It reflects a deeper question: can Saudi Arabia normalise relations while retaining freedom of strategic decision-making, securing meaningful progress towards Palestinian statehood and avoiding subordination to another state’s regional agenda? Riyadh appears unwilling to accept normalisation at any political price.

Against this background, the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement among Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan represents a significant attempt at strategic diversification. The agreement reportedly treats an attack on one member as an attack on all. Türkiye has indicated that it could help meet Saudi technical and military requirements, while Pakistan has reiterated its commitment to the arrangement. It would be premature, however, to describe this arrangement as a fully operational Sunni alliance against an “Abrahamic alliance” and a Shia bloc. Türkiye and Pakistan maintain their own relationships with Iran, the United States, China and the Gulf states. Neither country will automatically enter an open-ended Yemeni war simply because Riyadh requests it. The real strength of the Mecca agreement will be measured not by declarations but by command arrangements, intelligence cooperation, air and missile defence integration, logistical preparation and agreed conditions for collective action.

The renewed Houthi offensive has become the agreement’s first serious test. Houthi forces have attacked Saudi cities, energy infrastructure and shipping while advancing around strategically important areas of Yemen’s Red Sea coast. A ballistic missile aimed at Riyadh was intercepted on 19 September, while other attacks were reported against Yanbu, Taif, Baish and Farasan. Washington’s refusal to conduct direct strikes on Saudi Arabia’s behalf has intensified doubts about the reliability and limits of the American security guarantee. The United States has reportedly continued intelligence-sharing and targeting assistance, but President Donald Trump declined Saudi requests for direct military intervention. This distinction is important. Washington’s reluctance may create leverage over Riyadh, but there is no publicly verified evidence that the United States controls the Houthis or is deliberately directing their attacks to force Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords. The Houthis receive substantial Iranian support but also pursue their own ideological, territorial and political objectives. American non-intervention could reflect concern about another prolonged war, fear of regional escalation or an effort to preserve diplomatic flexibility. It may indirectly increase pressure on Saudi Arabia, but indirect benefit should not be confused with proven orchestration.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Egypt must be understood within this search for strategic depth. Saudi Arabia needs political legitimacy from the Arab world’s most populous state, access to Egyptian military experience and cooperation in protecting the Red Sea. Egypt has offered political support, but it remains cautious about direct military involvement. Egypt’s hesitation has practical explanations. It remembers the heavy cost of its intervention in Yemen during the 1960s. Its economy depends on Gulf investment, including substantial Emirati capital, while instability in the Red Sea directly damages Suez Canal revenue. Cairo must preserve relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE while avoiding entanglement in another difficult Yemeni war. Reducing President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s position to Israeli control or to the circumstances of his rise to power may satisfy a political narrative, but it does not adequately explain Egypt’s present calculation.

The critical question is whether Türkiye and Pakistan will translate their commitments into meaningful assistance. That assistance need not begin with a ground invasion. Integrated air defence, intelligence-sharing, electronic warfare, counter-drone systems, naval patrols, training and logistical support would be more realistic and less dangerous. Attempting to drive the Houthis entirely out of Yemen through foreign military intervention would probably reproduce the failures of the previous decade. The Houthis possess deep local roots, difficult terrain, extensive combat experience and an expanding missile-and-drone arsenal. Saudi Arabia should therefore avoid interpreting sovereignty solely as the ability to wage war without Western support. Genuine sovereignty requires diversified partnerships, domestic military capacity, economic resilience and the freedom to negotiate without external coercion. It also requires a credible political plan for Yemen. Establishing a national unity government cannot simply mean replacing UAE-backed factions with Saudi-backed ones. It must include a workable settlement among Yemen’s principal political, tribal and regional forces while preventing the country from becoming permanently divided.

The question of whether Iran and the Houthis are indirectly serving Israeli interests deserves a careful answer. Their attacks can produce outcomes advantageous to Israel by weakening Saudi Arabia, disrupting alternative regional alignments and increasing Riyadh’s need for advanced Western defence systems. But this does not prove coordination or shared purpose. Strategic adversaries often unintentionally strengthen one another. Houthi actions intended to pressure Saudi Arabia may instead push Riyadh closer to Washington or even toward security cooperation with Israel. That would be an unintended strategic consequence rather than evidence of an alliance. The Mecca agreement will survive only if it becomes an effective security framework rather than a symbolic declaration or sectarian slogan. Its success should not be measured by whether Turkish and Pakistani armies invade Yemen, but by whether the three states can deter attacks, protect shipping, strengthen diplomacy and support an inclusive Yemeni settlement. If it becomes merely another military bloc confronting Iran and the Houthis, it could deepen the very encirclement Saudi Arabia seeks to escape.

Saudi Arabia is undoubtedly under pressure, but it is not without options. It can diversify its alliances, strengthen regional diplomacy, defend its territory and resist arrangements that compromise its legitimate interests. Yet its safest path lies neither in accepting foreign direction nor in launching another unlimited war. The decisive test will be whether Riyadh can combine military preparedness with political wisdom and transform its new partnerships into instruments of deterrence, strategic independence and peace.