BRICS: A Global South Dream Built on Deep Divisions

The 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi that ended may have projected an image of a confident and increasingly influential Global South, but beneath the diplomatic smiles and carefully worded declarations lies a much more complicated reality. At the same BRICS table were countries directly involved in wars, caught in geopolitical confrontations or deeply entangled in rivalries with one another. Russia is waging war in Ukraine. Iran is caught in a wider regional confrontation with the United States and its Gulf allies and, as this is written, is launching attacks against Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE. India and China remain strategic competitors, separated by a long-running border dispute despite deep economic interdependence. The Gulf presents another layer of complexity. Iran’s relationship with Saudi Arabia and the UAE is shaped not only by competing geopolitical interests but also by the deep-rooted Sunni-Shia divide, which continues to influence regional alliances and security calculations. Iran has also dragged Houthis to this war. Despite periods of diplomatic rapprochement, this sectarian and geopolitical rivalry is unlikely to disappear easily. The fact that Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE now sit within the same BRICS grouping does not erase these fundamental differences. Nor does BRICS membership automatically make them economic or strategic partners. So, how realistic is it to expect these countries to build a coherent alternative economic order?

BRICS was born partly out of dissatisfaction with the existing Western-dominated global financial and political architecture. Its ambition was not merely to create another forum for developing economies, but to increase the influence of emerging powers and reduce dependence on institutions and financial systems dominated by the United States and its allies.

At the New Delhi summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian were prominent participants, while Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi sought to maintain India’s strategic relationship with Moscow. Modi and Putin discussed the Russia-Ukraine war as well as defence and energy cooperation. But Russia’s war in Ukraine is not a minor disagreement that can simply be placed on a diplomatic agenda. It has caused enormous loss of life and destruction of infrastructure. Russia continues to frame its actions in terms of security and military objectives, while Ukraine and much of the international community regard the invasion as aggression. The consequences have extended far beyond Europe. Citizens from countries such as Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh and Nepal have reportedly been recruited as mercenaries or lured into the fighting, exposing the vulnerability of people from smaller and developing states to conflicts driven by much larger geopolitical powers.

India showcased just how complicated this balancing act can be. New Delhi remains a close partner of Washington while maintaining strong relations with Moscow and Iran. India is also one of the world’s biggest buyers of Russian oil and has sought to expand bilateral trade with Russia. India’s relationship with China is equally paradoxical. China is one of India’s most important trading partners, yet the two remain strategic competitors. Their unresolved border dispute has repeatedly generated tension, while their economies remain deeply interconnected. Xi Jinping’s engagement with Modi at the summit, therefore, carried significance beyond the BRICS agenda, encompassing the border dispute, trade imbalances and Chinese investment.

The fundamental weakness of BRICS is that it is not a military alliance or even a conventional political alliance. It is a grouping of countries with very different political systems, strategic interests and foreign-policy objectives. Russia and Iran may favour a BRICS that becomes a stronger counterweight to the West. India and Brazil, however, have traditionally been more cautious about transforming the grouping into an explicitly anti-Western alliance. And as the dollar is the key trading currency, they are all split how to navigate this moment. India, in particular, has every reason to prevent BRICS from becoming an ideological bloc directed against Washington. New Delhi wants strategic autonomy, not a new Cold War alignment. Brazil has similarly emphasised the economic and developmental character of the grouping.

The presence of major oil producers such as Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE gives BRICS substantial influence over global energy production and reserves. The possibility that these countries could increasingly settle energy transactions in currencies other than the US dollar naturally concerns Washington.
China’s position is particularly important because it is a major buyer of Iranian oil and a central economic partner for several BRICS members.

For BRICS, perhaps the greatest contradiction is that its two most populous members are also strategic competitors. India and China’s rivalry has reshaped the strategic landscape of South Asia and the wider Indian Ocean. Smaller countries such as Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh and the Maldives increasingly find themselves navigating between competing major powers. For these countries, BRICS is therefore not merely an abstract debate about Global South solidarity. It has consequences. Every Chinese investment, every Indian infrastructure project, every Russian energy relationship and every American or European strategic engagement can become part of a larger geopolitical calculation.

Sri Lanka, sitting at the centre of the Indian Ocean, knows this particularly well. The country cannot afford to treat great-power rivalry as someone else’s problem, nor can it assume that closer association with one geopolitical grouping automatically delivers economic security.

There is also a misconception that countries can simply decide to join BRICS and begin benefiting from its economic architecture. Membership is fundamentally a diplomatic process. A prospective member must have the political support of existing members, while geopolitical considerations inevitably matter. The creation of a partner-country category provides a softer route for countries seeking closer engagement without immediately becoming full members.

BRICS is undoubtedly important. It represents growing dissatisfaction with a global system in which developing countries often believe their voices are weaker than their economic and demographic weight would suggest. Its expansion also underlines that countries want greater room to manoeuvre between Washington, Beijing, Moscow, New Delhi and other centres of power.

But BRICS should not be mistaken for a unified geopolitical bloc. It is a coalition of interests rather than a coalition of ideology. That may actually be its greatest strength, and its greatest weakness. The members do not need to agree on everything to cooperate on trade, development, energy or finance. But the more BRICS seeks to challenge the existing global order, the harder it becomes to avoid the geopolitical contradictions among its members.
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The writer is an award-winning journalist and the Deputy Editor for Ceylon Today, Sri Lanka