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Bangladesh

Benazir and the challenges of repatriating laundered money

Special Correspondent

Published: 05 Aug 2026, 12:00 AM

Benazir and the challenges of repatriating laundered money
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It is common knowledge in Bangladesh that former Inspector General of Police Benazir Ahmed is widely regarded as a mastermind behind large-scale corruption.

Allegations of corruption and money laundering surfaced against him even before the fall of the Awami League government. When the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) launched its investigation, Benazir fled the country.

Initial inquiries by the Commission revealed that he had allegedly laundered at least Tk10,000 crore out of Bangladesh on various occasions, leading to multiple cases being filed against him. Since December 2021, he has also been under US sanctions over alleged human rights violations. On 12 June, Benazir was arrested in Dubai, but on 27 July, a United Arab Emirates court granted him bail. After completing all legal formalities, the former IGP was released from prison on 30 July.

Following his arrest, the Bangladeshi government sought to bring him back to face trial and accordingly contacted the Dubai police and other relevant authorities. The extradition documents and legal submissions presented by Bangladesh were heard in a Dubai court, which ultimately granted Benazir conditional bail. Although the government says it has appointed a law firm to challenge the bail order and secure his extradition, an analysis of UAE law suggests that the likelihood of  bringing him back is slim. Benazir is a well-known figure accused of corruption, and details of his vast illegal assets across several countries have been widely reported. Yet questions remain as to why a suspected money launderer like him cannot be extradited. More importantly, the issue extends beyond Benazir, raising broader questions about why Bangladesh has been unable to act against those accused of laundering vast sums of money over the past seventeen years and who are now living comfortably abroad, or why those laundered funds cannot be recovered.

Answering these questions requires a thorough examination of both domestic legislation and international financial law. It is widely alleged that enormous sums were laundered during the tenure of the previous Awami League government. A white paper committee formed under the interim government investigated these financial flows. Citing the committee's findings, Prime Minister Tarique Rahman told Parliament that between 2009 and 2023, illicit financial outflows from Bangladesh amounted to approximately US$234 billion, averaging $16 billion, or nearly Tk1.8 trillion, each year.

However, money laundering did not cease after the fall of the Awami League government. Under the Yunus administration, capital flight reportedly increased, with deposits in Swiss banks alone rising by nearly 41 per cent. Economists estimate that around Tk30 trillion was laundered out of Bangladesh over the past seventeen years. Recovering these funds could significantly help stabilise and revitalise the country's economy. Yet despite repeated assurances from the Yunus administration regarding asset recovery, no tangible results were achieved. Upon assuming office as Bangladesh Bank Governor under Prof Yunus, Ahsan H Mansur initially claimed that part of the laundered money could be recovered within a short period. Before leaving office, however, he revised his position, acknowledging that recovering the funds would take many years.

While the current government has also pledged to recover laundered assets and bring offenders to justice, little concrete progress has been made so far. Other countries have achieved notable success in repatriating illicit assets, with India also recovering funds from abroad in recent years. This raises the question of why Bangladesh continues to lag behind. Legal and financial experts identify five principal reasons for this shortfall.

The first relates to weaknesses in Bangladesh's legal and judicial framework. The country's laws governing the detection and prosecution of money laundering remain largely below international standards. Many transactions classified as money laundering under Bangladeshi law are not recognised as such in foreign jurisdictions, creating immediate legal and operational obstacles. Furthermore, foreign courts often question the neutrality and fairness of Bangladesh's judicial system. During Benazir Ahmed's bail hearing in Dubai, his defence counsel challenged the transparency of Bangladesh's legal process, arguing that he would not receive a fair trial if extradited.

The second factor is a deficit of international credibility arising from political vendettas. A UK court recently rejected an application from Bangladesh on the grounds that the money laundering charges appeared to be politically motivated. In countries such as the UK and the UAE, many individuals accused of financial crimes claim to be victims of political persecution or seek political asylum. Consequently, when Bangladesh later brings money laundering charges against them, those allegations are often viewed with scepticism. Moreover, sweeping and unsubstantiated allegations against business figures without adequate evidence undermine the government's credibility from the outset. During the Yunus administration, for example, several prominent industrial groups were labelled as money launderers without proper investigation or evidence. Their bank accounts were frozen, subjecting them to significant hardship, even though most were later found to have had no involvement in money laundering. This damaged Bangladesh's international credibility far more than it affected the targeted entities, while inadvertently shielding actual offenders. By making unsubstantiated allegations against leading domestic businesses, the Yunus administration called into question the impartiality of its own financial investigations, making foreign governments more reluctant to cooperate.

The third factor concerns the routing of funds through third countries using legitimate financial channels.

Laundered money rarely moves directly from Bangladesh to its final destination. Instead, it is routed through intermediary jurisdictions. For example, individuals accused of laundering money into Singapore allegedly transferred the funds first through companies in third countries before they entered Singapore via legitimate banking channels. As a result, destination countries regard these funds as lawful inflows and are often unwilling to entertain recovery requests from Bangladesh, as international law does not oblige host countries to act unless the entry of the funds itself is deemed unlawful under local legislation.

The fourth factor concerns citizenship. Many alleged money launderers hold dual citizenship or have acquired foreign nationality. Rather than investing under their Bangladeshi identity, they use their foreign citizenship to acquire assets. Consequently, when Bangladesh attempts to prosecute them as Bangladeshi nationals, foreign jurisdictions often regard the claims as legally problematic.

The fifth factor is the evidential burden required to prove that the funds originated in Bangladesh. Under money laundering laws, there must be a direct legal link between the money transferred from the country of origin and the assets held abroad. Furthermore, funds are deemed to be laundered only when the accused cannot demonstrate a legitimate source of income. However, many of those accused by Bangladesh have legitimised their overseas holdings through offshore companies and complex ownership structures, making it exceptionally difficult to establish a clear paper trail.

As a result, while recovering laundered money remains a popular political slogan, actual recovery efforts have produced very limited results. The interim government previously announced a range of initiatives, including identifying overseas assets, activating Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs), using mutual legal assistance mechanisms, and engaging international financial intelligence networks. Yet the practical outcome has been negligible. In reality, asset recovery is a lengthy, costly and uncertain process in which the burden of proof, strict legal deadlines, political commitment and sustained international cooperation present formidable challenges.

The case of Benazir Ahmed offers an important lesson. To combat money laundering effectively, the relevant institutions must operate impartially and independently. In the past, allegations of money laundering were repeatedly used to target political opponents—a practice that was heavily employed during the Yunus administration, diluting the seriousness of the issue at home and undermining Bangladesh's credibility abroad.

To prevent further capital flight, recover stolen assets and bring offenders to justice, the government should adopt several key measures:

Avoid sweeping accusations: Conduct thorough and impartial investigations before filing charges, involving international investigative agencies whenever necessary.

Adopt scientific financial tracking: Replace arbitrary estimates with scientifically robust assessments of laundered funds, working with international organisations to trace transaction routes and build credible evidence.

Engage international expertise: Enter into long-term retainer agreements with specialist foreign law firms experienced in cross-border asset recovery.

Depoliticise the issue: Keep financial crimes above political considerations and ensure that money laundering laws are never used as weapons against political opponents.

There is little doubt that vast sums of money have been laundered out of Bangladesh and that the identities of many of those allegedly involved are widely known. However, rhetoric alone is not enough. Bangladesh must present its case internationally with rigorous, admissible evidence. Above all, the government must establish modern, forward-looking legislation and robust oversight mechanisms to ensure that such systemic plunder can never happen again.

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