Safeguarding the Bay of Bengal through Bangladesh-Japan Defence Cooperation

The Bay of Bengal is situated at a crossroads of global trade and commerce, energy flows and communication.

It has greatly contributed not only to Bangladesh but to the Indo-Pacific region as a gateway of the region to the Indian Ocean. Bangladesh’s major global trade is highly reliant on the Bay, and the country considers it a lifeline, an easy alternative to connect the world.

Among the countries of Indo-Pacific region, Japan places importance to the Bay of Bengal, since most of its energy imports are connected to the sea line of communications of the Bay.

Given the common interests in the Bay of Bengal, there comes the rationale of shared responsibility on the part of Bangladesh and Japan to ensure the Bay’s maritime security.

The Bay of Bengal remains vulnerable to some key security risks, mostly non-traditional, including IUU fishing, illegal migration, trafficking of humans and drugs, piracy and marine terrorism, smuggling under organised crime networks, etc. These threats are significantly impeding the freedom of navigation, free trade and regional stability. Thus, bringing Bangladesh and Japan on board to counter such threats and safeguard the Bay is essential. Their recent policy-related development widens the scope for enhancing the defence and security cooperation between Bangladesh and Japan, particularly under the banner of maritime security.

Japan has contributed to Bangladesh’s development trajectory since 1972. During his 1978 visit as a first State Guest and subsequent visit in 1980, impressed by Japan’s post-war economic progress, President Ziaur Rahman focused on diversifying Bangladesh’s strategic position toward the West and envisioned Bangladesh’s symmetric export-oriented growth as East Asian did. President Ziaur Rahman’s visit led to the establishment of the Japan-Bangladesh Committee for Commerce and Economic Cooperation (1980) and the first Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Dhaka. Many historians consider these visits a ‘foundational brick’ for both the BNP’s and Bangladesh’s “Look East” policy, which was primarily economic in nature. Building on the course charted by President Ziaur Rahman, as a natural consequence of this course, the development trajectory has expanded from solely economic aid-dependent development to ‘Comprehensive Partnership’ in 2014 and later to ‘Strategic Partnership’ in 2023. After recognising Bangladesh as its ‘Strategic Partner’, Japan selected Bangladesh as one of the first recipient countries of “Official Security Assistance (OSA)”, which is a new defence and security grant aid cooperation framework of Japan established in 2023.

Many Bangladeshi security experts consider Bangladesh’s selection as a recipient country of OSA a great moment for both Bangladesh and Japan to enhance the bilateral cooperation in the area of defence security. It reflects the Japan’s strategic outlook to the changing realpolitik across the Indo-Pacific region and its littorals. China’s geopolitical interests also collide with those of the Japan in the region. In the Bay of Bengal, the Chinese military, economic and diplomatic presence, compared with Japan’s solely economic engagement, led Japan to rethink its partnership posture and introduce OSA to the region, in particular for Bangladesh. It becomes strategically important for Japan to reduce the gap and to focus more on OSA and other defence-related commitments with Bangladesh to foster their defence cooperation. For Bangladesh, such cooperation is also vital for diversifying its major defence reliance on China. Moreover, even prior to the launch of OSA framework, Japan had undertaken various forms of cooperation contributing to Bangladesh’s maritime security. In December 2021, Japan provided four 20-meter and twenty 10-meter-class rescue boats to Bangladesh as part of Japanese government grant aid (valued at Approx. US$25 million) to strengthen the Bangladesh Coast Guard’s disaster-response and rescue capacity.

Meanwhile, under the initiative of the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF), Japan’s vessels such as JS Samidare and JS Kaga have occasionally made calls to Chattogram Port. JMSDF regarded such a call as a “goodwill exercise” designed to improve interoperability between Bangladesh and Japan. Later, in 2023, under its OSA programme, Japan committed to providing five patrol boats (valued at approx. US$3.8 million) to the Bangladesh Navy. Bangladeshi security experts remark that such OSA support reflects Japan’s aim to broaden the scope of military procurement to Bangladesh. For Japan, OSA is intended to support its like-minded country, and for Bangladesh, to enhance its maritime capabilities and ensure the maritime safety and security of the Bay of Bengal. For Japan, such assistance is vital for translating its Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision of promoting the rule of law, freedom of navigation and regional stability in the Indo-Pacific. 

In 2025, during the visit of Professor Dr Muhammad Yunus, then chief adviser of Bangladesh, to Japan, another major development regarding Bangladesh-Japan defence cooperation took place. As a follow-up to the negotiation of a defence deal started in 2023, the visit also revisited the deal, and later, on 03 February 2026, Bangladesh and Japan signed an agreement on the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology to boost military modernisation and deepen strategic partnership as well as defence cooperation between the two countries. The agreement follows suit of the UN Charter for maintaining peace and security, aimed at providing an institutional framework for acquiring advanced technology and defence logistics from Japan, as well as prospects for joint research and development. The agreement has already entered into force.   

Bangladeshi experts emphasise the agreement’s significance for advancing Bangladesh’s defence capabilities, particularly for safeguarding Bangladesh’s maritime domain. They regard, with proper utility of the agreement, Bangladesh could foster its marine domain and situational awareness, enhance the capacity building of its maritime forces through advanced training and surveillance capabilities. With such capabilities, Bangladesh can secure its vast maritime domain from vicious transnational threats and become a security provider on one of the most critical sea lines of communication for international trade and supply chain. Thus, the Japan’s view of ensuring freedom of navigation for regional security and stability would be materialised within a broader strategic framework of FOIP.

However, in the meantime, a democratic power transition took place in Bangladesh, and the newly elected BNP government has also made its remarks on the defence agreement. According to the media reports, during a courtesy call with newly appointed Foreign Minister Dr Khalilur Rahman, the Ambassador of Japan to Bangladesh SAIDA Shinichi reminded the significance of the agreement and also officially invited Prime Minister Tarique Rahman to visit Japan at a mutually convenient time to strengthen the long-tested partnership between the two friendly nations across diverse sectors. 

Therefore, for ensuring maritime security and safety in the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh-Japan defence cooperation as well as the agreement could be a catalyst for enhancing Bangladesh’s maritime surveillance capabilities and advanced training with transferred technology from Japan, and for promoting freedom of navigation and regional stability in the Indo-Pacific, as Japan’s FOIP aims to do.  

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.)