Nuclear-armed State: Choice or Necessity?

Every sovereign nation either relies on international guarantees or secures itself through deterrence. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) promised that a balance non-nuclear states would forgo weapons in exchange for protection and disarmament by nuclear powers. In reality, nuclear states have modernised their arsenals while non-nuclear states remain vulnerable.

The recent US-Israeli aggression against Iran is only the latest proof that paper promises do not stop bombs. This brutal reality forces every threatened nation to confront of acquiring nuclear weapons against aggression. It is a choice for survival. Until the powerful genuinely disarm or enforce equal security for all, that choice will remain the only rational path for any country unwilling to accept permanent vulnerability.

No country with a reliable nuclear arsenal has ever been invaded or suffered a major conventional defeat. The cost of aggression becomes existential for the attacker. This “insurance policy” allows smaller nations to level the playing field against larger adversaries without matching them tank-for-tank or soldier-for-soldier. Nuclear weapons also confer immense diplomatic leverage, ensuring that a state is taken seriously on the world stage. While moral and financial costs are significant, nuclear status provides a form of security no treaty can replace.

As of early 2026, nine countries possess nuclear weapons including the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. Together, they hold approximately 12,300 warheads, with nearly 9,600 in active stockpiles. Two nations Russia and the United States control roughly 86% of all nuclear warheads globally.

Nuclear-armed states misuse their power through coercive diplomacy, military aggression backed by nuclear threats and deliberate endangerment of nuclear safety. The United States and Israel, backed by their nuclear capabilities, have repeatedly violated international laws and recklessly attacked one country after another. This audacity sends a clear and dangerous message to non-nuclear states that the weak remain unprotected and aggression goes unpunished. Watching such attacks on vulnerable nations, any threatened state would naturally conclude that nuclear weapons are the only reliable means of self-defence. Such dynamics raise serious doubts about the effectiveness of global legal frameworks and security guarantees. In this context, non-nuclear states increasingly see themselves as defenceless, leading some to reconsider nuclear weapons as a necessary tool for deterrence and survival. This outcome, ironically, undermines the very foundations of the global non-proliferation regime that was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear arms.

Historically, Cold War brinkmanship exemplified systematic misuse. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, both superpowers manipulated the risk of annihilation for diplomatic advantage. More recently, North Korea has alternated between negotiation and provocation to extract aid and legitimacy. The International Court of Justice has found that threatening nuclear use is generally illegal, yet nuclear-armed states continue leveraging their arsenals to pursue aggressive wars and force weaker nations into concessions.

The NPT safeguards nuclear-armed states by freezing a hierarchical status quo. The five original nuclear powers are permanently recognised as legitimate weapon-holders, while all other signatories are permanently barred from acquiring them. International inspections target only non-nuclear states, leaving the arsenals of nuclear powers unmonitored. The promise of disarmament under Article VI remains vague and unenforced. Thus, the NPT functions less as an equal security pact and more as an institutional defence of nuclear monopoly.

If nuclear-armed states claim the sovereign right to possess weapons for their own protection, logic demands that every other country has the same right. There is no moral or legal basis for granting permanent nuclear privilege to a few while denying it to others. When a nuclear-armed state bombs nuclear facilities or assassinates scientists in a non-nuclear country, it is not enforcing international law; it is committing military aggression to preserve a nuclear domination. Such actions meet the definition of state terrorism which uses violence against civilians and infrastructure to achieve political goals. Under international law, unprovoked military strikes against a non-aggressor state with no UN mandate constitute war crimes.

The NPT demands that non-nuclear states renounce weapons in exchange for security, yet it fails to prevent nuclear-armed states from attacking them. When a nuclear power attacks a compliant non-nuclear nation as seen with Iran the treaty’s core promise collapses. The non-nuclear state has kept its bargain by staying disarmed, but the nuclear state faces no consequence. This reveals the NPT as a one-way trap: it disarms the vulnerable while shielding the powerful, offering paper promises instead of real protection.

The double standard exposes the NPT as a convention that looks powerful on paper but has no real enforcement ability against those it was meant to restrain. It cannot stop North Korea from leaving and building bombs, nor prevent Israel or India from staying outside its framework entirely. The NPT restrains only those willing to be restrained: the non-nuclear majority. The nuclear-armed minority does as it pleases.

South Asia, the most densely populated and nuclear-dense region in the world, illustrates the stakes. India and Pakistan possess growing arsenals, while Myanmar’s instability adds further strategic vulnerability. Bangladesh, a non-nuclear NPT signatory, remains defenceless against coercion or aggression from its nuclear-armed neighbours.

A state that cannot deter existential threats through conventional means must either accept permanent vulnerability or acquire the ultimate deterrent. For any threatened nation, developing nuclear weapons capability is not aggression; it is a rational and defensive response to an insecure world where only nuclear powers truly enjoy inviolable sovereignty.

The NPT has failed. While arming the powerful, it disarms the vulnerable, punishes non-nuclear states for seeking security and offers no protection when nuclear-armed aggressors’ attack. The recent US-Israeli strikes on Iran prove the bitter truth that paper promises do not stop bombs. Any nation facing an existential threat now has choices: either develop nuclear weapons or remain defenceless. Until nuclear powers genuinely disarm or enforce equal security for all, the NPT is not a treaty of peace. It is a weapon of inequality.