On the night of 6 November 1975, as the clock struck midnight, a tracer bullet from the Two Field Regiment at Dhaka Cantonment shot into the sky, following the direction of Subedar Major Anisul Haque, spreading a flash of light as a signal.
Immediately, the 38 LAA Regiment responded with gunfire from the north corner. Within minutes, thousands more shots were fired into the sky from various points around the garrison, marking the start of the subcontinent's second sepoy mutiny.

The first sepoy mutiny, which began on 29 March 1857, had shaken the foundation of the British Empire in India, spreading from Barrackpore in Kolkata to cities including Delhi, Agra, Lucknow, Meerut, Dhaka, Chattogram, Sylhet and Jashore.

But in both 1857 and 1975, ordinary sepoys were unable to secure their own interests; instead, hundreds faced consequences for their rebellious actions. The first revolt failed to restore the last Mughal emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar, to the throne in Delhi. However, 118 years later, the latter mutiny paved the way for the emergence of Maj Gen Ziaur Rahman, a leader who appealed to Bangladeshi soldiers.
Zia, calm by nature, was not one to act impulsively but rather waited for the right moment to react. This cautious temperament contributed to his success and left an indelible mark on history 49 years ago.
Since the ghastly assassination of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and most of his family members on 15 August, Khandaker Mushtaque Ahmed, the self declared president, and the killers were operating the country from the Bangabhaban.

Zia, deprived of the post of chief of army staff initially in 1972 and later in early 1975, finally replaced his junior course mate Maj Gen KM Shafiullah as the new chief. But he had hardly any chance to contact Mustaque and take crucial decisions as there was newly appointed defence adviser of the president, General (Retd) MAG Osmani, and chief of defence staff, Maj Gen Khalilur Rahman, between the president and him.

Zia also had little control over the army that had been struggling after losing its chain of command. For instance, in mid-September he ordered to bring all the tanks back to the cantonment, keeping only three to protect the Bangabhaban but when the instruction was not followed, he became bound to cancel it a week later [“Ekattorer Muktijuddho, Raktakto Madhya August O Sharajantramay November”, Col (Retd) Shafaat Jamil].
Chief of general staff Brig Gen Khaled Mosharraf openly stressed on returning discipline in the army and 46 brigade commander Col Shafaat Jamil raised the issue in different conferences in the army headquarters but Zia took a “wait and see” policy ["Bangladesh: Raktakto Audhaya 1975-81", Brig Gen (Retd) M Shakhawat Hussain].

In such a situation, a number of officers led by Brig Gen Khaled Mosharraf and Col Shafaat Jamil launched a coup to “reestablish discipline in the army” and confined Zia in his house. Right before his house arrest, Zia somehow managed to make a phone call to his Liberation War-time fellow and old friend Lt Col (Retd) Abu Taher and requested to rescue him [Jhonjabikkhubdho Sei Dingulo, Lutfa Taher].
Taher, founding vice-president of Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) and a key organiser of the Ganobahini, the armed wing of JSD, was preparing for a coup with his Biplobi Sainik Sangstha, a clandestine revolutionary socialist group of sepoys within the Bangladesh Army. They published thousands of aggressive leaflets mentioning 12-point demands of sepoys, including removal of discrimination between sepoys and officers, abolishment of batman system and release of political prisoners, and spread those across the cantonment.

Khaled was then busy in conducting meeting in the cantonment and Bangabhaban and negotiating with Mushtaque to confirm his promotion to the post of chief of staff and find a new figure to replace the president. He had no idea about Taher’s move and his influence over the sepoys. Zia became bound to resign but till then Khaled couldn’t establish his full authority over the army as the new chief. No address was made on television or radio to the nation or the army regarding the aim of the coup until Chief Justice Abu Sadat Mohammad Sayem took oath as president. Moreover, there was a publicity terming Khaled as a pro-India officer which was fuelled by an Awami League procession brought out under the leadership of his mother and brother [“Ek General-er Nirab Shakhya”, Maj Gen Moinul Hossain Chowdhury].

From 3 to 6 November, there was no government functional in the country. People were anxious and frustrated. Mushtaque was in the Bangabhaban but he was not active as president and Khaled was neither interested to take over any top post of the government nor clear his position ["Bangladesh: Raktakto Audhaya 1975-81", Brig Gen (Retd) M Shakhawat Hussain].

Zia was a charismatic figure for his historic role (proclamation of independence) and ordinary soldiers were sympathised towards him for his silence amid intense conflicts for power between senior officers. His sudden house arrest had increased his acceptance to them further. Taher tried to use it while Khaled completely ignored the fact [Novemberer Paltapalti Obbhutthaner Dukkhojonok Audhaya, Maj Gen (Retd) Syed Muhammad Ibrahim].

On 6 November midnight, thousands of soldiers stormed the Dhaka Cantonment firing bullets towards the sky and chanting slogan “Sipahi sipahi bhai bhai, officerder rokto chai!” (Sepoy are brothers, demand blood of officers). They rushed to the residence of detained Zia to rescue him. A group of soldiers led by Major Mohiuddin, Major Mostafa and Subedar Major Anisul Haque freed Zia and carried him to a car for taking to the Two Field Regiment office [“Tinti Sena Obbhutthan O Kichu Na Bala Katha”, Lt Col (Retd) MA Hamid, PSC].

Taher went there along with members of Ganobahini and Biplobi Sainik Sangstha and requested Zia to go to the radio station and officers present there told Zia to not step out of the cantonment. Zia sent an audio tape of his address to the radio office but didn’t leave the cantonment. Taher angrily reacted and left the office. On 7 November morning, he returned again and placed 12-point demands of soldiers but Zia remained silent. Meanwhile, thousands of soldiers took to the streets of Dhaka where mass people joined them and expressed joy of relief from uncertainty [“Ek General-er Nirab Shakhya”, Maj Gen Moinul Hossain Chowdhury].

Maj Gen Khaled Mosharraf and his associates Lt Col ATM Haider and Col Khondker Nazmul Huda, who took shelter at the headquarters of the 10 Bengal Regiment in the capital’s Agargaon, were killed on 7 November morning.
Taher wanted to use Zia’s influence to secure his party’s interests. JSD was not strong enough to occupy power as many of their leaders and cadres were languishing in jail. Taher wanted to bring them out, be a part of the establishment and create a parallel centre of political and military power. JSD thought it had the capacity to control everything if even it doesn’t hold office officially [Smaraniya Sei Din, Lawrence Lifschultz].

Zia had some other thoughts. He called Taher to bring JSD men on board to make sure his release. But he didn’t solely depend on Taher. Officers and soldiers of Two Field Regiment, Four East Bengal Regiment, Engineering Core, Log Area Signals, EME, Medical Supply, Battalion, Ordinance and other units, regiments and battalions took part in the mutiny under the leadership of JCOs and NCOs. Taher didn’t have any idea about this.

Being a serving officer Zia had profound influence on the cantonment while for Taher it was difficult to control everything from outside. He gathered all his loyal officers and soldiers from different cantonments of the country and always remained surrounded by them so that no one could harm him and do anything against his will.
Zia actually outplayed Taher through his strategy, intelligence and power. Consequently, Taher was tried by a military tribunal inside the Dhaka Central Jail and on 21 July 1976 executed in charge of high treason and murder while Zia established complete control over the army silencing his opponents.