Bangladesh’s Arctic Opening: Leveraging Ties with Russia and China

In November 2021, the Sevmorput, the only nuclear-powered cargo ship in service, left St. Petersburg carrying heavy equipment for Bangladesh's Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant. It did not take the Suez Canal. It sailed north and east along Russia's Arctic coast, through the Northern Sea Route (NSR). Few people in Dhaka noticed at the time. They should have, because the voyage hinted at a future in which Bangladesh's interests and the Arctic are more closely tied than geography suggests.
Russia's state nuclear corporation, Rosatom, built the nuclear power plant and also runs the NSR. In October 2026, Rooppur's first unit reached minimum controllable power, putting Bangladesh on the threshold of the nuclear age. That relationship is a door into the Arctic. Dhaka should deliberately decide how far to walk through it. 
This year has exposed a hard truth: Bangladesh's energy lifeline runs through the Strait of Hormuz, largely closed since the Iran war began on 28 February. Qatar supplied about 60 per cent of Bangladesh's LNG imports last year, but no cargo has arrived from Ras Laffan since the war began, and QatarEnergy has halved its scheduled 2026 deliveries. Asian spot LNG prices have neared $30 per million British thermal units, about triple pre-war levels. Power cuts have led knitwear factories to report cancelled orders and halted production. Since garments generate most export income, Bangladesh cannot afford an energy model that depends on a single chokepoint.

This is where the Arctic matters: it is warming nearly four times faster than the global average, and retreating ice is opening once-closed sea lanes. In 2025, the NSR saw a record 103 transit voyages carrying about 3.2 million tonnes of cargo, mostly oil, LNG and bulk commodities. Russia's Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 projects already ship gas east to Chinese terminals. Calling the Arctic its "strategic resource base,” Russia expects future energy exports to flow increasingly from there to Asia rather than Europe.
A long-term Russian supply relationship covering Arctic oil, LNG and fertiliser could diversify Bangladesh’s energy sources beyond the Gulf. Routed down the Arctic coast, then through the Pacific and the Strait of Malacca, these cargoes would bypass Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. They would not replace Gulf supplies, but even a modest alternative could strengthen Dhaka’s weak bargaining position. 
Russia matters to Bangladesh beyond Rooppur, supplying vital wheat and fertiliser while seeking Asian customers and Bay of Bengal allies. Bangladesh gains leverage by negotiating as a partner rather than a supplicant. China, its largest trading partner, supplies much of the yarn, fabric, and machinery that power its garment industry. The Arctic route does not shorten trips from Chattogram to Rotterdam, so the Suez route remains Bangladesh’s natural option. But it could reshape supply-chain economics. A faster seasonal link between northern China and Europe, alongside Arctic energy flows to East Asia, could shift Asia’s logistics pivot. Bangladesh should join this network. Chinese investment, including a $2.1 billion port-modernisation commitment agreed in March 2025, could help connect Chattogram and the Matarbari deep-sea port under construction to it.
Bangladesh has niche strengths: it is one of the world's largest ship-recycling nations, and the steel of retired ice-class vessels will one day reach the yards of Sitakunda. Its shipbuilders already export small vessels, while Polar Code-trained seafarers could work on the growing ice-class fleets Russia, China and South Korea are commissioning. Strategically, an Arctic role complements Bangladesh’s longstanding balanced foreign policy and ties with India, China, Japan, the United States and Russia. Since taking office in February 2026, Prime Minister Tarique Rahman has called his approach "Bangladesh First," met Rosatom's chief executive and sought closer ties with Beijing. An Arctic dimension would give Dhaka a stake in a theatre of great-power competition, and a reason for each power to take Bangladesh seriously.
History underscores the Arctic’s strategic importance. In World War II, Allied convoys crossed the Barents Sea to supply Murmansk, helping keep the Soviet Union in the war. The region remains a hub for great-power logistics, and Bangladesh's partners are key players. But cooperation requires caution: Russia faces extensive Western sanctions. In December 2022, Bangladesh turned away the Russian ship Ursa Major, carrying Rooppur cargo, after Washington identified it as sanctioned. Since the EU and US are Bangladesh’s largest garment markets, Arctic energy deals must comply with sanctions and protect exports. India, a neighbour and rising Arctic actor via its Chennai-Vladivostok corridor, will also be watching. Bangladesh must avoid debt traps that have harmed other countries in the region.
Bangladesh should build partnerships beyond Russia and China, engaging Japan (which is financing Matarbari), South Korea (a leading ice-class shipbuilder), India (which shares an interest in Russian Far East trade), and Norway (the Arctic state most open to outside scientific partnerships).
Practical steps include establishing an Arctic desk at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Second, accede to the Svalbard Treaty of 1920, which grants parties equal research and commercial rights in the archipelago (India and China are members, Bangladesh is not); giving the Bangladesh Oceanographic Research Institute a polar mandate and pursuing partnerships with Russian, Chinese and Norwegian institutions; negotiating long-term, sanctions-compliant Russian energy deals priced below the spot market; adding Polar Code courses at the Bangladesh Marine Academy; and applying for Arctic Council observer status. No Global South country, other than China and India, currently holds a seat.
Bangladesh will never be an Arctic state. But it is one of the countries most exposed to what happens in the Arctic; from rising seas in the Bay of Bengal to energy shocks in the Gulf. Its friendships with the powers that control Arctic routes are an asset to be used, not a liability to be hidden. The Sevmorput's voyage in 2021 was a sign. Dhaka should treat it as a starting point.
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The writer is a political and international affairs analyst and Research Fellow at Bangladesh Neeti Gobeshona Kendra