On Thursday, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) did something that years of diplomatic statements could not: it found Myanmar responsible for committing genocide against the Rohingya during the military operations of 2017. In the case brought by The Gambia, the judges went further than naming the crime. They ordered Myanmar to facilitate safe, voluntary and dignified return, restore or replace lost property, assist separated families and provide reparation. These obligations are binding, but a judgment cannot reopen a road or identify a destroyed home. The judges also found that Myanmar breached their 2020 order to preserve evidence, citing construction and destruction at former Rohingya village sites.
The court has also given Myanmar two years to report on restitution and proposed compensation before it considers the next stage. That interval should not become another period in which the Rohingya wait for declarations to acquire meaning. For Bangladesh, the urgent question is less whether the ruling is a diplomatic victory than whether the evidence needed to turn its remedies into individual claims can be secured while people remain displaced.
The difficulty begins with these words in the judgment: ‘place of residence’. Return is not simply the movement of refugees across the Naf River. It means being able to return to a particular place, recover possessions where possible, and live without renewed persecution. The court’s specified remedies include compensation for lost individual and collective property, the search for missing relatives and rehabilitation for survivors. But families who fled burning villages may have little paperwork left to establish ownership or the whereabouts of relatives. Some homes no longer exist.
The danger is not confined to the conduct of Myanmar’s central authorities. An August 2026 report by the UN Human Rights Office described abuses by both the military and the Arakan Army, which exercises control over much of Rakhine, including confiscation of Rohingya land and obstruction of return. A legal duty imposed on Myanmar does not, by itself, give it effective control of every village or ensure that any armed actor will respect the families arriving there. A replacement house cannot repair dispossession if its occupants remain exposed to persecution; the judgment expressly requires protection against discrimination. Counting people as ‘repatriated’ without addressing those conditions would confuse movement with restitution.
Bangladesh already has a starting point, though it is not a ready-made compensation system. The Government of Bangladesh and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) jointly register Rohingya refugees, recording family composition, personal details, biometric identifiers and places of origin in Myanmar. These records can help preserve identity and family links across years of displacement. They cannot, without further evidence, establish a boundary, prove ownership of a field or determine what a family has lost. The Court itself treated satellite imagery and corroborated witness accounts as important evidence. Similar methods could preserve a record of villages and losses without turning testimony prematurely into a legal finding. That distinction should guide any attempt to use them for the purposes of the judgment. UNHCR says the improved data-sharing arrangements outlined in its 2026 guidance are intended for protection and assistance, and are not designed to transmit refugee information to Myanmar without appropriate return conditions and an informed, voluntary decision. This safeguard matters. A register valuable to victims could also expose them if sensitive addresses or testimony passed into unsafe hands. Working with Rohingya representatives and independent protection specialists, Bangladesh could explore a voluntary, confidential way to record property descriptions, village histories, missing relatives and surviving documents, clearly distinguishing verified evidence from testimony awaiting assessment. The purpose would be to preserve potential claims, not to promise that Bangladesh can adjudicate land rights within another state.
Bosnia and Herzegovina provides a useful comparison precisely because it shows what a right of return requires after mass displacement. Following the Dayton peace agreement, property claims were pursued through domestic procedures under international supervision. By November 2003, the agencies overseeing implementation reported that property law implementation had reached 92 per cent in both of Bosnia’s main entities; more than 202,000 habitable properties had been repossessed by legitimate claimants. That figure measured property repossession, not the proportion of refugees who had physically returned or recovered a safe life.
The distinction matters as much as the achievement. Bosnia had a peace settlement, enforceable local property procedures and an international administrative presence. Myanmar has no comparable settlement or mechanism covering the Rohingya’s former homes, and fighting and persecution continue in Rakhine. It can seriously take Bosnia’s measurable approach: record the claims made, decide them through a credible process and verify whether the promised remedy reached its claimant. Without those steps, even a clear statement of the right to return can remain detached from the ground on which a house once stood.
The judgment creates a stronger legal position, not an automatic route to enforcement. Under Article 94 of the UN Charter, a party to an ICJ case may turn to the Security Council if the other party fails to comply, but Council action remains discretionary. Bangladesh is not the applicant in this case; The Gambia is. Bangladesh’s practical contribution could be to help ensure that Rohingya concerns and securely preserved evidence reach those pursuing compliance, while pressing for independent scrutiny of conditions in Rakhine. Any future restitution process should allow survivors to participate without exposing them to retaliation and should protect the choice not to return until it is safe to do so. The court has reserved the amount and form of compensation for a later phase, and Myanmar’s report is due within two years of 19 November 2026. These are openings for sustained examination of what has actually changed, not a countdown to sending refugees across the border. Independent scrutiny must ask whether families can use their land safely, not merely whether their departure from a camp has been recorded. The ruling establishes who bears legal responsibility. Its value to a displaced family will ultimately depend on whether that responsibility can be connected to a home, a loss and a remedy that can be claimed.
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The writer is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at IUBAT and is currently on study leave, residing in Oslo, Norway