Epaper ☀️ 🌐 English বাংলা Russian Hindi Chinese
×

Follow Us

Opinion

Foreign Investment Liberalisation and Capital Flight Dilemma

Dr. Abdullah A Dewan

Dr. Abdullah A Dewan

Published: 20 Nov 2026, 12:00 AM

Foreign Investment Liberalisation and Capital Flight Dilemma
A A

Bangladesh, like other developing countries, needs foreign investment to increase productive capacity, create jobs, upgrade technology and strengthen its foreign exchange position. Financial incentives alone, however, cannot secure investors’ confidence. Investors need assurance that their capital can enter and leave the country through transparent, predictable and legally enforceable procedures. Bangladesh Bank’s 3rd November decision to ease restrictions on preference-share investment is therefore a welcome move. Its effectiveness nevertheless hinges on a fundamental question: Can Bangladesh facilitate legitimate foreign capital movements while preventing these arrangements from becoming channels for illicit financial transactions?
Preference shares, known as preferred stock on Wall Street, generally give investors priority over common shareholders in dividends and claims on assets upon liquidation, although creditors rank ahead of both. Common shareholders typically have voting rights and greater potential to benefit from growth. Preference shareholders generally receive dividends on specified terms and have limited voting rights. These rights and any redemption provisions depend on the terms of issuance and applicable law.
The circular allows resident manufacturing and service companies to issue preference shares to non-resident investors without prior central bank approval when the dividend rate does not exceed five per cent of face value. Higher, participating or adjustable dividend rates require approval. Shares must be issued at face value against foreign currency received through official banking channels. Eligible dividends and redemption proceeds can be remitted abroad without prior approval, subject to regulatory and tax requirements. The reform reduces administrative delays and improves predictability.
Foreign investors have legitimate claims to dividends and repayment of redeemable capital under applicable laws and contracts. Such lawful outflows are not capital flight, and treating them as suspect would deter the very investors the country seeks to attract. Capital flight becomes a governance concern when resources are transferred unlawfully, concealed from regulators, or routed through arrangements designed to disguise ownership or circumvent financial controls.
Nevertheless, a legally documented transaction is not necessarily a transparent one. Consider a hypothetical case. Funds transferred abroad illicitly years ago sit in an offshore company. That company then “invests” in a Bangladeshi firm through a proper bank channel, and sometime later the shares are redeemed, and the proceeds are sent back abroad. On paper everything is in order. The money has acquired a respectable history as foreign investment, and the real owner never appears. This does not establish wrongdoing under the new circular. It shows why verification must reach beyond the immediate banking transaction.
The circular contains an important safeguard: dividends and redemption proceeds must return through the nominated authorised dealer bank to the country from which the investment originated. A change of bank requires prescribed clearance and transfer of records. These requirements create a documentary trail and restrict opportunities for routing payments through third jurisdictions. However, tracing the destination does not establish who ultimately owns the funds. An offshore company can receive money in the original jurisdiction while its controlling individuals remain concealed unless ownership is effectively verified.
The five per cent threshold also needs careful reading. It is an approval threshold, not a ceiling on total remittances. Although a low dividend rate may limit transfers through dividends alone, substantial foreign exchange outflows can occur through redemption of principal. Such repayments are legitimate when contractual and regulatory conditions are met; their size alone does not indicate wrongdoing. Effective oversight must follow the entire investment, including its source, ownership, dividend payments and redemption.
Bangladesh’s experience with illicit outflows makes the point more than theoretical. The 2024 White Paper estimated cumulative illicit financial outflows at roughly $234 billion over 2009-2023, averaging about $16 billion annually. These are estimates rather than verified measurements, and their methodology and uncertainty warrant caution. Nevertheless, their magnitude underscores the importance of financial transparency. Funds illicitly transferred abroad could potentially re-enter through apparently legitimate investment structures. A liberalised channel may attract genuine investors alongside attempts to obscure the origins or ownership of capital, making credible safeguards against money laundering and concealed ownership essential.
A related issue is timing. Foreign investment strengthens foreign exchange availability today, but dividends and redemptions create demand for foreign currency later. Export-oriented firms can earn the dollars to meet those obligations. A firm serving only the domestic market may contribute substantially to employment and output, yet it must buy foreign currency from the banking system when payments fall due. That is no reason to discourage domestic-market investment, but it does mean the quality of an investment should be judged together with the payments it will generate.
The circular explicitly requires compliance with know-your-customer requirements and anti-money-laundering standards. The central issue is how effectively banks enforce them. Banks should verify ultimate beneficial ownership and the source of funds at entry, then monitor subsequent transactions. Unusually early redemptions, complex offshore ownership, undisclosed related parties and repeated short-duration investments may justify closer examination, though none should be presumed unlawful. Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit should assess patterns across banks, since transactions unremarkable in isolation may become significant when viewed together. Risk-based supervision can preserve faster procedures for genuine investors while directing scrutiny towards transactions requiring further explanation.
Beyond financial supervision lies the broader institutional environment. Corruption, confrontational politics, extortion and weak contract enforcement can deter productive investment however smooth the approval procedures are. Liberalisation lowers administrative barriers, but whether capital arrives, stays and builds something depends on whether investors trust the institutions around it.
The policy should also be judged by evidence rather than by the number of shares issued. Bangladesh Bank could publish regular aggregate figures on investment inflows and outflows, holding periods, redemption patterns and compliance failures. Assessing employment, output and other productive contributions would require coordination with Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, investment authorities and relevant government agencies. Such reporting would help distinguish genuine productive investment from transactions primarily involving financial recycling, without imposing unnecessary burdens on legitimate investors.
Bangladesh should welcome foreign capital through open, predictable and dependable arrangements backed by credible regulatory oversight. Ultimately, the reform’s success should be measured by the transparency of capital movements, the identification of their true owners and the productive contributions of the investments it attracts.

The writer is Professor Emeritus of Economics at Eastern Michigan University, USA, and a former physicist and nuclear engineer at the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission. He can be reached at [email protected]

Read More
Advertisement