Four days separated two decisions that do not fit together. On 15 November in Manila, ASEAN leaders opened a door for Myanmar's military-backed government. On 19 November in The Hague, the International Court of Justice said it was "fully convinced that Myanmar committed acts falling under … the genocide convention." Southeast Asia must now hold both at once. Dhaka should watch closely, but without illusions.
ASEAN's Approach
The Manila decision is cautious, but its direction is clear. Leaders kept the limits on Myanmar's representation at summits and foreign ministers' meetings "until there is meaningful progress in the implementation of the 5PC." Myanmar's participation in sectoral ministerial bodies remains unrestricted. They also adopted a phased, progress-based approach. "Subject to sustained and concrete progress in the implementation of the 5PC by Myanmar," ASEAN may gradually restore Myanmar's full political representation. Members were also encouraged to engage Myanmar on their own, in coordination with the Chair.
What the text leaves out matters more. The decision does not mention Rakhine, the Rohingya, Bangladesh or repatriation. Displacement appears only in a list of security risks, alongside human trafficking, drug trafficking, cyber threats and online scams. Instead, the bloc reaffirms that Myanmar "remains an integral part of ASEAN."
For Bangladesh, the message is plain. Even at the moment of greatest legal pressure on Myanmar, the region's main document on the crisis did not name the Rohingya.
The dilemma the verdict creates
ASEAN now faces a real contradiction. Its members are moving towards normal relations with a state that the world's highest court has found responsible for genocidal acts. Three tensions follow.
The first tension is about reputation. Several members are hosting Myanmar's leaders. Every handshake is read against how Myanmar has approached the Rohingya issue, and what Bangladesh has asked of the ASEAN members. UN Secretary-General warned in Manila that engaging the military must not be mistaken for "appeasement."
The second is internal. ASEAN does not speak with one voice. At the UN General Assembly's Third Committee, a day before the verdict, Vietnam voted against the Rohingya resolution, while Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and Timor-Leste voted in favour. Muslim-majority members carry domestic pressure that Hanoi and Vientiane do not.
The third concerns ASEAN's leverage. Its seat at the summit table is the only real pressure it has left. Richard Horsey of the International Crisis Group warned against readmitting Myanmar "without getting anything meaningful in return." The junta, meanwhile, is not bargaining in good faith. On 14 November, its delegation rejected proposals on the special envoy and regular progress reports, arguing that the elections had made an envoy unnecessary.
The likely outcome is not a reversal; rather, ASEAN will likely absorb the verdict quietly.
Why Myanmar matters more to them than Bangladesh
Dhaka must accept an uncomfortable truth. For Southeast Asia, Myanmar is a member, a neighbour and a market. Bangladesh is a sympathetic partner outside the room.
Thailand shows why. It shares a border of more than 2,400 kilometres with Myanmar, with long-standing ties in trade, security and migration. Myanmar is a major supplier of natural gas to Thailand. In August, Thai Prime Minister Anutin and Min Aung Hlaing committed to a $12 billion trade target, a reopened border bridge and wider investment in energy, agriculture and healthcare. Bangkok reportedly hopes for a decision on Myanmar's full return by the time it chairs ASEAN in 2028.
The money runs deeper still. As of December 2025, Singapore, China and Thailand were the top sources of investment in Myanmar. Power, and oil and gas, took the largest shares. Behind all this sits China. Many ASEAN capitals fear that isolating Naypyidaw only pushes it further into Beijing's arms.
Bangladesh cannot compete on these terms. It is not an ASEAN member. Its trade with the bloc is modest. Its main asset in Southeast Asian eyes is moral standing, and moral standing rarely outweighs gas, borders and investment.
This does not make ASEAN hostile to Bangladesh. It makes Bangladesh a lower priority. Dhaka's diplomacy should be built on that fact, not on hope.
Managing expectations
Bangladesh should not expect ASEAN to suspend Myanmar, impose sanctions or make the ICJ judgment a condition of re-engagement. Consensus rules make that nearly impossible. Expecting it will only produce disappointment and public frustration in Dhaka.
A realistic goal is smaller but achievable. It is to get the Rohingya into ASEAN's own definition of "progress". If restoring Myanmar's full representation is to depend on progress, Bangladesh should press for Rakhine and the Rohingya to count in measuring it.
What Dhaka should do
First Dhaka needs to begin speaking ASEAN's language. Almost all ASEAN member governments respond to interests, less to appeals. Dhaka should frame the Rohingya issue around the risks that this bloc already names and shows concerns about - trafficking, boat movements, drugs and scam networks. Rakhine left unstable is a regional security problem, not only Bangladesh's humanitarian one.
Second is to invest in Singapore's chairmanship. Singapore takes the ASEAN chair in January and prohibits arms transfers to Myanmar. It is the most promising partner for tougher benchmarks. Dhaka should open a structured dialogue with Singapore now, before the 2027 agenda is set.
Third, use the openings in the text. The decision asks Myanmar to allow non-discriminatory aid, including to "unserved communities." Dhaka should argue that the Rohingya in Rakhine are among them. The decision also encourages coordination between the ASEAN and UN special envoys. Bangladesh should brief both envoys regularly and ask that Rakhine be on their agenda.
Fourth is to treat members differently. Malaysia and Indonesia, which voted for the resolution, are natural champions. They should be asked to raise the verdict inside ASEAN. Thailand should be engaged especially given the importance it has to Myanmar. Its channel to Naypyidaw is real, and Dhaka may need it to pass messages.
Fifth, use BIMSTEC. Thailand and Myanmar both belong to this Bay of Bengal grouping, and so does Bangladesh. It gives Dhaka a forum where it sits as an equal. Connectivity, energy and maritime security can give Bangkok reasons to value Bangladesh in its own right.
Sixth is to build economic weight. Dhaka should keep pursuing deeper institutional links with ASEAN. This should include a formal dialogue partnership. Trade and investment ties take years to build, but they are the only lasting way to matter more in Southeast Asian calculations.
Seventh, accept the Arakan Army reality. ASEAN's envoy already holds informal meetings with ethnic armed organisations. Bangladesh should ask that any such talks include the actors who actually control Rakhine and the conditions for Rohingya return.
The verdict has given Bangladesh a stronger legal position. It has not changed Southeast Asia's interests. Thailand still needs Myanmar's gas, Singapore its markets, and the whole region its stability. ASEAN will feel the dilemma, but it will probably resolve it in Myanmar's favour.
Dhaka's task is not to win that argument immediately or outright. The priority is to make sure the Rohingya are never again absent from the page.
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The writer is political and international affairs analyst