Can Peace Be Measured on Paper?

Nearly three decades after Bangladesh signed the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Peace Accord, a troubling question has returned to Parliament: how peaceful are the hills today? On 11 November, Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed informed lawmakers that 316 people had been killed in attacks by armed groups over the preceding five years. Of them, 308 were civilians, and eight were members of the security forces. Another 490 people had been injured. They become more thought-provoking when placed beside another parliamentary statement made just two months earlier. In September, the government reported that 65 of the 72 provisions of the 1997 peace accord had been fully implemented. Both statements concern the same region, yet they seem to tell different stories. One speaks of progress towards fulfilling an agreement. The other reveals the continuing cost of armed violence. Neither necessarily invalidates the other. But together they raise a question that deserves more attention than the usual debate over whether the accord has succeeded or failed. If so much has been accomplished under the agreement, why does insecurity remain such a serious concern? The difficulty may lie in how progress is measured.

For people living in Rangamati, Khagrachhari and Bandarban, peace is more immediate than a government report. It means being able to travel without fear, earn a living without intimidation and seek help when threatened. Parliamentary figures suggest these basic expectations remain under pressure. According to the home minister, armed groups carried out attacks against Bengali communities, ethnic minority communities and security personnel during the five-year period. Nor should the actions of armed organisations be attributed to entire populations. Were the attacks concentrated in particular districts? Has the situation improved in recent years, or have the dangers simply changed? How many cases have reached court, and how many victims have obtained justice? The published figures do not provide enough detail to answer these questions. The government’s reported operations against armed groups are relevant, but the public also needs to know what those operations have achieved. Security should ultimately be measured by whether people are becoming safer, not simply by how many operations are conducted.

The peace accord was intended to address problems that went well beyond armed confrontation. Signed on 2 December 1997, it provided a framework for regional administration and measures concerning land disputes, rehabilitation and political representation. Institutions such as the CHT Regional Council, the Hill District Councils and the Land Dispute Resolution Commission form part of that framework. Consider a family involved in a longstanding land dispute. The existence of a commission offers little practical reassurance if the dispute remains unresolved for years. The disagreement over implementation figures makes this distinction especially important. In September 2026, CHT Affairs Minister Sa Ching Prue Jerry told Parliament that 65 provisions had been fully implemented, with seven still outstanding. However, representatives of Parbatya Chattogram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS), a party to the original accord, have disputed the government’s assessment. In December 2024, The Daily Star reported their position that only 25 provisions had been fully implemented, 18 partially implemented, and 29 remained unimplemented. These are competing assessments, not interchangeable facts. Does a provision count as fulfilled when a law is passed, when an institution begins operating, or when people receive the benefit it was intended to deliver? Without agreed, publicly understandable standards, ordinary citizens find it hard to assess both official progress reports and criticisms of them.

An experience from Indonesia offers a useful way of thinking about this problem. In August 2005, the Indonesian government and Free Aceh Movement signed an agreement intended to end a prolonged armed conflict in Aceh. The settlement was followed by Aceh Monitoring Mission, established with the involvement of the European Union and participating Southeast Asian countries. Its responsibilities were clearly defined. Monitors observed the disarmament of former combatants, the withdrawal of designated security forces, efforts to reintegrate former fighters into civilian life and compliance with other commitments. They could also examine complaints about alleged violations of the agreement. Aceh's experience was not without difficulties, and its political circumstances were different from those of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. It would be misleading to suggest that Bangladesh could simply copy the Indonesian arrangement. In Aceh, important parts of the agreement were linked to activities that could be observed and checked. Bangladesh already has mechanisms concerned with implementing the CHT accord. The question is whether their assessments give the public a sufficiently clear picture of results. A statement that a provision has been implemented should ideally explain what has changed, who is responsible for carrying it out and what remains unresolved. Such clarity would help both the government and its critics move beyond competing totals.

The latest figures should therefore encourage a more practical conversation about peace in the hills. Bangladesh does not need another argument in which one side counts completed provisions and other points to continuing violence, with neither addressing the other’s evidence. It needs a clearer way to examine both. The government could publish an annual account of security in the three hill districts, showing deaths, injuries, reported attacks, investigations and the outcomes of serious criminal cases. Separate public assessments could explain progress on the accord’s outstanding commitments, particularly where land disputes and the functioning of local institutions remain contested. Residents from different communities should have safe opportunities to describe their experiences and question official findings. They would also allow the public to distinguish genuine improvements from promises that have yet to deliver results. They could also help identify which problems require stronger law enforcement and which demand better administration or political dialogue. The 1997 accord remains an important achievement in Bangladesh's history. Recognising its significance does not require treating every aspect of its implementation as successful. The more serious task is to examine both with equal care. After almost 29 years, the people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts deserve an answer that goes beyond the number of provisions completed. They deserve to know whether the institutions created in the name of peace are making their everyday lives safer.
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The writer is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at IUBAT and is currently on study leave, residing in Oslo, Norway