COP31 and Bangladesh: Turning Climate Vulnerability into Diplomatic Leverage

Bangladesh is about to enter another round of negotiations with renewed urgency, as negotiators meet in Antalya from 9 to 20 November with Türkiye as the chair of the COP31 and Australia as the chair of the negotiations. What does it take for a border nation to become a force for good? The solution is not yet another call for help. Bangladesh must integrate climate justice with economic security, competitiveness, technology and strategic autonomy.

Structural exposure, cyclones, surges, riverbank erosion, floods and salinity are direct threats to livelihoods and growth due to a low-lying delta, a dense coastal population, and climate-sensitive agriculture. In 2022, Bangladesh accounted for approximately 0.52 per cent of global emissions. Dhaka estimates annual climate losses at around US$15.2 billion, a figure cited by the World Bank. The World Bank estimates that cyclones cost approximately $1 billion per year and extreme heat costs up to $1.78 billion in 2024. 

The gap is stark. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) estimates that developing countries will need $310-$365 billion per year for adaptation by 2035, while international public adaptation finance totalled $26 billion in 2023. It also cautions against increasing the debt ratio. The $300 billion target agreed at COP29 includes both mitigation and adaptation, and COP30 only "calls for efforts to at least triple" adaptation finance by 2035. Bangladesh's medium-term climate-action needs are estimated at least $12.5 billion, or approximately three per cent of GDP. Bangladesh should therefore demand adaptation and finance for loss and damage, with a grant-based approach. Adapting by borrowing would increase a nation's fiscal burden, which already has to pay for health, education and industry.

The Loss and Damage Fund needs to be swift, too. Its start-up phase set aside $250 million for 2025-26. Grants are available from $5 million to $20 million per request, and half of the grants are allocated to small island states and least developed countries. That's very small compared to what is needed. However, the Board's decision to allocate $21.6 million for Nepal’s response to this year's Bhotekoshi floods, submitted outside the normal period, shows faster access is possible. Bangladesh should demand simple applications, regular payments, and recognition of non-economic losses: homes, land, displaced communities and lost social connections.

Bangladesh should make resilience a national security priority. Climate-related disasters internally displaced about 21 million people between 2008 and 2024. Salinity in the south-west, river floods and north-western water stress threaten livelihoods. The National Adaptation Plan and Delta Plan 2100 set direction, but the Centre for Policy Dialogue says that implementation plans lack safeguards for public climate funds and that some projects reflect political rather than technical priorities. Funding should support integrated river management, coastal protection, freshwater security, resilient farming, urban drainage and early warning, all vital to productivity, health and stability.

Market access is increasingly shaped by climate policy. The EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) entered its final implementation stage on 1 January 2026, covering iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen. Garments are currently excluded, so Bangladesh faces no direct exposure. However, an expanded scope or buyers’ carbon-footprint requirements could raise costs for exporters lacking affordable finance and technology. Bangladesh should seek technology transfer, climate finance and industrial upgrading in trade-related climate rules. Carbon accounting should drive green industrialisation, not create barriers.

This year's disruption to Gulf energy flows highlights the role renewables, grids, storage and efficiency can play in reducing emissions and enhancing energy security. However, households, farms and factories require affordable and reliable power. A quick turnaround without finance and infrastructure would involve costs. It is not just about equipment finance; a just transition should include technology transfer, joint research, skills development, local manufacturing and affordable storage. Collaborations between universities, research institutes and industry would help develop local capacity and minimise reliance on imported technology.
Rivers flowing beyond Bangladesh's borders compel regional cooperation as it is now. The 12th December 2026 is the expiry date of the Ganges Water Treaty of 1996, and its renewal remains uncertain. Bangladesh should include shared-river management on the agenda of COP31 and tie it to adaptation with India, Nepal and Bhutan. This includes joint flood forecasting, open hydrological data, drought preparedness and Himalayan research, and renewable electricity trade.

Bangladesh is endowed with real assets. It has cyclone early warning, community-based adaptation and coastal resilience, and a voice in the G77 and China and the Least Developed Countries Group. But influence can't be achieved by just pointing out suffering. It requires clear priorities, published evidence, transparent domestic climate governance and measurable delivery. Willingness to fund would increase if there was independent monitoring of climate finance, open project selection and evidence-based assessment of results. Five asks would support Dhaka's stance: triple adaptation finance through grants, with a clear 2025 baseline; improve and streamline access to the Loss and Damage Fund; provide technology and financial support for climate-related trade rules; ensure a fair energy transition that builds local capacity; and share river data and forecasts with neighbouring countries.

There will be no declarations or pledges at COP31 used to judge success. It will be judged on whether negotiations result in accessible finance, the protection of development, increased technological capacity and making millions more resilient. Vulnerability is the key to leverage for Bangladesh's economic future and strategic autonomy.
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The writer is a Professor in the Department of Geography and Environment at the University of Dhaka and Chairman of the Foundation for Geointelligence Policy Support (FGPS). He can be reached at [email protected]