Rebuilding Republic beyond Politics of Power

Bangladesh has reached a political moment in which winning an election is no longer the most difficult part of the democratic experiment. The more consequential challenge is to prove that a change of government can produce a change in the character of the state.

Following the July 2024 uprising, the departure of Sheikh Hasina’s government, the interim administration led by Muhammad Yunus, and the return of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) to power through the February 2026 election, the country has faced an extraordinary political upheaval.

Tarique Rahman’s government now possesses the authority to govern, while the public retains the right to question whether the promises of democratic renewal are becoming reality. The central question is no longer who should rule Bangladesh, but whether Bangladesh can finally establish a political order in which power is exercised as a public responsibility rather than a partisan possession. 

The BNP’s decisive electoral victory has provided the government with a substantial parliamentary mandate. Yet electoral legitimacy and democratic transformation are not interchangeable. A party can win convincingly and still fail to reform the institutions through which political domination becomes possible. The history of Bangladesh offers repeated warnings against confusing popular support with an unlimited entitlement to govern. Governments may enter office promising freedom, accountability and national reconstruction, only to discover the attractions of centralised authority once they begin exercising it. The test of the present administration will therefore be whether it can resist the temptation to treat electoral success as proof that its decisions are beyond challenge.

Political scientist Robert A. Dahl, in On Democracy, identifies meaningful participation, political equality and enlightened understanding as essential democratic conditions. His argument challenges the narrow understanding of elections as occasional opportunities to select rulers. Citizens do not surrender their sovereignty after casting their ballots. They retain the right to scrutinise public decisions, demand explanations and oppose policies they consider unjust. The democratic mandate is consequently a conditional public trust, not a blank cheque. The more decisive a government’s electoral victory, the greater its responsibility to demonstrate that its majority will serve as an instrument of reform rather than a shield against accountability.

The July uprising was fuelled by grievances that extended beyond a particular government or political personality. The concentration of authority, restrictions on political opposition, questions surrounding electoral credibility and the demand for accountability helped create a crisis that ultimately overwhelmed the existing order. The uprising also exposed the distance between the promise of national development and the experience of citizens who felt excluded from political decision-making. Its significance cannot be reduced to the replacement of one administration by another. It raised a more fundamental question about the relationship between the citizen and the state: whether public institutions exist to serve the population or whether citizens are expected to accommodate the convenience of those who control those institutions.

A constitution should not become the property of whichever party happens to command a parliamentary majority. Nor should constitutional reform be reduced to an endless negotiation in which every political actor protects its immediate advantage at the expense of institutional progress. A credible process requires transparent deliberation, public scrutiny and meaningful engagement with political parties, civil society, legal experts, youth representatives and communities whose voices have traditionally received insufficient attention. The government must recognise that parliamentary strength provides the authority to initiate reform, but lasting constitutional legitimacy requires more than numerical superiority. Opposition parties, in turn, must demonstrate that their participation is motivated by the public interest rather than a desire to obstruct the government. Neither side should be permitted to convert a historic opportunity into another episode of partisan deadlock.

The philosopher John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, places equal basic liberties at the foundation of a just society. Applied to Bangladesh, this principle demands that constitutional safeguards protect citizens regardless of their political affiliations. An opposition activist should enjoy the same legal protections as a governing party supporter. A journalist investigating the government should not face intimidation because the findings are inconvenient. A citizen accused of a crime should receive due process even when the accusation generates public anger. The strength of democratic institutions is revealed not by how comfortably they accommodate the powerful, but by how reliably they protect those who lack political influence.

This makes accountability for past abuses one of the most important and delicate responsibilities of the post-uprising state. Allegations of unlawful killings, political persecution, corruption and other abuses require credible investigation and, where supported by evidence, lawful punishment. But justice must be distinguished from retaliation. If accountability depends on political identity, the result will be another hierarchy of privilege in which yesterday’s powerful become today’s defendants and today’s powerful become tomorrow’s untouchables. The purpose of reform is not to reverse the direction of impunity but to dismantle it. A justice system earns public confidence when it can investigate allies and opponents according to the same standards, without interference from political leaders or pressure from the street.

Rebuilding the republic also requires confronting the institutional structures that have survived successive political transitions. A government may replace senior officials, reorganise departments and announce administrative reforms, yet leave intact the incentives that reward loyalty over competence. The civil service, police, judiciary, electoral administration and public procurement system must be protected from partisan capture. Merit-based recruitment, transparent appointments, independent oversight and enforceable disciplinary procedures are essential if institutions are to function beyond the preferences of individual leaders. The objective should not be to create a bureaucracy loyal to a new political establishment, but to build a professional public service loyal to the law.

The same principle applies to the media. A free press is not an ornamental feature of democracy, nor is criticism of the government evidence of hostility to the country. Bangladesh’s recent political upheaval demonstrated the importance of public communication in exposing abuses and mobilising citizens. Yet the post-uprising period has also raised concerns about intimidation, attacks on media organisations and pressure on journalists. The Commonwealth’s election assessment noted that restrictive laws had contributed to a chilling effect on media freedom. These concerns cannot be dismissed simply because the country has returned to electoral government. 

The BNP government must understand that protecting unfavourable reporting is as important as welcoming favourable coverage. Journalists must be able to investigate allegations of corruption, question ministers, examine public expenditure and report on abuses without fear of violence, arbitrary legal action or organised intimidation. Equally, journalism must meet its own obligations of accuracy, verification and fairness. A democratic media environment requires both professional responsibility and protection from political coercion. A government confident in its mandate should have little reason to fear scrutiny. Indeed, independent scrutiny can help distinguish genuine reform from the performance of reform.

The opposition also has responsibilities that extend beyond criticising the government. The Jamaat-led alliance and other opposition forces must offer credible alternatives, scrutinise legislation and participate constructively in constitutional discussions. Their democratic legitimacy depends not merely on the number of seats they hold but on their willingness to defend principles that would remain valid if they themselves came to power. Political competition becomes destructive when every disagreement is framed as an existential battle and every compromise portrayed as betrayal. Bangladesh needs an opposition capable of holding the government accountable without treating the failure of the state as a political victory.

The future of the Awami League and the political participation of its supporters present another difficult question. The collapse of Sheikh Hasina’s government cannot erase the political presence of millions of citizens who have supported the party, nor can historical grievances justify collective punishment. Any legal restrictions, investigations or decisions concerning political participation must rest on transparent laws, evidence and due process. Accountability for individual wrongdoing must not be confused with the permanent exclusion of an entire political constituency. A sustainable democratic order must provide lawful routes for political competition while ensuring that no party, regardless of its historical significance or popular support, stands above the law. Exclusion may simplify political calculations in the short term, but it rarely resolves the underlying divisions of a society.

Economic insecurity may ultimately determine whether democratic renewal becomes a lived reality or remains a political promise. Citizens who struggle with rising living costs, insecure employment, inadequate healthcare and unequal educational opportunities cannot be expected to judge national progress solely through constitutional declarations. The BNP’s election programme included commitments on employment, industrial revival, social protection, education and healthcare. These promises now require transparent budgets, measurable targets and public reporting on implementation. 

Economic reform must also address the structures that make opportunity dependent on political connections. Young people need access to quality education, relevant skills and fair recruitment rather than assurances that jobs will eventually appear. Women require safe workplaces, equal opportunities, affordable childcare and protection against discrimination. Small businesses need predictable regulations and access to finance, while workers need wages and working conditions that allow them to live with dignity. Public money must be spent according to demonstrable need rather than partisan loyalty. If the benefits of economic growth remain concentrated among influential groups, democratic institutions will struggle to retain public confidence, regardless of how frequently the government invokes its electoral mandate.

The challenge is especially urgent for the generation whose participation helped make the July uprising possible. Young Bangladeshis did not mobilise simply to exchange familiar political faces for unfamiliar ones. Their demands expressed a desire for dignity, fairness, opportunity and a political culture in which advancement did not require submission to entrenched power. That aspiration cannot be fulfilled by inviting young people to attend consultations while decisions remain concentrated among established political elites. Youth representation must become meaningful in political parties, public institutions, universities and policy-making bodies. 

Education is central to this transformation. In Democracy and Education, John Dewey understood democracy as a way of living together through shared experience and communication, not merely a form of government. Bangladesh’s educational institutions must therefore cultivate independent judgment, intellectual curiosity and respect for disagreement. Universities should not become extensions of political party offices, and student organisations should not function as instruments of intimidation. An educational system that rewards conformity while discouraging questioning will struggle to produce the citizens a democratic republic needs. The purpose of education is not to train people to repeat the convictions of those in authority, but to equip them to examine authority critically.

Political culture must change alongside formal institutions. George Orwell’s Animal Farm offers a warning through its memorable declaration that “All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.” The line captures a danger that Bangladesh knows too well: the possibility that a movement founded on equality may gradually develop its own privileged class. Revolutionary language can conceal familiar practices when leaders begin to believe that their historical contribution entitles them to special treatment. The lesson is not that every political transition is destined to fail, but that democratic vigilance must continue after the celebrations end. No political force should receive permanent moral immunity for having opposed a previous injustice.