Why Equating Dhaka with Islamabad Could Backfire

In South Asia’s evolving geopolitical landscape, Bangladesh and Pakistan represent two very different realities. Their historical trajectories, political experiences, economic progress and relationships with India have followed distinct paths. Yet a growing tendency within sections of India’s political discourse and public debate appears to place Bangladesh and Pakistan within the same strategic frame. While such a narrative may serve certain domestic political purposes, it risks creating long-term complications for India’s own diplomatic and strategic interests.

India and Bangladesh share one of the most extensive and interconnected relationships in the region. Geography, trade, culture, water resources, connectivity and people-to-people ties bind the two countries in ways that are fundamentally different from India’s relationship with Pakistan. For decades, New Delhi and Dhaka have worked together on issues ranging from border management and security cooperation to energy trade and regional connectivity.

However, political developments in recent years have led to a shift in perception. In parts of India’s domestic political arena, Bangladesh has increasingly been viewed through the lens of migration, border security and identity politics. Public debates, election campaigns and social media narratives have often contributed to an image of Bangladesh that does not necessarily reflect the broader reality of bilateral relations.

This trend carries consequences. Diplomacy is built not only on agreements between governments but also on trust between peoples. When a neighbouring country is repeatedly portrayed as a strategic concern or treated as part of a broader security problem, public perceptions inevitably change. In Bangladesh, such narratives can create doubts about India’s intentions and fuel the belief that Dhaka is not being viewed as an equal and independent partner.

The challenge has become more pronounced following Bangladesh’s recent political transition. Any major political change naturally creates a new diplomatic environment. The key question for India is whether it can adapt to that new reality with flexibility and pragmatism. Successful foreign policy is not built around individuals or specific governments alone; it is built around long-term national interests and enduring state-to-state relations.

Political transitions in Bangladesh have introduced new dynamics that New Delhi must carefully navigate. Public opinion, domestic political calculations and changing regional considerations – all influence how the current leadership approaches India. In such a context, expectations of a rapid return to the previous level of political comfort may not align with the realities on the ground.

At the same time, India’s own domestic politics can complicate efforts to rebuild confidence. When foreign policy issues become entangled with electoral rhetoric, long-term strategic goals risk being overshadowed by short-term political gains. This is particularly significant in the case of Bangladesh, where perceptions matter as much as policy.

From a strategic perspective, India has little to gain by treating Bangladesh and Pakistan as part of the same geopolitical equation. Doing so ignores the unique characteristics of Bangladesh and risks pushing bilateral relations into unnecessary turbulence. More importantly, it may encourage the very outcome that India would prefer to avoid: the emergence of closer political or strategic understandings among countries that feel marginalised by New Delhi’s approach.

For India, maintaining stable and constructive relations with Bangladesh is not merely a diplomatic objective; it is a strategic necessity. Bangladesh plays a critical role in regional connectivity, trade routes, energy cooperation and the economic integration of India’s northeastern states. Any deterioration in ties would, therefore, carry implications far beyond traditional diplomacy.

There is also a broader regional dimension. South Asia remains one of the least integrated regions in the world, despite its immense economic potential. Cooperative relations between India and Bangladesh have often been viewed as a model for what constructive regional engagement can achieve. Allowing suspicion and political rhetoric to erode that foundation would be a setback for the wider region.

Another important consideration is respect and mutual recognition. Modern international relations are increasingly shaped by partnerships rather than hierarchies. Smaller neighbours expect to be treated with dignity and strategic relevance, not merely through the prism of larger powers’ domestic calculations. Bangladesh’s economic growth, demographic strength and geopolitical significance have given it a far more influential role than many traditional assumptions would suggest.

For this reason, rebuilding confidence does not necessarily require dramatic diplomatic breakthroughs. Often, incremental steps can be equally effective. Expanding cultural exchanges, strengthening educational links, encouraging business cooperation and promoting sporting engagements can help restore goodwill and create a more positive atmosphere for broader policy discussions.

So, the real challenge for India is not how to respond to political changes in Bangladesh, but how to avoid allowing domestic narratives to shape regional diplomacy. Viewing Bangladesh through the same lens as Pakistan may generate political headlines, but it is unlikely to advance India’s strategic interests. A stable, confident and cooperative Bangladesh is far more valuable to India than a relationship weighed down by mistrust and misperceptions.

As South Asia enters a period of renewed geopolitical competition and shifting alliances, New Delhi’s success will depend on its ability to pursue a nuanced and forward-looking neighbourhood policy. Recognising Bangladesh as a distinct and important partner rather than as part of a broader security narrative would be a significant step in that direction. In diplomacy, creating adversaries is easy; sustaining trust is far more difficult. For India, the wiser course may be to invest in that trust before the costs of its erosion become much harder to reverse.
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The writer is a political analyst, private banking financial crime compliance specialist, columnist and poet based in Geneva, Switzerland