CHT: Present Realities and Government’s Way Forward

The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) -- comprising Rangamati, Khagrachhari and Bandarban-- is one of Bangladesh’s most strategically sensitive regions. Covering roughly one-tenth of the country and sharing long borders with India and Myanmar, the area possesses immense geopolitical, environmental and security importance. Its difficult terrain, ethnic diversity, unresolved land disputes, armed organisations, cross-border trafficking routes and proximity to conflict-ridden Myanmar make peace in the CHT a matter of national security rather than merely a regional administrative concern. The roots of the problem are historical. The construction of the Kaptai Dam in the early 1960s submerged approximately 54,000 acres of agricultural land and displaced nearly 100,000 people, most of whom belonged to Chakma community. Many received inadequate compensation, and thousands migrated to India. After Bangladesh’s independence, disagreements over cultural recognition, regional autonomy and land rights contributed to the emergence of the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti and its armed wing, the Shanti Bahini. An insurgency lasting nearly two decades caused deaths, displacement and deep mistrust among hill communities, Bengali residents and state institutions.

The 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord ended the principal insurgency and enabled combatants to surrender their weapons. It created or strengthened institutions such as the CHT Regional Council, three Hill District Councils, the Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs and the Land Dispute Resolution Commission. The accord remains a historic achievement because it replaced armed confrontation with political dialogue. However, the settlement has never been fully consolidated. Disputes persist over landownership, the authority and election of local councils, rehabilitation of displaced people, demilitarisation and the division of administrative powers between national and regional institutions. The vacuum created by incomplete implementation has allowed rival organisations to expand. The PCJSS itself divided, while the United People’s Democratic Front and its factions developed their own political and armed structures. More recently, the Kuki-Chin National Front and its armed wing emerged in parts of Bandarban. The KNF’s alleged involvement in attacks, abductions, bank robberies and weapons theft in 2024 demonstrated that geographically limited militancy can still create a national security crisis. Extortion, kidnapping, factional killings and coercive taxation have affected traders, transport operators, contractors and ordinary villagers. Rival groups often claim to represent particular communities, but armed intimidation deprives those same communities of democratic choice and economic opportunity.

The Myanmar conflict has added a dangerous new dimension. Fighting in Rakhine and Chin states, the growing strength of the Arakan Army, the displacement of populations and the circulation of weapons have transformed the Bangladesh–Myanmar border into an increasingly volatile frontier. Armed actors can exploit forests, remote trails and ethnic connections extending across Bangladesh, Myanmar and India. Narcotics, particularly methamphetamine, as well as small arms, contraband goods and human trafficking move through overlapping networks. A local incident can therefore acquire a transnational character rapidly. Foreign actors may attempt to exploit instability in such a strategically important region. The CHT lies near India’s north-eastern states, Myanmar’s conflict zones, the Bay of Bengal and transport corridors connecting South and Southeast Asia. International advocacy groups, religious organisations, intelligence services, transnational ethnic networks and geopolitical competitors may all take an interest in developments there. Some involvement may be humanitarian or concerned with legitimate human rights issues; other activity may seek political leverage, influence local organisations or keep Dhaka under diplomatic pressure.

The government must nevertheless distinguish verified interference from speculation. Foreign funding, arms supply, militant training or assistance in establishing sanctuaries should be investigated through intelligence, financial records and diplomatic channels. Allegations should not be presented as established facts without evidence. Labelling every expression of indigenous grievance as a foreign conspiracy would alienate citizens and make genuine external manipulation easier. Conversely, dismissing every security concern as propaganda would leave the country exposed. The appropriate response is professional counterintelligence combined with political inclusion and transparent investigation. External powers gain opportunities primarily when internal grievances remain unresolved. Land disputes, corruption, weak local governance, unemployment, unequal access to public services and perceptions of cultural disrespect can become recruiting tools for armed organisations. Heavy-handed security actions, communal violence or failure to investigate abuses may also be used internationally to damage Bangladesh’s reputation. The most effective defence against foreign influence is therefore not secrecy alone; it is a legitimate state that protects every citizen impartially.

Security forces remain indispensable because civilians cannot negotiate freely when armed groups control roads, collect illegal taxes or threaten political opponents. The Army, Border Guard Bangladesh, police and intelligence agencies must maintain surveillance over border areas. The Peace Accord should be reviewed clause by clause, with the government publishing a credible account of what has been implemented, what remains pending and which provisions require legal clarification. A time-bound roadmap should follow. Local and regional council elections based on an accepted voter list would strengthen representative government. The Land Commission needs adequate resources, workable procedures, cadastral surveys, digitised records and mechanisms to prevent fraudulent claims. Land cases must be resolved through law, evidence and consultation rather than ethnic mobilisation. A renewed dialogue should include the government, accord signatories, non-signatory political groups, women, youth, traditional leaders, Bengali residents and smaller hill communities that often feel overshadowed. 

Development should be redesigned around local needs. Roads and tourism projects alone cannot create peace if residents fear displacement or receive few benefits. Education in Bangla, English and appropriate mother tongues, residential schools in remote areas, scholarships, vocational training, telemedicine, maternal healthcare, digital connectivity and local employment can reduce isolation. Development projects should undergo environmental and social-impact assessments, since deforestation, unregulated tourism and hill cutting threaten livelihoods and increase landslide risks. Local people must receive a fair share of economic opportunities. Bangladesh should also strengthen cooperation with India and engage every relevant authority across the Myanmar frontier to prevent armed groups from using neighbouring territory. Border coordination should cover intelligence sharing, trafficking, illegal crossings and the return of criminals, without allowing any foreign power to interfere in Bangladesh’s internal administration. International assistance may be accepted where useful, but policies for the CHT must be formulated in Dhaka through consultation with the region’s citizens.

The government’s central task is to reject two misleading extremes: that the CHT is merely a law-and-order problem, or that security measures are unnecessary and every conflict can be solved through concessions. Sustainable peace requires both authority and justice. Bangladesh must protect its territory firmly, disarm violent groups, control its borders and resist foreign manipulation. At the same time, it must resolve legitimate grievances, ensure equal citizenship, honour realistic commitments and make local institutions accountable.