Bangladesh, in a World of More Weapons and Less Aid

Every dollar spent on defence is a dollar unavailable elsewhere. As global insecurity grows, so does a difficult question: what are we sacrificing in the name of security? For developing countries like Bangladesh, the trade-off is already evident. The sharp retreat in US foreign assistance, including disruptions to USAID-supported programmes, has intensified pressure on development and humanitarian financing. In Cox’s Bazar, UNICEF warned that severe cuts in official development assistance were threatening education, health, protection and other essential services for hundreds of thousands of Rohingya children.

Yet as development funding comes under strain, military spending continues to rise. In 2025, the world recorded 61 state-based armed conflicts, the highest number in the post-Second World War dataset. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), global military expenditure reached US$2.887 trillion, marking the eleventh consecutive annual increase and standing 41 per cent higher than a decade earlier. Military spending outside the United States alone rose by 9.2 per cent in 2025. Beyond the cost of conflict, these figures point to a broader shift in how nations define security, build alliances and pursue international cooperation.

The United Nations remains indispensable. Its humanitarian, development and peacekeeping roles, backed by universal membership, cannot be replaced by regional organisations or defence pacts. Yet the UN Security Council has often struggled to act when major powers are directly involved in, or divided over, conflicts. The issue is not declining trust in the UN, but a growing reluctance to rely on global institutions alone for immediate security.

Alternatives are already emerging. Traditional regional institutions such as NATO, the European Union, the African Union and ASEAN continue to play important security roles. Smaller strategic groupings are also gaining prominence. AUKUS links Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States on advanced defence capabilities, while the QUAD brings together Australia, India, Japan and the United States around Indo-Pacific interests. Recent defence arrangements involving Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye reflect a similar trend. Meanwhile, BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation provide additional platforms for advancing political, economic and strategic interests.

These arrangements are not identical. Some are military alliances, some are regional organisations, and others are bilateral, trilateral or “minilateral” partnerships. But together they indicate a more fragmented international order in which states increasingly operate through overlapping circles of cooperation. And money tends to follow perceived security. SIPRI estimates that military expenditure in Asia and Oceania increased by 8.1 per cent in 2025. India, already the world’s fifth-largest military spender, increased expenditure by 8.9 per cent to $92.1 billion. Pakistan increased its spending by 11 per cent to $11.9 billion.

For Bangladesh, this changing environment deserves attention. Bangladesh cannot, and need not, compete with major powers through military expenditure. It has legitimate defence requirements, particularly given its geography and strategic location on the Bay of Bengal. But its long-term security depends just as much on economic stability, employment, education, healthcare, energy, climate resilience and social cohesion. This is where the global shift becomes worrying.

Money spent on defence is not automatically money wasted. Governments have a responsibility to protect their citizens and sovereignty. But budgets involve choices. When security expenditure rises faster than investment in health, education, climate adaptation and social protection, the opportunity cost becomes real. For countries with limited fiscal space, that trade-off can be particularly painful.

The same calculation applies internationally. If wealthy countries devote greater fiscal and political attention to defence, deterrence and strategic competition while development assistance contracts, poorer countries may experience the consequences far from any battlefield.

Bangladesh is already seeing what shrinking international assistance can mean in Cox’s Bazar. Similar pressures could affect climate finance, health, education, food security and other areas where developing countries still depend partly on international cooperation. This is why South Asia needs a different conversation about regionalism. The region does not lack common threats. Climate change does not recognise the India-Bangladesh border. Rivers cross several countries. Air pollution travels freely. Energy markets are interconnected. Earthquakes, cyclones, floods, disease outbreaks and displacement can quickly become regional problems.

Yet SAARC, the institution specifically created for South Asian cooperation, remains largely dormant. BIMSTEC provides another important platform, particularly around the Bay of Bengal, but cannot fully substitute for cooperation across South Asia.

At a time when regional cooperation is gaining importance globally, South Asia remains one of the least integrated regions. The answer should not be another arms race. Imagine if even a fraction of the effort now devoted to strategic competition were invested in a South Asian disaster-response mechanism, regional electricity trading, climate research, public health surveillance, student and researcher mobility, or coordinated management of transboundary water. That would also be security.

Regionalism does not have to weaken the United Nations. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter explicitly recognises a role for regional arrangements in maintaining international peace and security. Stronger regional institutions can complement a global system rather than replace it. For Bangladesh, that distinction matters. Smaller countries benefit from international rules and functioning multilateral institutions because power alone cannot protect their interests. Bangladesh therefore has little interest in a world where universal institutions simply give way to competing blocs dominated by larger powers. The emerging international order may nevertheless be moving towards a mixture of global institutions, regional organisations and smaller bilateral and minilateral partnerships. Bangladesh will have to navigate all three.

The question is what kind of regionalism South Asia chooses. If growing insecurity produces mainly military alliances and higher defence expenditure, developing countries may pay twice: first through a more dangerous world, and again through reduced investment in their people.

For Bangladesh, security and development should not become competing priorities. The real challenge is to broaden our understanding of security itself. Protecting borders matters, but so do protecting livelihoods, educating children, strengthening health systems, securing energy, and helping communities withstand climate disasters. In an increasingly fragmented world, that may be the form of regionalism South Asia needs most.

____________________________________________________

The writer is an academician and development strategist, currently serving at a foreign diplomatic mission in Dhaka.

He can be reached at [email protected]