A Nation That Neglects Its Defence Risks Losing Its Freedom

There are people in our country who regularly speak against national defence, the armed forces and military modernisation. Some do so out of ignorance; and others knowingly or unknowingly repeat narratives promoted by quarters that do not want Bangladesh to become strategically capable and militarily self-reliant. Whatever their motive, such rhetoric weakens public understanding of national security and ultimately works against the interests of the country. They ask questions like “Who will attack us?” “Why do we need modern fighter aircraft?” “Why do we spend money on defence when we have other national priorities?” These questions may sound attractive, but they are based on a dangerous misconception. No independent country can guarantee that it will never face aggression, coercion, border violations, maritime disputes, cyberattacks, terrorism or regional instability. Bangladesh may desire peace, but peace cannot be secured by goodwill alone. A country does not maintain armed forces because it wants war. It develops credible defence capabilities so that others will hesitate to impose war upon it. A capable military also protects national resources, supports diplomacy and gives the government options during crises. 

History repeatedly demonstrates the danger of unpreparedness. Poland was invaded in 1939 despite diplomatic assurances. Iraq occupied Kuwait within days in 1990. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 showed that borders, airports, power stations, ports, bridges, communication networks and civilian centres can become targets from the first hours of war.

Singapore provides an important example. It is a small island state of about 744 square kilometres with a population of approximately 60 lakh in 2025. Yet Singapore has never concluded that its small size, economic success or peaceful foreign policy makes defence unnecessary. When Singapore became independent in 1965, it had only two infantry battalions consisting of about 50 officers and 1,000 soldiers, two ships and no air force. Recognising its vulnerability, it built the Singapore Armed Forces virtually from scratch and introduced compulsory National Service in 1967. Today, Singapore operates a technologically advanced military with modern F-15SG and F-16 fighters and has ordered eight F-35A and 12 F-35B stealth aircraft. Its defence expenditure has remained around 3% per cent of GDP, reflecting a sustained national commitment. Singapore’s defence policy rests on two complementary pillars: deterrence and diplomacy. Its government recognises that credible defence protects sovereignty and gives a small country the political freedom to act in its own interests. Defence planning is also integrated into civilian infrastructure. 59 underground MRT stations have been hardened to serve as public shelters, each accommodating approximately 3,000 to 19,000 people. Shelters are also located in residential blocks, schools, community centres and selected public developments. Singapore has prepared alternative runways as well. A 2.5-kilometre section of Lim Chu Kang Road can be converted into an operational runway. During Exercise Torrent in 2016, the road was transformed into an airstrip in about 48 hours, after which F-15SG and F-16 fighters conducted take-offs and landings. The first such exercise occurred in 1986. Singapore understands that airbases will be priority targets during war; therefore, its aircraft must be capable of surviving and operating from alternative locations.

Other countries like Switzerland, Finland and Sweden follow similar principles. These countries differ in geography, politics and strategic environment, but they share one understanding: national defence is not the responsibility of the military alone. It requires the preparedness of the state, economy, infrastructure and population. Defence is not only about tanks, ships and fighter aircraft. It includes food, fuel, medical supplies, communications, cyber protection, transportation, industrial capacity and public resilience.

Bangladesh must learn from these examples. We have a population exceeding 17 crore, extensive land borders and sovereign rights over a large maritime area in the Bay of Bengal. Our seaports, airports, industries, bridges, power plants, communication networks, offshore resources and exclusive economic zone – all require protection. Bangladesh’s position between South and Southeast Asia creates economic opportunities, but it also brings strategic competition and external pressure.

Military modernisation must therefore be treated as a permanent national responsibility. Bangladesh needs a balanced Army, Navy and Air Force; modern combat aircraft; layered air and missile defence; long-range and low-altitude surveillance radars; armed and surveillance drones; electronic and cyberwarfare capabilities; precision weapons; secure communications; maritime surveillance; and protected command-and-control facilities. Buying equipment alone, however, is not modernisation. Modernisation requires trained personnel, adequate ammunition, spare parts, maintenance facilities, simulators, realistic exercises and a sustainable budget covering the entire service life of each system. An expensive aircraft grounded for lack of engines or spare parts provides no deterrence. A missile without an integrated radar and command network cannot create an effective air-defence shield.

Bangladesh should identify selected highways that could be adapted for emergency aircraft operations. New expressways should, where technically feasible, include reinforced straight sections, removable dividers and unobstructed approaches. Protected aircraft shelters, dispersed fuel and ammunition storage, alternative command centres and rapid runway-repair units should be developed. Metro stations, underground parking facilities and major public buildings should also be assessed for possible dual use as civil-defence shelters. The country needs emergency warning systems, evacuation plans, first-aid training, firefighting capacity and regular national preparedness exercises. Such arrangements would be valuable not only during war but also during earthquakes, cyclones, industrial accidents and other disasters. The domestic defence industry is equally important. Bangladesh should gradually develop the ability to produce ammunition, drones, communication equipment, surveillance systems and selected military components. Maintenance, repair and overhaul facilities must be expanded so that imported platforms do not remain completely dependent on foreign technicians. Major procurement agreements should include technology transfer, local training, spare parts and long-term logistical support.

Defence expenditure must be transparent, professionally assessed and properly audited. Supporting modernisation does not mean supporting waste, corruption or unnecessary purchases. Every acquisition must be based on a realistic threat assessment, operational requirement and life-cycle cost. National security cannot be strengthened through unsuitable purchases motivated by political or commercial interests. 

Bangladesh seeks friendship with all and hostility toward none. That is a sound foreign policy principle. But friendship is not a substitute for preparedness, and hope is not a defence strategy. We do not have to choose between peace and strength. Credible strength is one of the foundations upon which lasting peace rests. Bangladesh must remain peaceful but prepared, friendly but not submissive, prosperous but protected, and always capable of defending its sovereignty and national interests.