A Five-Point ‘Dhaka Doctrine’ for New-Delhi

The current in India–Bangladesh relations call for a reassessment of India’s strategic approach towards Bangladesh. Dhaka has made an appropriate diplomatic environment a prerequisite for a possible visit to India while pressing for the extradition of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the return of suspects wanted in the killing of Sharif Osman Hadi. Dhaka increasingly emphasises sovereign equality, dignity, non-interference, reciprocity, and mutual interest, while India remains concerned that Bangladesh’s expanding strategic autonomy could adversely affect Indian security.

The central challenge is to distinguish security red lines from sovereignty red lines. India has a legitimate right to protect its security, while Bangladesh has an equal right to diversify its external partnerships, provided its territory is not used against India. Given Bangladesh’s strategic importance to India’s Northeast and the Bay of Bengal, however, neither side can afford sustained mistrust.

As India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar recently emphasised, durable bilateral relations must be grounded in mutual interest and reciprocity, rather than unilateral expectations. This principle provides a compelling basis for India to move beyond a “balance of threat” paradigm toward an approach grounded in reciprocal security, sovereign equality, strategic reassurance, and mutually beneficial interdependence.

Historical Roots of the Security Dilemma
India has rarely viewed Bangladesh simply as a sovereign neighbour. Since the East Pakistan period, New Delhi has assessed the territory through the lenses of migration, refugees, communal instability, Northeast security, insurgency, and competition with Pakistan and China. The 1971 intervention therefore served humanitarian, ideological, and strategic objectives, while the underlying perception of Bangladesh as a security variable persisted after independence.

This created a fundamental asymmetry of perceptions: India asks, “What does Bangladesh mean for India’s security?”, while Bangladesh asks, “What does India’s security policy mean for Bangladesh’s sovereignty?” This divergence has produced competing red lines and enduring mistrust.

India supported the broader Mukti Bahini but simultaneously helped create the Mujib Bahini, an armed force particularly loyal to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. This parallel policy, according to Avinash Paliwal, “created antinomies that laid the groundwork for deep-seated resentment against India in Bangladesh.” New Delhi’s preference for secular Bengali nationalism as a counterweight to Pakistan’s Islamic identity further shaped its strategic relationship with the Awami League. India’s close relations with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League reinforced perceptions of Indian influence over Bangladesh’s political trajectory.

After independence, this strategic orientation persisted, with India treating the Awami League as its preferred political partner and viewing nationalist and Islamist forces primarily through a security lens. The deeper problem, however, is structural: when India equates Bangladesh’s political alignment with its own security, Bangladesh perceives legitimate Indian security concerns as interference in its sovereign political choices.

From “Balance of Threat” to Mutual Strategic Autonomy
Viewed through Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat Theory, India’s response to Bangladesh’s strategic diversification is better understood as a problem of threat perception than demonstrated hostile intent. Dhaka’s growing engagement with China or Pakistan may be interpreted through India’s concerns over geography, China’s rise, and Pakistan’s rivalry, risking the conflation of Bangladesh’s strategic autonomy with anti-Indian balancing.
Such perceptions can reinforce a security dilemma: Indian efforts to limit external influence may encourage Bangladesh to diversify further, thereby deepening Indian threat perceptions. The key challenge is to distinguish strategic diversification from deliberate balancing against India.

Jaishankar’s emphasis on “mutual interest” provides a useful foundation. Genuine mutuality requires India to recognise Bangladesh as an autonomous strategic actor whose relations with China, Pakistan, and others constitute distinct bilateral choices, not extensions of Sino-Indian or Indo-Pakistani rivalry.

India should therefore respect Bangladesh’s sovereignty, political autonomy, territorial integrity, equitable water interests, trade, border security, and diversified partnerships, while Bangladesh recognises India’s legitimate security concerns. The objective should not be an India-aligned Bangladesh but a confident, strategically autonomous Bangladesh that regards stable and reciprocal relations with India as serving its own national interest.

A Five-Point “Dhaka Doctrine” for New Delhi
1.   Recognise Bangladesh’s Strategic Autonomy
New Delhi should explicitly distinguish Bangladesh’s strategic autonomy from strategic alignment against India. Dhaka has legitimate interests in maintaining relations with China, Pakistan, the United States, Japan, Gulf states, and other partners, just as India exercises strategic autonomy in its own foreign policy. Bangladesh’s external partnerships should therefore be assessed on their substantive security implications, not their symbolism. Diplomatic engagement, trade, or political dialogue with Pakistan or China should not, by themselves, be treated as threats. India’s genuine red lines should instead concern activities that directly endanger its security, sovereignty, or territorial integrity. This is the foundation of strategic reassurance.

2. Adopt Reciprocal 
Confidence-Building Measures
India should seriously consider Bangladesh’s request for the extradition of Sheikh Hasina and the return of individuals wanted in the Sharif Osman Hadi killing, and other killers absconded from Bangladesh. India should pursue confidence-building measures through a Strategic Stability Dialogue covering security, borders, maritime affairs, intelligence, cyber threats, and Northeast security; renewed engagement on Teesta and other water issues; reduced border fatalities; greater Bangladeshi market access; and expanded academic and youth exchanges. Together, these measures would strengthen relational capital.

3. End Regime-Centric Diplomacy
India should shift from government-to-government to durable state-to-state engagement. The Hasina era demonstrated the risks of overreliance on a single party or leader. India should therefore engage Bangladesh’s political institutions, opposition, civil society, business, academia, media, and professional sectors while maintaining political neutrality. Bilateral interests should remain resilient across changes of government.

4. Make Non-Interference Reciprocal
Sovereignty and non-interference must be reciprocal. Bangladesh should prevent its territory from being used against India’s security or territorial integrity, while India should ensure that its territory does not become a platform for political activities directed against Bangladesh’s government and state. Reciprocal restraint would strengthen mutual trust.

5. Separate Bilateral Relations from Third-Country Partnerships
India should not automatically equate Bangladesh’s relations with China, Pakistan, or other states with strategic hostility. Such partnerships should be assessed according to their concrete security implications, rather than through the broader prism of Sino-Indian or Indo-Pakistani rivalry. Genuine security threats should be addressed through dialogue and proportionate measures; legitimate strategic autonomy should be met with diplomacy rather than pressure.

India should reposition Indo-Bangla relations from a threat-centric paradigm toward reciprocal security, sovereign equality, strategic reassurance, and mutually beneficial interdependence. The objective is not an India-aligned Bangladesh but a strategically autonomous Bangladesh whose own national interests favour stable, reciprocal, and durable relations with India. Considering the asymmetric interdependences between these two asymmetric neighbours, India should seek to make its relationship with Bangladesh an economic and strategic asset for Bangladesh-- not a national burden.
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The writer is a 2026 Legislative 
Policy Fellow of the US Congress