July does not belong to those who threaten democracy

Two years after the July uprising, Bangladesh faces an uncomfortable paradox. A movement that mobilised citizens against authoritarianism is now being invoked by some of its self-proclaimed custodians to justify a politics of confrontation. The latest examples came from National Citizen Party (NCP) Convenor Nahid Islam and Jamaat-e-Islami Ameer Shafiqur Rahman, who warned of another uprising if their preferred constitutional reforms are not implemented by an elected BNP government led by Prime Minister Tarique Rahman.

More significantly, these warnings relate to a constitutional settlement that has yet to secure broad political consensus.

This is no longer merely political rhetoric. It reflects a growing tendency to present street mobilisation as an alternative to democratic negotiation. A government elected through a popular mandate cannot reasonably be expected to surrender its authority whenever a political group threatens another uprising over unresolved demands. The July uprising was not fought to replace one form of political pressure with another.

Nahid Islam, in particular, has increasingly presented the NCP as the principal guardian of the July legacy. This marks a notable departure from the image of a student movement that sought to challenge traditional politics of entitlement. The message now appears to be that unless the NCP’s preferred constitutional agenda is accepted, the country should prepare for renewed agitation.

That is not democratic persuasion. It risks becoming political pressure.

The similarity in the language used by the NCP and Jamaat-e-Islami is also striking. At a July 18 gathering in Barishal, Jamaat Ameer Shafiqur Rahman similarly suggested that constitutional reform should proceed according to their expectations or the country could face another movement. When political parties with different histories adopt comparable language of ultimatums, it inevitably raises an important question: are constitutional disagreements being resolved through dialogue or through political pressure?

Constitutions are not written under threats.

They emerge through compromise, parliamentary debate and broad national agreement. Once political actors imply that an elected government’s legitimacy depends on accepting their preferred constitutional formula, democratic competition itself risks being weakened.

This confrontational approach is not confined to speeches. It has also surfaced in political campaigns that critics argue may normalise intimidation. The recent “League Dhor” (“Catch the League”) programmes organised by Islami Chhatra Shibir at Dhaka University and Rajshahi University have attracted attention because of the message conveyed by the slogan itself. Political opponents in a democracy are expected to be challenged through debate, elections and institutions—not portrayed as targets to be pursued.

Whatever the organisers intended, such language risks blurring the distinction between political mobilisation and vigilantism. Coupled with repeated warnings of another uprising, it contributes to a political environment in which street power appears to be gaining greater legitimacy as a tool of political influence.

The irony is that the current constitutional dispute is rooted partly in the shortcomings of the process that produced the so-called July Charter.

From the outset, the Charter faced a fundamental challenge: it did not succeed in generating broad political consensus.

The National Consensus Commission, led by Dr Ali Riaz, faced criticism from the beginning for what many described as an exclusionary approach. Of Bangladesh’s 52 registered political parties, only 21 were formally invited to dialogue, alongside nine unregistered organisations. Consequently, many legally recognised political parties were excluded from discussions on constitutional reform. Critics regarded this as a significant weakness in a process intended to build a genuine “national consensus”.

The lack of consensus became even more apparent when several participating parties ultimately declined to sign the July National Charter in October 2025. Those refusing included the Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB), the Socialist Party of Bangladesh (BASAD), BASAD (Marxist) and Bangladesh JASAD. The NCP itself also initially withheld its signature.

A charter that failed to secure unanimous support even among participating parties naturally raises questions about the extent to which it could be presented as a nationally accepted consensus. Some critics argue that the charter effectively prolonged the broader political transition and delayed the electoral process. Statements from government leaders have reinforced that perception.

Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed told Parliament on April 30 that the government’s order implementing the July National Charter was legally questionable. He said the BNP had remained silent on many issues in the interest of holding elections and had agreed to sign the charter to prevent polls from being delayed under the pretext of reform.

Representing the BNP in the National Consensus Commission discussions, Salahuddin Ahmed also criticised the reform process, remarking that several intellectuals had “arrived from abroad carrying baskets full of miraculous reforms”, ultimately leading to the drafting of the July National Charter.

It should be remembered that the primary responsibility of any interim arrangement is to restore democratic continuity through credible elections. Sensitive constitutional questions require the participation, scrutiny and accountability of a parliament elected directly by the people.

The proposal to resolve unresolved constitutional questions through a referendum has further complicated the debate. While referendums can be valuable democratic instruments, they are not substitutes for political compromise. Complex questions concerning executive authority, parliamentary powers, judicial independence and fundamental rights cannot easily be reduced to a simple “yes” or “no” vote without oversimplifying public opinion.

Attempting to build consensus through a referendum after political negotiations have failed is unlikely to resolve deep divisions. Referendums work best when political negotiations have already produced a broadly accepted framework. In a highly polarised political environment, they are unlikely to create consensus on their own.

The broader challenge after July concerns not only constitutional reform but also the contest over ownership of the uprising itself. Because the student movement was not visibly affiliated with any single political party, competing groups have sought to portray themselves as its principal inheritors. A popular uprising built on the sacrifices of ordinary citizens has consequently become the subject of political competition.

This sits uneasily with Bangladesh’s political history, where major national movements have traditionally emphasised collective sacrifice rather than partisan ownership. The July uprising cannot belong exclusively to any one party, ideology or generation.

Yet the NCP has at times appeared to suggest that criticism of its proposals amounts to opposition to the July movement itself. Such an approach risks narrowing the democratic space for legitimate disagreement. Democratic movements belong to all citizens; they are not the exclusive property of any political party.

Political developments since July have also created new forms of polarisation. While many welcomed the emergence of the NCP from the Anti-Discrimination Student Movement, others questioned the rapid transformation of the movement’s most visible leaders into leaders of a conventional political party.

Questions have also been raised over whether those who promised to transform Bangladesh’s political culture have themselves become drawn into some of the same patterns of power politics and patronage they once criticised.

The NCP’s perceived closeness to Jamaat-e-Islami has likewise prompted debate about its commitment to inclusive politics. Calls to permanently exclude certain groups from politics, together with attempts to reinterpret aspects of Bangladesh’s 1971 Liberation War, have generated disagreement even among many political leaders. Any party seeking to represent a new political culture will inevitably face scrutiny over its alliances and values.

Meanwhile, attacks on minority communities, cultural institutions and incidents of mob justice during the post-July period have heightened public concern. Those claiming to uphold the legacy of July were widely expected to play a leading role in defending pluralism, the rule of law and civil rights.

Another concern is that representatives of a movement originally launched against privilege and nepotism have themselves faced allegations of misconduct, including the misuse of political influence. Such allegations, whether proven or otherwise, have inevitably affected public confidence.

The greatest risk is that the moral authority of a historic movement may gradually diminish if its language is employed more for political advantage than for democratic reform.

Against this backdrop, repeated warnings of another uprising appear less like preparations for genuine mass mobilisation than an attempt to exert political pressure after failing to secure an electoral mandate. No political party has a veto over Bangladesh’s constitutional future. Nor does any group possess exclusive ownership of the democratic aspirations of its people.

No one has the moral authority to threaten instability simply because an elected government declines to adopt a particular political agenda. If advocates of constitutional reform genuinely believe they enjoy broad public support, the democratic path remains open: contest elections, secure a parliamentary majority and pursue reforms through constitutional procedures. That is how democratic systems are intended to function.

Calling for another uprising whenever political negotiations fail is not a substitute for democratic politics. The greatest departure from the spirit of July would not be disagreement over reform, but any suggestion that street power should take precedence over the ballot box and Parliament as the ultimate source of political authority.

Bangladesh needs constitutional reform through an inclusive, democratic and elected process—not pressure politics carried out in the name of revolution.

Speaking at a discussion titled “Bloody July: Context, the Debt of Blood, and Bangladesh’s Future” at the National Press Club in Dhaka on 19 July, Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed observed: “The spirit of July cannot be exploited for political gain indefinitely. July does not belong to any one individual or party. Instead of using this movement for political interests, everyone should act responsibly to realise its original aspirations.”