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Since the end of the Cold War, successive American administrations have repeatedly redefined Asia’s strategic geography in response to changing distributions of power. Under Barack Obama, the traditional “Asia-Pacific” framework gradually evolved into the broader “Indo-Pacific”, reflecting mounting concerns over China’s rise and the growing strategic importance of India. During Donald Trump’s first administration (2017-2021), the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) became the organising principle of US strategy in Asia, emphasising maritime security, strengthened alliances and the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The 2017 National Security Strategy formally identified China as a strategic competitor, while the declassified US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific envisioned closer cooperation among the United States, Japan, Australia and India to preserve the regional balance of power.
Yet developments during Trump’s second presidency have revived debates about whether Washington is gradually moving beyond the Indo-Pacific paradigm towards a more transactional and narrowly conceived Asia-Pacific order centred on direct bargaining with Beijing. Discussions surrounding a possible US-China “G-2” have reopened fundamental questions about the future of American strategy in Asia: whether coalition-building and alliance management will remain the foundation of regional order or whether Washington increasingly favours selective accommodation through great-power diplomacy. While the institutional architecture of the Indo-Pacific remains intact, Trump’s own strategic instincts marked by scepticism towards multilateralism, preference for bilateral negotiations and emphasis on economic reciprocity have introduced an element of uncertainty into US policy.
The Trump administration has not abandoned the Indo-Pacific strategy, nor has it articulated a coherent alternative centred on US-China co-management. Rather, American policy appears characterised by strategic ambivalence: a tension between preserving the coalition-based logic that gave rise to the Indo-Pacific and pursuing a more transactional relationship with China. The result is not the emergence of a fully formed Asia-Pacific order but an increasingly contested and transitional strategic landscape whose future contours remain uncertain.
Trump’s Strategic Worldview and the Limits of the Indo-Pacific
Although Trump’s first administration institutionalised the Indo-Pacific concept, Trump himself has remained sceptical of alliances and multilateralism, favouring transactional diplomacy and direct negotiations among major powers. As Tai Ming Cheung’s analysis of the 2025 National Security Strategy shows, the administration has combined military deterrence in the Indo-Pacific with efforts to cultivate a “mutually advantageous” economic relationship with China.
Recent discussions at the Observer Research Foundation similarly suggest that Trump 2.0 marks a shift from internationalism toward nationalism and burden-sharing, with Washington expecting allies to assume greater security responsibilities while adopting less confrontational language toward Beijing. Meanwhile, crises in the Middle East and elsewhere have raised doubts about whether the Indo-Pacific remains America’s foremost strategic priority, fuelling concerns among regional allies, particularly Japan, about a possible US-China “G-2”. Nevertheless, despite leadership-level uncertainty, the Quad continues to function in areas such as technology, maritime security, supply chains and humanitarian cooperation.
The Absence of a Coherent Asia Strategy
Kurt Campbell, one of the principal architects of the Indo-Pacific strategy, in a discussion at the Hoover Institution, suggested that Trump views China less as an ideological adversary than through the prism of shifting power balances and great-power bargaining.
Campbell observed that Chinese leaders increasingly believe that “the correlation of power” has shifted against Washington, partly because American attention has been diverted by crises in Iran and the broader Middle East. More significantly, Campbell implied that Trump’s administration lacks an overarching strategic framework comparable to the Indo-Pacific strategy developed during earlier administrations.
Although Campbell reaffirmed the importance of alliances and partnerships, he acknowledged that such cooperation persists “even if a current overarching strategy is lacking”. His remarks revealed a central contradiction in Trump’s Asia policy: while the institutional architecture of the Indo-Pacific remains intact, the president’s instincts favour summit diplomacy and direct negotiations with Xi Jinping.
Campbell nevertheless insisted that the United States cannot manage competition with China alone. America’s long-term position, he argued, depends on sustained cooperation with allies such as India, Japan, Australia, and Southeast Asian states. His comments suggest that Trump has not replaced the Indo-Pacific with a coherent Asia-Pacific alternative but instead presides over a transitional and internally contested strategy.
Signs of an Emerging Asia-Pacific Turn
Several developments suggest that the Indo-Pacific consensus is weakening. The costs of strategic competition with China, including trade wars, technological restrictions, and military modernisation, have increased significantly.
Research indicates that US containment policies have accelerated China’s technological self-sufficiency and strengthened indigenous innovation ecosystems. China’s proposal for a World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization reflects Beijing’s ambitions to shape emerging institutions alongside, or in competition with, Western-led frameworks.
Questions about American reliability have also intensified. The Munich Security Report 2026 describes the Indo-Pacific as an arena characterised by overlapping competition, economic interdependence, and institutional fragmentation rather than simple bipolar rivalry. Similarly, analyses in Le Monde and the Financial Times argue that U.S. military commitments in the Middle East have strained resources and weakened confidence among allies.
The Pentagon’s recent decision to remove “Indo” from “Indo-Pacific” terminology as symbolic evidence of a broader strategic shift. Trump’s second administration increasingly favours deal-making and direct engagement with Beijing, thereby replacing coalition-building with great-power management. Although the Quad remains active, its agenda has shifted toward relatively noncontroversial areas such as supply chains and emerging technologies. As Brahma Chellaney notes, the danger lies not in the formal collapse of alliances but rather in the gradual erosion of their strategic rationale.
The future of American strategy in Asia remains uncertain. The Indo-Pacific continues to shape military planning, alliance networks, and institutional arrangements, and there is little evidence that Washington has decisively abandoned the strategic architecture constructed over the past decade. At the same time, President Donald Trump’s foreign-policy instincts, characterised by scepticism towards traditional alliances, preference for bilateral bargaining, and inclination toward direct engagement with China, have revived debates over the possibility of a more accommodationist US-China relationship.
The evidence examined here suggests that the United States has not yet embraced a coherent Asia-Pacific strategy to replace the Indo-Pacific framework. Rather, Washington appears caught between two competing visions of regional order: one rooted in coalition-building, deterrence, and the management of Chinese power through alliances, and another grounded in transactional diplomacy and great-power bargaining. Trump’s approach to China reflects not a complete strategic realignment but a persistent ambivalence over how American power should be exercised in Asia.
Consequently, the central issue is not whether the Indo-Pacific will disappear, but whether the alliance-based logic that produced it can coexist with an increasingly leader-driven and transactional approach to Beijing. The answer will shape not only the future balance of power in Asia but also the broader evolution of the international system. Whether the current moment represents a temporary period of adjustment or the beginning of a more fundamental transformation in American grand strategy remains one of the defining geopolitical questions of the coming decade.
The writer is a 2026 Legislative Policy Fellow of the US Congress