Shadow Network of Illicit Armsin CHT and Regional Security

An uncomfortable truth is repeatedly emerging in South Asia’s security landscape. Illicit arms and separatism never remain confined within defined borders. Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), India’s northeastern region, and the border areas of Myanmar have today evolved into a complex, interconnected security zone where history, geopolitics and weak border management have created prolonged instability. The rise of armed insurgency in CHT during the 1980s marked a significant starting point of this crisis. Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS), established in 1972, and its armed wing, the Shanti Bahini, gradually transformed into an organised guerrilla force. According to various studies and international observations, the conflict from 1976 to 1997 resulted in approximately 8,000 to 10,000 deaths and displaced hundreds of thousands of people. The role of regional powers in this prolonged conflict has been widely debated, particularly allegations regarding training and logistical support in border areas.

At that time, India’s northeastern states – Tripura, Mizoram and Nagaland – were heavily militarised to address their own internal security challenges. In this context, large stockpiles of arms and ammunition were accumulated in border regions. According to intelligence analyses and security experts, a portion of these weapons entered CHT through smuggling networks, significantly enhancing the operational capability of the Shanti Bahini. Among the commonly used weapons were 7.62 mm calibre rifles and SLRs (self-loading rifles). The long-term operations of the Bangladesh Army in Chittagong Hill Tracts – particularly during the 1980s and 1990s – played a crucial role in suppressing these armed activities. Alongside military efforts, avenues for political resolution were also opened. The 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord is widely regarded as a turning point in this conflict. However, the withdrawal of over 200 military camps and the resulting administrative vacuum created opportunities for the emergence of new armed groups, such as the United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) and, more recently, the Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF). The peace accord has remained controversial for various reasons, including concerns over constitutional inconsistencies, and its full implementation has not been achieved. Therefore, a comprehensive assessment of the agreement has become essential.

The situation has become even more complex due to internal instability in Myanmar. Following the military coup in 2021, many border regions of the country have effectively fallen outside state control. This vacuum has led to the emergence of an “open market for arms”, where insurgent groups from South and Southeast Asia can easily procure weapons like AK-series rifles, rocket launchers and modern ammunition in these areas. The cultural and ethnic affinity – Kuki population of Manipur and the Bawm, Pangkhuya and Lusai communities of CHT belong to the broader Zo ethnic group – has facilitated cooperation among separatist groups. Security analyses suggest that when security forces of one country conduct operations, these groups often cross borders and seek refuge in neighbouring territories.

Smuggling networks form a key pillar of this system. Due to rugged terrain, weak surveillance and close cross-border ties among local communities, a strong smuggling corridor has developed. Weapons entering through the Myanmar border move into CHTs via Manipur, and vice versa. This network is further reinforced by the narcotics economy, particularly opium cultivation. Recent operations in Alikadam border area of Bandarban led to the destruction of significant opium fields, highlighting the expansion of the region’s criminal economy.
Therefore, the security reality surrounding CHT, Manipur and Myanmar represents a “transnational security complex”, where instability in one country rapidly spills over into another. In such a scenario, unilateral military action or stricter border enforcement alone cannot provide a sustainable solution. Instead, it demands a multidimensional, coordinated and long-term strategy.

Firstly, regional cooperation must move beyond formal diplomatic rhetoric to become operational and effective. It is essential to establish a trilateral security framework among Bangladesh, India and Myanmar, incorporating regular joint meetings, hotline communication and real-time intelligence sharing. While limited bilateral cooperation has existed in the past, it is insufficient for the current complex environment. Identifying border “hotspots” and initiating joint surveillance or coordinated patrols could be practical steps forward.
Secondly, since the rugged terrain of CHT and India’s northeastern region weakens traditional border control methods, modernisation of border management is now a necessity of the time. It is not enough to merely increase manpower; rather, borders must be effectively monitored through technology-driven surveillance such as drones, satellite imaging, ground sensors and smart fencing. Without “technology-driven border management”, it is nearly impossible to prevent smuggling and illegal infiltration.

Thirdly, intelligence sharing must be made deeper and more trust-based. In the current reality, separatist groups can rapidly shift their positions and take shelter across borders. As a result, conducting effective operations based solely on the limited information of national intelligence agencies becomes extremely difficult. A joint intelligence coordination cell could be established, where information regarding terrorist networks, arms trafficking routes and sources of financing is shared in real time.

Fourthly, an important dimension of this crisis lies in its economic and social context. Border communities – often deprived of development and excluded from state services – frequently become involved in smuggling or illicit activities for their livelihood. Therefore, strengthening security measures alone will not suffice; rather, sustainable development, job creation and the expansion of education and healthcare services are essential to integrate these populations into the mainstream. The concept of “security with development” is highly relevant in this regard.

Fifthly, the current instability in Myanmar has become the central axis of this entire crisis. Due to internal conflict and administrative breakdown, many of its border regions have effectively turned into “no-man’s land”, serving as safe havens for insurgent groups and arms traffickers. In this situation, international and regional initiatives such as efforts by ASEAN or the United Nations to find a political solution can play a crucial role in resolving the crisis.

Finally, political will is the key driving force behind this entire process. History has shown that if any state, for short-term strategic gains, indirectly tolerates or encourages instability, the long-term consequences are severely negative. The current reality in South Asia serves as a reminder of that lesson. The current situation in South Asia exemplifies this “boomerang effect”, where networks of arms supply and training developed in the past have now turned into threats for every state. Unless mutual trust, cooperation and the concept of collective security replace suspicion and competition, this “shadow war” may gradually evolve into a broader regional crisis. It is imperative that the government accords this issue the highest priority and takes necessary measures in the interest of national security.
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The writer is a retired Major General, former military diplomat, security and political analyst, and author. He can be reached at [email protected]