Asymmetric Interdependence vs Quest for Strategic Autonomy

Bangladesh’s quest for strategic autonomy faces a structural obstacle: its deep interdependence with India operates within a relationship marked by unequal economic resources, geographic advantages and political leverage. Although cooperation with India is essential for Bangladesh’s prosperity and security, the terms of that cooperation can restrict Dhaka’s freedom of action when access to water, markets, electricity and regional connectivity depends heavily on decisions made in New Delhi. The problem is not interdependence itself, but the unequal distribution of power within it.
In international relations, asymmetric interdependence describes a relationship in which both parties need one another, but one can better withstand the costs of disruption. The more vulnerable party consequently has less bargaining power, even when both formally possess sovereign equality. Bangladesh’s relationship with India illustrates this dilemma. India surrounds Bangladesh on three sides, shares 54 rivers with it and remains a major source of industrial inputs, essential commodities and electricity. These connections create opportunities for cooperation, but they also expose Bangladesh to decisions over which it has limited control.
An October 2026 analysis by the National University of Singapore’s Institute of South Asian Studies identifies that political tensions persist, yet material interdependence in water, trade and energy continues to compel bilateral engagement. Bangladesh cannot eliminate this geographic reality. It must, however, confront the political and economic vulnerabilities that arise when essential national interests depend on an unequal partnership.
Water diplomacy most clearly exposes the consequences. The 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty is scheduled to expire on 12 December 2026, creating an urgent test of whether bilateral cooperation can accommodate Bangladesh’s downstream vulnerability. The treaty established a framework for sharing dry-season flows at Farakka, but climate change, growing demand and changing river conditions have intensified concerns about whether existing arrangements can provide adequate long-term protection.
Certainly, there is reported uncertainty surrounding renewal, including Bangladesh’s demand for stronger guarantees and political opposition within India. Meanwhile, research in Water International finds that India-Bangladesh cooperation on transboundary water data remains narrow and reactive despite the countries sharing 54 rivers. The study, based on 28 expert interviews and documentary evidence, identifies persistent asymmetries in access to information and cooperation. 
These findings reveal a deeper problem than disagreement over water allocation. When the upstream country has greater control over river flows and related information, the downstream country’s food security, livelihoods and ecological stability become partly dependent on the upstream country’s decisions. Bangladesh needs a renewed Ganges treaty with predictable allocations, transparent monitoring, year-round hydrological data sharing and credible dispute-resolution mechanisms. Without such safeguards, formal bilateral cooperation may continue while substantive vulnerability persists.
Trade reveals a comparable imbalance in economic bargaining power. Bangladesh benefits from proximity to India’s large market and relies on Indian cotton, yarn, industrial materials and other inputs. Yet these commercial ties coexist with a substantial trade deficit and recurring disputes over access to the Indian market.
Figures attributed to Bangladesh’s National Board of Revenue put imports from India at approximately $10.96 billion in fiscal year 2025-26, compared with exports of $1.75 billion. Although a deficit alone does not establish unfairness, the imbalance highlights the importance of improving export competitiveness and reciprocal market access.
Recent negotiations provide more direct evidence of the difficulties Bangladesh faces. At the 8-9 October 2026 meeting of the Bangladesh-India Joint Working Group on Trade, Dhaka sought the removal of restrictions at Indian land ports, the withdrawal of anti-dumping duties affecting Bangladeshi jute products and continued preferential access following its anticipated graduation from least-developed-country status. 
These demands suggest that geographic proximity does not automatically translate into equal commercial opportunity. Bangladesh’s dependence on Indian inputs can support domestic production, but restrictions on its exports can limit the benefits it derives from the relationship. The risk is that Bangladesh remains an important market for Indian goods without securing equivalent opportunities for its own producers.
Dhaka must therefore pursue enforceable market-access commitments, transparent customs procedures and effective mechanisms for resolving trade disputes. It must also diversify exports, improve industrial productivity and develop regional value chains. Any proposed Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement should be assessed against measurable gains for Bangladeshi businesses and workers. Without stronger domestic competitiveness and reciprocal access, trade integration may reinforce existing asymmetries rather than reduce them.
Energy dependence further narrows Bangladesh’s room for manoeuvre. Electricity from Adani Power’s Godda plant accounted for 15.6 per cent of Bangladesh’s electricity supply in the final quarter of 2025, even as domestic gas production declined and electricity demand rose. Cross-border electricity imports can be economically necessary and beneficial. The strategic concern is the concentration of essential supply in a limited number of external sources, particularly when long-term contracts create financial obligations that are difficult to escape. 
Dhaka should diversify supply, expand economically viable renewable energy, improve transmission infrastructure and strengthen regulatory scrutiny of power-purchase agreements. Hydropower cooperation with Nepal and Bhutan could widen regional options, although such arrangements would still require effective transit and transmission links. The objective should be to reduce exposure to supply concentration and unfavourable contractual terms, not to abandon electricity trade with India. Disputes over migration, border enforcement and the treatment of Bangladeshis can deepen public distrust when the two governments operate with unequal political expectations. 
Bangladesh must avoid replacing dependence on India with dependence on China or another external power. Every partnership should be assessed according to its economic value, fiscal sustainability, technological benefits and implications for national security. Regional cooperation through BIMSTEC and stronger connectivity with China, Nepal and Bhutan could expand Bangladesh’s options, but only if these initiatives produce practical alternatives rather than additional commitments without corresponding benefits.
Ultimately, Bangladesh’s India dilemma is not whether to cooperate with its geographically indispensable neighbour, but whether it can do so without surrendering the freedom to make independent strategic choices. Achieving strategic autonomy requires stronger institutions, independent technical expertise, reliable economic and hydrological data, coordinated policymaking, parliamentary scrutiny of major agreements, and a more diversified productive economy. 
Through enforceable agreements, transparent negotiations, economic diversification, and credible regional partnerships, Bangladesh can reduce the vulnerabilities that allow asymmetric interdependence to constrain its policy options. The objective is not confrontation with India, but a more balanced relationship in which mutual dependence produces reciprocal benefits rather than disproportionate leverage. For Bangladesh, strategic autonomy means ensuring that geography necessitates cooperation with India but does not dictate the terms on which its sovereignty is exercised.

The writer is a 2026 Legislative Policy Fellow of the US Congress