Restoring Army Readiness after Prolonged Deployment

Bangladesh Army has carried a prolonged burden of deployment outside its cantonments in aid of civil power. Whatever the immediate necessity that originally justified this deployment, its duration and consequences deserve serious examination. A national army cannot remain indefinitely engaged in civilian law enforcement without creating risks for its training, operational readiness, institutional culture and relationship with the public. The government and Army command must now give priority to recovery, professional consolidation and the restoration of normal military routines. The timeline should be stated accurately. The nationwide deployment began in July 2024, and Reuters reported that the military was withdrawn from nationwide duties on 15 June 2026, before a further limited deployment in six districts later that month. It is therefore reasonable to describe the principal deployment as lasting nearly two years, rather than precisely twenty-four months. Whether it was the longest comparable deployment in Bangladesh’s history requires a fuller examination of historical records. Its exceptional duration, however, is sufficient reason for concern. 

There is also an important distinction between speculation about another “Operation Clean Heart” and an announced government decision. On 1 October 2026, Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed stated that no formal decision had been taken to launch a joint operation and that there was no plan for an operation similar to Clean Heart. He said coordinated law-enforcement activities would continue and be intensified. That clarification should be acknowledged. Nevertheless, the public discussion provides a timely opportunity to consider the dangers of renewed dependence on the Army for routine internal security. The central concern remains valid: after such prolonged employment, the Army needs a protected period to restore training, maintain equipment, assess readiness and address the pressures experienced by its personnel. This is a matter of national defence. An infantry unit occupied with law-and-order duties is not necessarily receiving the training required to operate effectively alongside artillery, engineers, armour and supporting services. The disruption of training is more than a theoretical concern. In March 2026, the home minister himself acknowledged that the Army’s extended field deployment was disrupting training schedules and creating other internal issues.

The government and Army command should therefore examine the actual effects of deployment rather than assume either that everything remains satisfactory or that the institution has suffered uniform damage. Assertions that discipline, moral values or the command structure have deteriorated across the Army require evidence. The appropriate response is an honest professional assessment of training deficiencies, disciplinary trends, equipment condition, personnel fatigue and operational readiness.

The formal command structure may remain intact while its practical operation becomes more complicated. Officers deployed among civilian authorities may receive requests from administrators, police officials, political figures and local influential persons. Some requests will be legitimate; others may be inappropriate. Without clearly defined responsibilities, personnel can face uncertainty about priorities and authority. There are also risks to ethical standards. Arrests, searches, disputes over property and dealings with alleged criminals expose personnel to sensitive situations involving fear, money and competing interests. Most soldiers may discharge these duties honestly, yet even isolated misconduct can harm the wider institution.

Morale deserves equal attention. Extended deployment can mean interrupted leave, separation from families, uncertain schedules and sustained exposure to confrontation. Personnel may feel that their professional development has been postponed while expectations placed upon them continue to expand. Officers and soldiers need rest, predictable routines, training opportunities and confidence that their primary military responsibilities remain valued. Recovery must address these human needs alongside equipment and operational requirements. The Army’s public image is especially vulnerable during prolonged policing duties. In a politically divided society, an action taken against one group may be portrayed as favouring another. An arrest may provoke accusations of bias; restraint may be described as weakness. Soldiers can become associated with disputes they did not create and policies they did not determine. Repeated exposure to this environment risks weakening the broad public trust on which a national army depends.

The personnel who carried out lawful duties under difficult conditions deserve recognition. Many faced demanding circumstances and considerable personal risk. Their contribution should not become an excuse to impose an indefinite burden upon them. Appreciation must include responsible decisions about the duration and nature of their employment. The history of Operation Clean Heart offers a warning about the consequences of military involvement in crime-control campaigns. The operation in 2002-03 was followed by grave controversy over treatment of detainees and the provision of indemnity. In its 2015 judgement, the High Court declared the indemnity law unconstitutional and allowed affected persons to seek legal remedies. This history demonstrates why lawful conduct, judicial oversight and accountability cannot be replaced by promises of immunity.

A forceful anti-crime campaign may create an immediate impression of action, but lasting public security depends on investigation, evidence, prosecution, fair trials and effective institutions. Military deployment cannot by itself repair weaknesses in police leadership, criminal investigation, witness protection or the justice system. If civilian institutions remain deficient, withdrawing troops may expose the same problems again. Repeatedly call upon the Army to postpone the reforms that would reduce the need for military assistance. The government should therefore make civilian law-enforcement recovery an urgent priority.

For the Army, recovery should involve a structured programme based on the needs of each formation and unit. It should include restoration of training cycles, equipment inspection and maintenance, replenishment of essential resources, personnel welfare and independent assessment of readiness. Lessons from the deployment should be recorded, including lessons about lawful force, civilian coordination and command supervision. Deficiencies should be corrected without turning the review into a search for convenient scapegoats. There should now be a strong presumption against fresh, broad or prolonged Army deployment for ordinary law-and-order purposes. War and external defence must remain its primary focus. Genuine national emergencies, including catastrophic disasters or an exceptional collapse of civilian capacity, may still require military assistance. Such exceptions must be narrowly justified and must not become a route back to routine dependence. Any unavoidable deployment should have a defined purpose, limited scope, clear authority, regular review and an achievable withdrawal plan.