China’s Global Security Initiative: Principles, Practice and Bangladesh

In his Daily Sun article of October 25, “Standing Together for Security, Joining Hands for a Shared Future", Dr Liu Yuyin, China’s Chargé d’Affaires in Dhaka, presents the Global Security Initiative (GSI) as a framework for common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security. Its central proposition is appealing: national security should not be pursued at the expense of other nations. At a time of armed conflicts, geopolitical rivalries and economic fragmentation, this vision deserves serious consideration. Yet the credibility of any security initiative ultimately depends less on its declared principles than on the institutions, conduct and measurable outcomes through which those principles are implemented.
Proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2022, the GSI emphasises sovereignty, territorial integrity, peaceful dispute resolution and adherence to the United Nations Charter. Its recognition of nontraditional threats, including cybercrime, food insecurity, climate change and natural disasters, broadens security beyond military considerations. For developing countries, these threats can be as consequential as armed conflict. Dr Liu appropriately highlights the peacekeeping contributions of China and Bangladesh, alongside opportunities for cooperation against transnational crime and emerging security risks.
Nevertheless, diplomatic endorsement should not be confused with institutional effectiveness. Dr Liu cites support from more than 130 countries and organisations and the initiative's incorporation into more than 140 bilateral and multilateral documents. These figures indicate diplomatic acceptance, but not necessarily enforceable commitments. The GSI remains a Chinese policy initiative rather than an internationally negotiated collective-security institution with agreed enforcement mechanisms. Its practical significance must therefore be judged by whether cooperation produces credible dispute resolution, transparency, accountability and improved security outcomes.
The principle that one country's security should not undermine another's is morally compelling but operationally complicated. States frequently disagree over what constitutes a legitimate security concern. Territorial disputes, competing maritime claims, military alliances and strategic rivalries expose the distance between diplomatic aspirations and geopolitical realities. The central challenge is not securing agreement on attractive principles but establishing credible procedures for reconciling conflicting national interests. Without such mechanisms, common security risks remaining an aspiration rather than an enforceable international commitment.
Sovereignty presents another dilemma. Respect for territorial integrity protects weaker states against coercive interference, yet strict interpretations of noninterference can complicate responses to humanitarian crises extending beyond national boundaries. Bangladesh's prolonged Rohingya refugee crisis illustrates this tension. China's diplomatic engagement with Myanmar and Bangladesh could contribute meaningfully to a resolution, but diplomatic participation should not be mistaken for diplomatic success. The relevant measure is progress toward safe, voluntary and sustainable repatriation under conditions protecting the rights and security of displaced people. A security framework earns credibility when its principles improve the circumstances of those most exposed to insecurity.
Dr Liu also highlights the strengthening of China-Bangladesh relations following Prime Minister Tarique Rahman's visit to Beijing in June 2026. The joint communiqué envisages closer strategic dialogue, defence exchanges, military training and peacekeeping cooperation, alongside broader regional economic engagement. These arrangements may offer important opportunities. Yet they also raise questions about financial commitments, technological dependence, strategic expectations and the preservation of independent foreign-policy judgement. Agreements should be evaluated not merely by their diplomatic significance but by their long-term consequences for Bangladesh's national interests.
This brings into focus an important dimension receiving comparatively limited attention in Dr Liu's article: the economics of security. Political stability, predictable international relations and effective institutions shape investment, production, trade and economic growth. Armed conflicts disrupt supply chains, raise transportation and insurance costs, discourage capital formation and divert scarce public resources from productive development toward defence and emergency expenditures. Security is therefore not simply a political objective; it is an economic condition for prosperity.
A developing economy may possess abundant labour, expanding capital and improving technology, yet remain below its productive potential when insecurity undermines confidence and institutional effectiveness. Security strengthens economic performance by reducing uncertainty, protecting productive assets and enabling resources to generate greater output. Conversely, external insecurity can amplify domestic institutional weaknesses, making an economy more vulnerable to capital flight, disrupted investment and declining productivity. The economic value of security cooperation consequently extends beyond military preparedness to the preservation of productive capacity and developmental opportunities.
However, security cooperation is not economically costless. Defence procurement, infrastructure commitments and technological partnerships involve opportunity costs because resources devoted to one objective cannot simultaneously finance competing priorities. Moreover, arrangements that improve immediate security may create longer-term dependence when domestic technical expertise, maintenance capabilities and institutional capacity remain underdeveloped. The appropriate economic test is therefore the net contribution to national welfare, including the capabilities acquired, alternatives forgone and future obligations incurred. Security cooperation should strengthen national capacity rather than substitute external dependence for domestic weakness.
For Bangladesh, these considerations are especially important because sovereign equality under international law does not eliminate asymmetries in economic and strategic bargaining power. China offers substantial opportunities in trade, infrastructure, technology and defence cooperation. India remains indispensable because of geography, regional connectivity and shared security concerns. The United States, Japan and other advanced economies are important markets and sources of investment and technology. Emerging partnerships, including potential defence-industrial cooperation with Türkiye, further illustrate the value of diversification. These relationships need not be mutually exclusive, although managing competing expectations requires diplomatic skill and economic resilience.
Bangladesh's objective should not be mechanical equidistance among major powers but strategic autonomy grounded in national interests. Cooperation is desirable where interests converge; disagreement must remain possible where they diverge. Strategic autonomy does not require isolation, nor does it mean neutrality on every international question. It requires the institutional capacity, economic strength and diplomatic judgement to make independent decisions without disproportionate external pressure.
China, like every major power, seeks an international environment compatible with its security and economic interests. Western security arrangements likewise combine collective objectives with national strategic calculations. Neither should be judged exclusively by declared intentions. The relevant standards are consistency with international law, respect for sovereign equality, peaceful settlement of disputes and demonstrated restraint in exercising power.
Dr Liu's article makes a constructive contribution by emphasising cooperation over confrontation and identifying opportunities for China-Bangladesh collaboration. Its argument would be more persuasive with greater recognition of the tensions between national interests and collective security and of the economic consequences accompanying strategic commitments.
Ultimately, the credibility of any global security initiative rests on its demonstrated effectiveness in reducing insecurity, resolving disputes and protecting sovereign choice. Shared security is a desirable objective, but it does not imply identical strategic interests. For Bangladesh, the ultimate test is not what powerful nations promise, but what cooperation enables the country to achieve without compromising its sovereignty, development priorities or freedom of choice.

The writer is a former physicist and nuclear engineer at the BAEC and Professor Emeritus of Economics at Eastern Michigan University, USA. He can be reached at [email protected]