Hasina Cannot Be the Sum Total of Bangladesh’s India Policy

There is no question that Bangladesh has a legitimate interest in seeking the return of Sheikh Hasina. Dhaka has formally requested her extradition, and India says the request is being examined under its legal procedures. The issue is politically and emotionally charged, and the government is entitled to pursue it vigorously.

But there is a more fundamental question that Prime Minister Tarique Rahman's government must answer: Should the entire Bangladesh-India relationship be held hostage to the fate of one individual?

It should not.

Yet the recent handling of the India file by Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman and Foreign Affairs Adviser Humaiun Kobir—both inducted into their positions as technocrats—suggests that the Hasina question is increasingly overshadowing the much larger relationship between Bangladesh and its most important neighbour.

That is dangerous strategic shortsightedness.

The problem is not that Khalilur and Kobir are raising the extradition issue. They should. The problem is failing to separate one contentious political and legal matter from the many areas where Bangladesh and India must continue to work together.

Trade, energy, water, border management, counterterrorism, connectivity and regional commerce cannot simply be put on hold until New Delhi decides what to do about Hasina.

Foreign policy is the management of competing national interests—not the pursuit of one objective at the expense of all others.

Bangladesh cannot negotiate with geography

The first reality the government must confront is geography. India surrounds Bangladesh on three sides. No amount of political rhetoric can change that.

Bangladesh's economic relationship with India is also more complex than the headline trade deficit suggests. In FY2024-25, bilateral trade stood at $11.39 billion, with Bangladesh importing $9.62 billion and exporting $1.76 billion. The resulting $7.86 billion deficit is a legitimate concern, but the imports include food, industrial raw materials and other inputs essential to Bangladesh's economy.

The textile industry illustrates the point.

Bangladesh imported 12.15 lakh tonnes of yarn in 2024, worth about $3 billion, with around 95 percent coming from India. Local exporters have cited competitive prices, large consignments and, crucially, shorter delivery times as reasons for relying on Indian supplies.

This is not simply a question of finding another supplier.

Bangladesh's garment industry competes globally on price and lead time. Cotton, yarn or fabric may be technically substitutable, but sourcing from distant markets means higher freight costs, longer lead times and greater inventory requirements. At a time when Bangladesh is already struggling to remain competitive, deliberately adding to those costs would be economic self-harm.

There is another complication. Bangladesh's textile industry itself is under pressure from imported yarn, particularly from India. The Bangladesh Textile Mills Association has complained about competition and low gas pressure, while BGMEA has warned that restricting yarn imports could create shortages, increase costs and threaten employment.

This is why trade policy cannot be reduced to nationalism. Bangladesh must protect domestic industry where justified while preserving the competitiveness of its export sector. That requires evidence-based policy, not blanket hostility towards Indian commerce.

The energy crisis makes confrontation more dangerous

The timing of the government's tougher posture towards India is particularly unfortunate because Bangladesh is already facing an energy crisis.

Textile millers have recently sought Prime Minister Tarique Rahman's intervention as gas shortages reportedly cut production in some mills by almost half. The primary textile sector, with roughly $25 billion in investment, is already under pressure from gas shortages, high financing costs and other constraints.

Bangladesh's industrial economy needs dependable gas and power, affordable fuel and a stable operating environment. Factories cannot operate at full capacity without reliable energy; exporters cannot meet global delivery schedules if production is interrupted; and investors will not commit capital where basic infrastructure remains uncertain.

At a time when Bangladesh is struggling to revive investment, contain costs and restore competitiveness, the government can ill afford policies that make energy, trade or industrial inputs more expensive or unpredictable.

The irony is striking. At a time when anti-India rhetoric is gaining political currency, Bangladesh still needs practical cooperation with India on fuel and energy.

This is where slogans collide with the responsibilities of government.

It is easy for opposition politicians to demand that Bangladesh "teach India a lesson". It is much harder for a government to explain to a factory owner why production costs have risen or a shipment has been delayed because relations with a neighbouring country have deteriorated.

The Jamaat-NCP trap

There is a political dimension that the BNP government needs to understand clearly.

Jamaat-e-Islami and the National Citizen Party have increasingly occupied political space around a muscular nationalist narrative on India. Their alignment gives them an opportunity to portray the BNP as insufficiently nationalist whenever it seeks pragmatic engagement with New Delhi.

This creates a trap for the BNP.

The opposition can afford maximalist rhetoric. The government cannot.

Jamaat and the NCP do not have to keep Bangladesh's factories running, secure gas supplies, maintain power generation, negotiate water with India or keep border trade moving.

The BNP does.

That distinction is critical.

There is nothing wrong with nationalism. Bangladesh has every right to defend its sovereignty and national interests. But there is a difference between nationalism and jingoism.

Nationalism asks: What is best for Bangladesh?

Jingoism asks: Who can shout loudest against India?

The first is statecraft. The second is electoral theatre.

The danger is that the BNP, under pressure from its ultra-nationalist flank, could start competing with Jamaat and the NCP on their preferred terrain. That would be a mistake.

If the BNP becomes more confrontational towards India merely to avoid accusations of being soft, it could end up adopting policies that damage the very economic interests for which it will ultimately be held responsible.

Turning every domestic problem into an India problem

The ultra-nationalist narrative has another political advantage: it can turn complicated domestic problems into a simple foreign-policy story.

Gas shortages? Blame India.

Trade difficulties? Blame India.

Inflation? Invoke Indian influence.

Hasina's continued presence in India? Proof, supposedly, that the government has failed to defend Bangladesh's sovereignty.

Such narratives are politically attractive because they simplify complex problems.

But Bangladesh's economic difficulties are far too deep and structural to be attributed to one neighbouring country. The gas crisis reflects years of underinvestment, supply constraints and weaknesses in energy planning; the banking crisis is rooted in governance failures, bad loans and regulatory weaknesses; industrial competitiveness is constrained by high costs, infrastructure bottlenecks and productivity problems; inflation has multiple domestic and external causes; and weak investment confidence reflects policy uncertainty, financing constraints and broader institutional weaknesses.

India may affect some of these pressures. It cannot credibly be made the explanation for all of them.

The government's task is to solve these problems, not allow every frustration to become another episode in the India debate.

The BNP has the most to lose

An excessively hostile India policy is ultimately more dangerous for the BNP than for its political opponents.

If relations deteriorate and this contributes to higher import costs, disrupted supply chains, weaker investment or reduced connectivity, the consequences will eventually reach ordinary Bangladeshis.

Factories will face higher costs. Exporters may lose competitiveness. Consumers may pay more. Workers may lose jobs. Businesses may postpone investment.

At that point, voters will not necessarily ask whether the government was sufficiently tough on Sheikh Hasina. They will ask why their economic circumstances have not improved.

The BNP cannot govern Bangladesh through opposition-style politics. It now has to manage a country of more than 170 million people, with all the economic and security pressures that entails.

The government's responsibility is not to win every nationalist argument. It is to protect Bangladesh's national interest.

Khalilur and Kobir need to restore strategic balance

Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman should be particularly careful about allowing the Hasina issue to define the bilateral relationship. His own references to the need to address "irritations" in Bangladesh-India relations suggest an understanding that the relationship has broader problems requiring attention.

That is the right starting point.

Dhaka should continue demanding Hasina's extradition and make its legal and diplomatic case forcefully. But simultaneously, it must keep the broader relationship functioning.

There is no contradiction between pursuing extradition and negotiating trade, demanding justice for Hasina and discussing energy, or objecting to border incidents while expanding legitimate cross-border commerce.

Diplomacy is precisely about managing such contradictions.

The same responsibility falls on Humaiun Kobir. An adviser should understand domestic political sentiment, but his more important responsibility is to advise the prime minister about the consequences of policy choices.

The crucial question is not whether a particular India policy sounds popular today. It is whether that policy leaves Bangladesh stronger five or ten years from now.

If confrontation raises manufacturing costs, complicates connectivity, weakens security cooperation, makes water negotiations harder and narrows Bangladesh's diplomatic options, the government must explain what strategic gain compensates for those costs.

So far, that case has not been convincingly made.

Water cannot wait for Hasina

The most obvious example is water.

Bangladesh and India share 54 transboundary rivers. Water-sharing and river management require sustained negotiations, technical cooperation and political engagement. These are matters affecting agriculture, livelihoods and the environment.

Renewal of Ganga Water Treaty cannot sensibly be subordinated to the extradition question.

The same applies to border management and counterterrorism. Whatever the political disagreements between Dhaka and New Delhi, both countries have a shared interest in combating trafficking, smuggling, militant networks and other transnational threats.

Weakening those channels in pursuit of political leverage would be a poor bargain.

Bangladesh needs diversification, not confrontation

There is a legitimate argument that Bangladesh should reduce excessive dependence on any single trading partner.

It should.

Bangladesh should expand commercial relations with China, Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, the Gulf and other markets. It should develop alternative sources of raw materials, strengthen domestic manufacturing and improve ports and logistics.

But diversification is not substitution.

No Chinese, Japanese or Turkish policy can change Bangladesh's geographical relationship with India.

If Bangladesh wants to become a regional logistics and connectivity hub, it needs functional relations with the country through which much of its practical access to Nepal, Bhutan and India's Northeast must run.

The objective should therefore be strategic diversification without strategic antagonism.

Bangladesh First cannot mean Hasina First

The BNP's "Bangladesh First" principle should now be put to the test.

Bangladesh First means protecting the competitiveness of Bangladeshi factories, ensuring adequate energy, keeping borders secure, negotiating water, expanding regional connectivity and maintaining access to neighbouring markets.

It means dealing with India firmly wherever Bangladesh's interests require it.

It also means maintaining strong relations with India, China, Japan, the United States, Europe and other partners.

And yes, it means continuing to seek Sheikh Hasina's extradition.

But Bangladesh First cannot mean Hasina First.

The former prime minister's case is important. It cannot, however, become the organising principle of Bangladesh's foreign policy.

The BNP should resist the temptation to compete with Jamaat and the NCP in anti-India rhetoric. It should not allow its India policy to be dictated by fear of being labelled insufficiently nationalist.

A government must have the courage to be pragmatic.

Prime Minister Tarique Rahman's government has already spoken of the need for a "conducive environment" to advance Bangladesh-India relations. That instinct should be strengthened, not weakened.

The way forward is not to abandon the extradition demand. It is to compartmentalise it.

Pursue Hasina firmly—but pursue Bangladesh's interests simultaneously.

Keep trade channels open. Protect supply chains. Secure energy. Negotiate water. Maintain border and counterterrorism cooperation. Expand connectivity. Engage New Delhi at the highest political level.

Above all, refuse to allow domestic political competition to turn every bilateral issue into a test of patriotism.

Jamaat and the NCP can afford jingoism because they can remain outside the consequences of government policy.

The BNP cannot.

The opposition can afford the rhetoric. The government has to pay the bill.

Bangladesh therefore needs an India policy that is neither submissive nor belligerent, but hard-headed, pragmatic and relentlessly focused on national interest.

Sheikh Hasina's extradition can be pursued without putting Bangladesh's economy, security and strategic future at risk.

The BNP should understand that before its political opponents persuade it otherwise.