Manpower Export: Corruption At Every Step – Part IV
BMET: A hub of irregularities
Special Correspondent, Dhaka
Published: 14 Dec 2025, 12:00 AM
Illegal and risky sea-route migration has risen sharply in recent years, and experts say the surge is tied directly to widespread irregularities in Bangladesh’s manpower export system.
Key public institutions, including the Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET) and BOESL, have effectively surrendered control to a powerful group of private recruiting agencies.
According to investigators, agency owners and a group of insiders within these institutions have created a system where rules are routinely bypassed, workers are misled, and fraudulent documents are pushed through without scrutiny.
Despite numerous complaints, no meaningful action is taken, leaving the sector “in the grip of a corrupt syndicate,” as multiple migration experts describe it.
Inside BMET’s exit division
BMET’s exit division is meant to be a highly restricted zone, responsible for verifying employment contracts and issuing the mandatory clearance required for any worker leaving the country.
Public entry is prohibited, and every file is supposed to undergo careful review. Yet investigation shows that once office hours end, the restricted area becomes accessible to agency representatives.
They enter freely, sit in official chairs and process files themselves, often without the presence of BMET staff.
Evidence shows that in one instance, 79 files were approved in a single day. Clearance has also been issued using forged or altered passports, and agencies without approval for Saudi Arabia have nevertheless sent thousands of workers there.
The unrestricted access to BMET systems has raised concerns about data security, with officials warning that private actors regularly enter government servers and handle sensitive personal records without oversight.
Behind BMET’s façade of rules and controlled access, a parallel process thrives where syndicate members operate without fear of accountability.
Rules for some, immunity for others
On paper, BMET’s exit division has a detailed set of responsibilities. It must verify contracts, issue clearance, monitor agency activities, protect worker rights and preserve worker data.
It is also tasked with identifying fake documents and taking legal action whenever necessary. There is even a formal system for hearing complaints during designated hours.
In practice, these rules apply only to ordinary applicants and a few law-abiding agencies. For a select group backed by influential insiders, the rules are routinely ignored.
Members of the syndicate enter the restricted area freely, especially after official hours, and move their files through with little or no scrutiny.
Because several BMET officials are involved, internal oversight has become ineffective.
Many migrant workers continue to be deceived, while the integrity of official databases remains at risk.
Video evidence from inside BMET
Video footage recorded in July and August offers visible proof of these irregularities.
One clip shows Nurjahan Akter, managing director of T-20 Overseas (RL: 1415), walking out of the restricted division. She has multiple Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) cases against her.
Another video captures Md Rubel, managing partner of The Ifti Overseas (RL: 894), entering the area as a guard opens the door for him.
Rezaul Karim of Takwa Overseas (RL: 1945) is seen working inside the restricted room. Investigators say BMET activities are heavily influenced by Md Jamal Hossain of MS Makkah Overseas (RL: 1175) and Md Mizanur Rahman of Mizan Solution Service (RL: 2778).
Several of these agencies have sent hundreds of workers abroad without legal authorization.
Mizan Solution, for example, has no permission to send workers to Saudi Arabia but has nevertheless done so.
The investigation identified passport numbers linked to these irregular migrations, including A01209466, A1447443, A02842280, A03768483, A05090411, A05986278, A06574563, A07324087, A07991502, A08613560, A08619607, A08924359, A12482457, A15318790, A15672667, A16099690, A16120483, A16224547, A16493792, A16890228, EJE0833341 and EL0723201.
Who controls the syndicate
Investigators have named two central figures in the BMET syndicate: Nurjahan Akter of T-20 Overseas and Md Rubel of The Ifti Overseas.
Alongside operating their own agencies, they act as brokers for at least 50 others.
Nurjahan, once a third-class BMET employee, was dismissed after an ACC case involving fraud.
After losing her job, she reportedly strengthened her links within BMET and expanded her network for moving workers abroad through manipulated approvals.
Passport numbers tied to workers she sent illegally include A08438150, A13489175, A17951808, A17810690 and A17913497.
Rubel is described as a key accomplice who moves freely within the restricted area.
While legitimate agencies wait for days, Nurjahan and Rubel get dozens of approvals in a matter of hours.
On May 20 alone, 79 files from Nurjahan’s agency were approved.
On 17 March, 20 files from Ifti Overseas were cleared. Investigators also uncovered the use of fake or edited passports to send women workers abroad.
Related passport numbers include A11500637, A14704832, BR0869802, A17405551, AK0699345 and EK0251172.
ACC intervention
The ACC launched an enforcement operation at BMET on 29 May following complaints of document forgery and the trafficking of women workers.
Investigators found that agencies used fake passports to categorise women heading to the Middle East as “returnees,” helping them bypass official requirements.
BMET officers in collusion with agencies submitted clearance notes for nine fake passport holders without cross-checking the database.
They also attempted to approve clearance for four women under the age of 25, violating ministry guidelines.
Records showed offences under sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 109 of the Penal Code, along with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The ACC has since filed a case against nine individuals.
Experts warn of structural rot
Migration experts argue that BMET’s problems go beyond individual misconduct.
They describe corruption within the institution as “deeply embedded” and warn that without major structural reforms, the suffering of migrant workers will continue and public trust in the manpower export system will deteriorate even further.