The United Nations (UN) has warned that Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) may be trying to establish terrorist cells in Bangladesh. The key question is why Bangladesh appears attractive to the group now-- and whether its security environment contains the ingredients a clandestine network would need. The UN Security Council’s 38th report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, circulated on 10 August 2026, says AQIS is seeking to exploit Bangladesh to establish cells. It also attributes the November 2025 Red Fort attack in Delhi to AQIS. The Bangladesh warning therefore points to more than ideological interest: it concerns an organisation pursuing regional operational capability. AQIS has also told us what it wants.
After Sheikh Hasina’s ouster in August 2024, AQIS leader Usama Mahmoud issued a Bangladesh-focused statement through As-Sahab Subcontinent. VOX-Pol’s analysis found AQIS portraying the political upheaval as an opportunity and calling for Bangladesh to become “a centre and a preparatory ground for the Mujahideen of Islam.” The Khorasan Diary independently documented the propaganda. That is not proof of an operational cell. It is evidence of strategic intent. AQIS saw political disruption as an opening. And there was already an AQ-linked ecosystem inside Bangladesh.
Ansar al-Islam, also known as Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), has long been associated with AQIS. In 2024, the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), drawing on information from Bangladesh’s Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) unit and Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU), reported that the organisation was maintaining a cell-based structure, recruiting and training members, and attempting to establish cells across the country.
Authorities reportedly recovered three improvised explosive devices from a property used by Ansar al-Islam operatives and arrested suspects involved in recruitment and training. SATP also reported that the group maintained 100 to 150 websites, used social media for propaganda and recruited technology specialists through the Idratul Dawah Network (IDN).
That is a modern terrorist infrastructure built around recruitment, communications and technology. SATP also reported, citing CTTC, that Ansar al-Islam raised about Tk 1.8 million through the Deen Islam Foundation, an online fundraising initiative presented as humanitarian assistance for Palestinians. The amount was attributed to officials, but the case illustrates how an AQ-linked organisation could exploit digital platforms to mobilise resources. Then came the political vacuum.
The International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) assessed that the 2024 upheaval created a security vacuum marked by jailbreaks, escaped militants, looted weapons and a weakened police force. Its 2025 assessment argued that extremist groups exploited this environment to reorganise, recruit and increase their capabilities. That assessment is broader than AQIS, but it explains the attraction of Bangladesh: weakened intelligence, disrupted policing, accessible financing and online radicalisation create openings. AQIS was not alone in noticing them. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the regional branch of Islamic State, also directed propaganda at Bangladesh after the 2024 upheaval through the Al-Azaim Media Foundation. VOX-Pol found that both al-Qaeda and Islamic State propaganda treated the political transition as an opportunity.
The groups are rivals, but their parallel attention suggests Bangladesh had become a target across the transnational jihadist ecosystem.
There are also signs that militant networks can move from ideology to capability.
In December 2025, an explosion at the Ummul Qura International Madrassa in South Keraniganj led investigators to what RSIS described in February 2026 as an Islamic State-Bangladesh bomb-making facility. The site allegedly belonged to Sheikh Al Amin, a commander of Islamic State Bengal, also known as Neo-JMB. RSIS reported that high-grade explosives and materials for improvised explosive devices were recovered. This is not evidence of AQIS activity. But it demonstrates how militant infrastructure can remain concealed inside ordinary institutions until an accident or investigation exposes it. The regional dimension matters. AQIS was founded in 2014 as al-Qaeda’s South Asian branch, with ambitions across the subcontinent. RSIS has separately documented Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya (JAFHS), an AQ-centric Bangladeshi group that operated training camps in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
A functioning AQIS network could provide recruitment, financing or logistical support beyond Bangladesh. The strongest case for taking the warning seriously is the convergence of evidence. AQIS has expressed strategic interest. An AQ-linked organisation has demonstrated recruitment, training, digital outreach and fundraising. Researchers have documented security weaknesses since 2024. Islamic State has also targeted Bangladesh, while separate investigations show militant groups can rebuild operational infrastructure. The UN warning should therefore be treated as an early-warning signal.
By the time the threat is visible, it will already be too late. Bangladesh should strengthen intelligence cooperation, track terrorist financing, disrupt recruitment networks, and ensure counterterrorism agencies can detect reorganisation. The UN has offered Bangladesh something counterterrorism rarely gets: advance warning. Bangladesh should use it before that warning becomes a headline about an attack.
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The writer is a journalist at the Daily Sun