After the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s regime, the nation learnt two lessons concurrently: the citizens seek to vote freely and put an end to impunity. The student-led mass uprising in July-August 2024 paved the way to reform, but at the same time, it has opened the doors to the deterioration of the law-and-order situation and anarchy, which even the security forces could hardly check. The UN human rights office estimates that as many as 1,400 people had been killed during the 36 days of protests, most of whom were shot by security forces associated with the former government, which explained why accountability became a rallying cry. The vacuum thereafter caused a surge of vigilantism, revenge attacks and criminality as high as to torch police stations and kill police officers. Mob lynchings were on the increase as signs of a desperate state seeking a way back to its feet. Hence, the announcement of national elections (and a referendum on the July Charter) now seems to many like a lifeline back to institutional politics.

The political landscape has been radically altered. The exclusion of the Awami League has led to an inclusiveness issue; the high-profile re-entry of Tarique Rahman has been energising BNP followers; and the return to power of Jamaat-e-Islami and the sweeping victory of its student wing, Chhatra Shibir, in major campus unions has remapped the politics of youth. Against this backdrop, what agendas in the manifesto will actually determine this election?
The religious sentiment will be a very strong element, but the manner in which the parties will manage the sentiment might be decisive. The Supreme Court verdict to resuscitate the registration of Jamaat-e-Islami in 2025 made it a matter of course, and Chhatra Shibir wins in major campus unions like DUCSU, JUCSU, RUCSU and CUCSU made it clear that there is a surge of Islamist-aligned influence among students having access to elite campuses. However, it is also true that over the last two years, we have seen how easily identity rhetoric can turn violent, with minority groups bearing the brunt of victimhood and the vigilante onslaughts increasing as policing becomes lax. An electoral manifesto that appeals to faith-anchored values without demonising outgroups, that explicitly rejects mob justice and that makes a commitment to equal protection of all communities will almost certainly have an impact beyond core bases.
The image of political leaders and the media portrayal are core factors, particularly with a young electorate. In this regard, the homecoming of Tarique Rahman after 17 years of exile was crafted as an influential, televised narrative and immediately reframed the campaign optics of BNP just before the election. The parties that can align slick digital messaging with verifiable plans, whether it is on jobs, safety or rights, stand a higher chance to survive online.
The political relevance of anti-India sentiment at some points cannot be denied. Analysts examined the surging popularity of anti-India discourse with high-profile incidents and as their means to generate protests and delegitimise opponents. Certain Islamist and nationalist organisations have publicly attempted to market themselves by organising around this sentiment, gambling that it would “work” more with less aware audiences. However, manifestos relying too much on grievance geopolitics come at a risk: policy paralysis, investor jitters and turmoil in the country whose export-led model and energy security depend on a realistic approach in relations with all its major partners. The voters battered by inflation and blackouts can be compensated by straightforward foreign policy assurance, such as sovereignty but not isolation.
Legal or illegal “administrative support” has been too often a kingmaker in Bangladesh. The reality is that any such manifesto that does wink at illegitimate use of state leverage will only reinforce distrust that is already sky-high following the 2024 crackdown and the resultant security vacuum. Several reform commissions (judiciary, police, Election Commission, constitution) were launched by the interim government, but such progress has been neither even nor without controversy. Voters will evaluate the manifestos based on their details on independent policing, plausible prosecution of 2024-2025 abuses, transparent campaign finance and obvious punishments against meddling by any state apparatus. These are conditions to make the citizens believe that their vote will determine the electoral outcomes.
It is the trinity that makes decisions universally. By 2026, the economy had grown slowly, and the inflation rates remained high. Analysts warn of a further danger of load shedding unless dues are cleared and structural fixes implemented, suggesting domestic gas exploration, accelerated renewables and selective efficiency. It is not the first time voters have heard promises; they will seek specific plans on how to stabilise the prices and sectoral employment plans (garments, IT, agro-processing) and power sector reforms to reduce losses, eliminate opaque subsidies and keep the lights on.
Even the strongest policy planks can be discounted if people believe the contest is not open. The Awami League ban and the prosecution of its leaders have divided the opinion between accountability and pluralism. However, diaspora voting and long polling hours are the strategies to increase the participation. And the referendum on the July Charter on 12 February 2026 will force parties to take a side on institutional redesign. The diaspora vote (first time) and the turnout of young people, many observers argue, may be decisive, provided that the process is perceived to be fair.
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The writer is a doctoral student at Department of Political Science in
Texas Tech University and an Assistant Professor (On Leave) at
Department of Public Administration in the University
of Dhaka. He can be reached at [email protected]